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The aim of this research is to investigate the phenomenon of business 
method patents in Europe. Not only the issue of patentability of busi-
ness methods is discussed, but also the possible strategic use of these 
patents and patent applications is explored. For this purpose, a data set 
has been specifically created, including all the applications submitted in 
the class G06Q (namely data processing systems or methods, specially 
adapted for administrative, commercial, financial, managerial, supervi-
sion or forecasting purpose) at the EPO. A quantitative analysis of the 
data has been performed, revealing the huge volume of business meth-
od patent applications (more than 34,000) filed at the EPO over the last 
20 years. Equally, a continued interest of large companies in patenting 
business methods has been demonstrated. However, these empirical 
observations seem to be inconsistent with both the legal framework 
(most notably Article 52 EPC 2000 establishes that business methods 
are not patentable) and the low rate of acceptance of applications (only 
a small fraction of patents have eventually been granted) in the category 
of business methods at the EPO. All of this supports the hypothesis 
that firm demand for business method patent protection can be driven 
by strategic purposes, often resulting in inefficiencies in the market and 
reducing in competition. Hence, the research presented intends to high-
light overcoming inefficiencies, as well as possible antidotes provided by 
the EU competition law. On this purpose, some of the common practic-
es, such as hold-up or tacit collusion, are identified. At the same time, 
the beneficial effects of mutual licensing agreements are highlighted. In 
particular, the research examines the European legal framework on the 
technology transfer agreements. Their effectiveness in contrasting busi-
ness method patents’ strategic uses is analysed, particularly regarding 
reduction on competition. Based on this, the thesis argues ultimately 
that a wider opening in granting patent protection to business methods 
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In 1998, a relatively unknown company filed a patent application at the 
EPO seeking patent protection for a “Method and system for placing a 
purchase order via a communications network”.1 Admittedly, the inven-
tion was not easy to be classified. Indeed, it looked like one of those 
business methods considered not to be patentable, according to Article 
52 European Patent Convention (EPC). Nevertheless, the company ar-
gued that the method, which was computer implemented, represented 
an inventive technical contribution capable of simplifying and innovat-
ing the way to shop on the Internet. Facts proved that the company was 
right. The EPO, however, had a different opinion. Unlike other patent of-
fices around the world (such as USPTO, for example),2 the EPO decided 
that what Amazon described as a fundamental innovation in the way of 
trading was not an invention at all. Implementation by computer could 
not be enough, the EPO argued, to turn out a method already in use in-
to an invention worthy of patent protection.3 The EPO believed that 
such a clear statement would have resolved the problem, discouraging 
other firms to seek patent protection for business methods even if com-
puter-implemented. However, it did not. Conversely, patent applications 
similar to that of Amazon continued to be filed at the EPO, and not just 
a few of them were submitted. The EPO was flooded with patent appli-
cations regarding methods of doing business.4 How to deal with this 
situation? The EPO was on the horns of a big dilemma: favouring the 
new trend or maintaining a strict position? Eventually, the EPO worked 
out a compromise solution. A new reading of Article 52 EPC was offered. 
As such, patent protection was ultimately granted to business methods, 
																																																								
1  EP0902381/1998 “Method and system for placing a purchase order via a communi-
cations network” that was withdrawn. However a divisional application (EP1134680  
2001)  has been examined and refused  
2 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, T 1244/07 (1-Click/AMAZON) of 27.1.2011 at 
<http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t071244eu1.html> ac-
cessed 7th August 2017, para 27  
3 Ibid. para 23 
4 J Bessen, MJ Meurer, Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put inno-
vators at risk (Princeton University Press 2008)  
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whereby technical considerations, which were required to carry out the 
method, resulted in tangible technical effects.5  Therefore, not every 
computer-implemented business method could be granted patent pro-
tection in Europe. However, some of them were ultimately patented. 
 
Despite the fact that business methods are unlikely to receive patent 
protection at the EPO, companies have kept seeking patent protection 
for their business methods in Europe during the last 20 years. Data 
consistently reveals that patent applications relative to business meth-
ods have been profusely filed, even though it is almost sure that most of 
them will be refused. To further complicate the matter, the EPO has 
been left alone to deal with such a growing phenomenon. Over the 
years, neither the Conference of the EPC Contracting States nor the Eu-
ropean Union, to which most of the Contracting States are Member 
States, have provided clear guidance or indications on the issue of 
business method patentability. Even the proposal of a Directive on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions has been rejected,6 
especially due to raising doubts about the effect of granting patent pro-
tection to those subject matters. At that point the main question to 
answer became: could granting patent protection to business methods 
really spur innovation and implement economic growth, or rather it 
could ultimately result in strengthening market positions of same well-
known companies? This question is indeed the starting point of this re-
search.  
 
Financial derivatives as well as on-line banking or computer-
based auction systems are some of the most relevant innovative prod-
ucts burst on the scene with the digital revolution. Granting them 
patent protection has been presented has a fundamental step to secure 
development of these new technologies. Nevertheless, some influential 
																																																								
5 EPO, Case Law of the Boards of Appeal at <http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/caselaw/2016/e/clr_i_a_1_4_2.htm> accessed 3rd September 2017 
6 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions COM(2002) 92 (2002)  
OJEU C 151 E129  
	 11	
voices have raised concerns about the actual effect of it.7 Mounting 
fears have been expressed on possible inefficiencies in the market of 
business methods due to patents and patent applications. Similarly, re-
ducing in competition has been considered the potential negative 
consequence of a certain firms’ strategic attitude towards business 
method patents. Trying to understand whether all these concerns are 
justified, this research addresses the issue of business method patents 
both theoretically and empirically. In the first chapters, the develop-
ment of the EPO case law about the patentability of business methods 
is analysed. The discussion moves from the Vicom case to the recent 
conclusions of the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal, via the up and down 
of the relevant US Supreme Court’s decisions about business method 
patentability. Still using the doctrinal analysis approach, the thesis in-
vestigates then the possible economic effects of business method 
patents. According to the established point of view, patent protection is 
granted to spur innovation, encourage the spread of technical 
knowledge and facilitate transactions. Thus, granting monopolistic pre-
rogatives to inventors is usually related to ensuring economic growth. 
However, as subsequently discussed, no clear evidence has been pro-
vided that business method patents have produced any of the above-
described positive effects. Conversely, possible detrimental effects have 
been demonstrated referring to business method patents.  
 
As suggested by Shapiro in his seminal work, granting patent protection 
to business methods has resulted in encouraging the building of patent 
thickets.8 As such, uncertainty is strategically created on what it is pa-
tent protected and what it is not. Indeed, business methods are quite 
obvious inventions, thus copying them, as well as developing similar 
technologies, is easy and not costly. Nevertheless, the threat of being 
																																																								
7 TB Lee, ‘A Patent Lie’ NYT (St.Louis, 9 June 2007) quoting Bill Gates  (“ If people had 
understood how patents would be granted when most of today’s ideas were invented, 
and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today”) 
8 C Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stand-
ard–Setting’ (2001) 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 121 (“a dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights [especially of business method patents]…to 
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology’’)  
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involved in infringement litigations can be an effective deterrent to rivals 
and potential ones. Hence, causing uncertainty about the boundaries of 
patents can easily result in deterring competitors from copying the in-
vention, but not only. Indeed, patent thicket strategy can also affect 
competition in the market, whereby uncertainty is used to discouraging 
rivals to implement around a certain technology. Hence, Shapiro con-
cludes suggesting that business method patents could be used 
strategically to impede rivals to enter the market, thereby reducing, or 
even worst, eliminating competition.  
 
Based on Shapiro’s insight on the rapid growth of interest for business 
methods, this research investigates whether patent thicket strategy is 
put in place also at the EPO, trying to understand what kind of ineffi-
ciencies affect business method patent arena in Europe. For this 
purpose, a database has been specifically created, including all the ap-
plications submitted in the class G06Q (namely data processing 
systems or methods, specially adapted for administrative, commercial, 
financial, managerial, supervision or forecasting purpose) at the EPO. In 
particular, the study utilizes a quantitative approach to investigate the 
extent of the phenomenon of business method patents and patent ap-
plications at the EPO. Both number of applications over time and 
names of major applicants were identified. Then, the network of cita-
tions between patents and its projection into the network of citations 
between firms were constructed and analysed, in order to explore 
whether some strategies could be hidden behind the popularity of busi-
ness method patent applications at the EPO.  
 
Without wanting to spoil the findings of the investigation, some of the 
results of the empirical analysis seem to confirm the main concerns on 
the possible development of patent thicket strategy in Europe. Neverthe-
less, is it sure that granting patent protection to business methods 
would fatally mean preventing or lessening competition? On the pur-
pose of addressing this issue, the final chapters of the thesis are 
devoted to analyse the interface between patent protection and competi-
	 13	
tion law. The possible clash between IP rights and antitrust rules have 
taken on particular interest in the EU context, according to the peculi-
arities of the European Union. In particular, the completion of the 
Single Market has been of critical importance both in the development 
of the EU competition law and in the recognition of IP prerogatives 
framed by the Member States and the EPC. As such, a specific set of 
rules has been established, namely the Technology Transfer Block Ex-
emption Regulation (TTBER), which intends to balance pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive effects resulting from licensing agreements, specif-
ically mutual licensing agreements. Based on the analysis of the TTBER 
and the Technology Transfer Guidelines (TT Guidelines), the thesis is 
ultimately aimed at understanding whether the European competition 
law provides useful means to contrast those detrimental effects, namely 
hold-ups, tacit collusion and raising rivals’ costs schemes, which are 
common outcomes of practices such as patent thickets. If this is true, 
i.e. if the current EU legal framework on competition offers effective 
means to contrast the strategic use of business method patents and pa-
tent applications, then the conclusions of this thesis would be that 
there is no reason to be concerned about granting patent protection to 
business methods.  
  
Chapter I 
What is a business method? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This introductory chapter aims to explain why business methods have 
long been regarded as non-patentable, despite the fact that they are one 
of the most popular and widely debated subject matters in the Europe-
an Patent Office (as well as outside Europe).1 Article 52 (2) EPC includes 
“schemes, rules and methods for doing business” in the list of what is 
outside the scope of patentability; nevertheless, business methods have 
regularly been granted patent-based protection. To understand what it 
is seems to be an explicable anomaly, the patentability of business 
methods needs to be put into an historical perspective. On this pur-
pose, this chapter will briefly analyse some of the most relevant decision 
on this issue, thereby summarising the main argument typically advo-
cated against the patentability of business methods.  
 
An historical overview is indeed necessary to enhance the understand-
ing of the phenomenon of business method patent in Europe and 
whether any doubts can be cast on the proper extent of granting patent 
protection to this subject matter. Although this study will focus primari-
ly on the European Patent System, this chapter will draw heavily on the 
US literature and jurisprudence since the US patent system, as a result 
of its size and seniority, plays a crucial role in influencing the develop-
ment of EU legal and technical understanding of what amounts to a 
patentable invention. Therefore, to examine the patentability of busi-
ness methods against the backdrop of the relevant normative context, 
																																																								
1 E Archontopoulos, ‘Spot the difference: a computer implemented invention or a soft-
ware patent?’ (6th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association, Brussels, September 
2011) <www.epip.eu/conferences/.../ARCHONTOPOULOS%20Eugenio.pdf> accessed 
25 February 2014  
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both the US and the European law and practice will be taken into ac-
count.  
 
The chapter is organized into three parts. The first part is concerned 
with the concept of business methods and will provide, motivate and 
discuss the definition that will be adopted throughout this work. The 
second part will explain why business methods had not been patented 
until about twenty years ago and to this end will place a special empha-
sis on the role played by the lack of physicality and technicality of 
business methods. The third part will then investigate the role played 
by recent computational and technological advances in the patent sys-
tem, and particularly in the patentability of business methods.  
 
 
2. Business methods: a definition 
 
Even if the notion of “business methods” has a rather intuitive meaning 
and interpretation, finding a proper and widely accepted definition is a 
challenging task.2 Broadly speaking, business activities can include all 
the economic, organizational, managerial and financial activities that 
normally take place within both the manufacturing and service indus-
tries.3 Thus, business methods can in principle refer to a number of 
modes for doing business, including methods of marketing, accounting 
and finance, methods of trading as well as creating, entering, and oper-
ating in new markets, and methods of advertising and organizing 
customer service.4 As a result of the vagueness of the concept, defining 
																																																								
2 S Wagner S, ‘Business method patents in Europe and their strategic use : evidence 
from franking device manufacturers’ (2008) 17 Econ. Innov. New Techn. 173,173,  
3 JR Allison, SD Hunter, ‘On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technolo-
gy at a Time: The Case of Business Methods’ (2006) 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 731 
(“The most obvious kinds of practices that fall within the common understanding of 
the term "business method" include those relating to advertising, shopping, sales, 
purchasing, financing, insurance, human resources activities, and specialized forms of 
communication within and between firms”) 
4  IPO Manual of Patent Practice (2014) <www.ipo.gov.uk/practice-sec-001.pdf> ac-
cessed 25th February 2014, part I, 1.26; DF Spulber, ‘Should Business Method 
Inventions be Patentable?’ (2011) 3 Journal of Legal Analysis 265, 269 (“business 
method invention is the discovery of a commercial technique for firms to address mar-
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whether an invention is a business method has been considered de-
manding5. Moreover, for this reason the lack of patentability of business 
methods, often documented either in the US or in Europe has made this 
issue even much more difficult to understand.  
 
An attempt to overcome this problem was made by the U.S. Congress 
that, summarising the rulings of the US Patent Office and Courts on 
this subject matter, 6 suggested 
 
business methods refers to […] a method of: (a) administering, 
managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise or organisa-
tion, including a technique used in doing or conducting 
business […] (b) processing financial data; [ or ] any technique 
used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills7 
Thus, for example, it was considered business method either a method 
of book keeping for detecting and preventing tax evasion8 or a mode of 
keeping account for insuring against excessive losses for bad debts9. Al-
so, among business methods were included the methods for cash 
registering and account checking for securing hotel and restaurant 
properties from losses by peculations of waiters10 and methods of ar-
																																																																																																																																																																		
ket opportunities, such as a transaction procedure, market microstructure, financial 
system, operational process, or organizational form.”)  
5 BH Hall, ‘Business And Financial Method Patents, Innovation, And Policy’   (2009) 56 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society 443, 445  
6 DJ Kappos, JR Thomas, RJ Bluestone, ‘A Technological Contribution Requirement 
for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy’ (2008) 6 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 152, 163; JJ Love, WW Coggins ‘Successfully Preparing and Pros-
ecuting a Business Method Patent Application’ (2001) 2 
<www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/aiplapaper.rtf> accessed 25th   February 2014  
7 House Bill 5364 IH (106th Congress)- Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 
2000 <www.techlawjournal.com/cong106/patent/bus_method/berman.asp> accessed 
22 February 2014. Most recently, a new definition has been provided in the Obama’s 
American Invest Act (AIA), which has become law on September 16, 2011. “On the 
purpose of this Section  “covered business method patent” (CBM) means a patent that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other 
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product 
or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” 
Section 18. Transitional program for covered business method patents. 
8 Ex Parte Abraham 1869 Dec. Comm’r  pat 59 
9 United States Credit System Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co. 53 F. 818, 819 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1883) 
10 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. 160 F. 467, 469-72 (2d Cir. 1908) 
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ranging automobiles for an unobstructed view of a drive-in screen or 
stage11. Moreover, systems of fighting fires using standardized and in-
terchangeable fire fighting apparatus 12 as well as methods of recording 
stock transaction were regarded as business methods.13 Finally, busi-
ness methods also included the positioning of printed matter on bank 
checks and stubs14 and methods of pricing merchandise with a coded 
label.15 
 
Similarly, useful clues about defining innovative business methods were 
provided by the European Patent Office and the European National Pa-
tent Offices. As suggested by the EPO, business methods are 
concerned more with interpersonal, societal and financial rela-
tionships, than with the stuff of engineering - thus for 
example, valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing 
among candidates for a job, etc.16 
EPC Contracting State17 patent office and court practices have suggest-
ed that a business method could include a method of improving 
customer service by bar-coded banking materials18 or a scheme allow-
																																																								
11 Loew’s Drive-In Theatres Inc. v. Park-In Theatres Inc. 174 F.2d 547, 553 (1st Cir. 
1949) 
12 In re Patton 127 F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942) 
13 In re Wait 73 F.2d 982, 982-83 (C.C.P.A. 1934) 
14 In re Sterling 70 F.2d 910, 911 (C.C.P.A. 1934) 
15 In Re Howard 394 F.2d 869, 870 (C.C.P.A. 1968) 
16 EPO ‘Appendix 6 Examination of «business method» applications’ (Report on Compara-
tive Study Carried Out Under Trilateral Project B3b, 2000) < 
http://ladoc.ffii.fr/appendix6.pdf> accessed on the 23rd June 2017 (“Claims for busi-
ness methods can be divided into three groups: (1) claims for a method of doing 
business in abstract, i.e. not specifying any apparatus used in carrying out the meth-
od; (2) claims which specify computers, computer networks or other conventional 
programmable digital apparatus for carrying out at least some of the steps of the 
business method ("computer-implemented business methods"); (3) claims which speci-
fy other apparatus (perhaps in addition to computers) e.g. mobile telephones") 
17 On October 1977, the EPC contracting states were: Belgium, Germany (then West 
Germany), France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Now-
adays, the EPC Contracting States are all member states of the EU plus Albania, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. Here and in the fol-
lowing chapters “Europe” intents to refer to the countries where EPC has been entered 
into force. 
18C Waelde, G Laurie, A Brown, S Kheria, J Cornwell, Intellectual Property: Law and 
Policy, (3rd edn, UOP 2013) 415, citing Good News Pty Ltd's Application (BL 
O/124/84) 
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ing prisoners to exchange sentence time for corporal punishment19. 
Business methods were also systems of collecting tax by delaying inher-
itance20, a method of advertising by hooking leaflets on exterior door 
handles21 and a method for exploiting areas above train power lines.22 
However, almost all of these methods were qualified as non-patentable. 
In what follows I will explain what motivated the decision.    
 
3. How the story began: the non-patentability of business methods 
 
As suggested in the Introduction, even if the subject of this research is 
the European Patent System, an overview of the non-patentability of 
business methods needs to examine the US patent law and practice. 
The US patent system, for seniority and size, plays a crucial role in the 
understanding of the subject matter. The analysis will start from the 
American patent system as both the USPTO practice and the Court’s ju-
risprudence are crucial for understanding why business methods are 
non-patentable, or more precisely why they were not regarded as pa-
tentable for a long time. Then, the European Patent system will be 
investigated; especially the differences between Europe and the US on 
the non-patentability of business methods will be underlined. 
 
3.1 A historical overview 
It was Thomas Jefferson’s opinion that  
It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation 
of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed an 
exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one 
thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it 
is the action of the thinking power called an idea23.  
																																																								
19 Ibid. 415, citing Melia's Application (BL O/153/92)  
20 IPO (4) 1.26, citing Spedding's Application (BL O/96/99)  
21 Corte App. Torino, 7 November 1988 [1989] Giur. Dir. Ind, 187 
22 Cass. Civ sez.I,  2 April 2004 n.7597 [2006] Riv. Dir. Ind, 345  
23 T Jefferson, ‘Letter to Isaac McPherson Monticello, 13 August 1813’ 
<http://pwp.detritus.net/works/writings/no_patent_on_ideas.html> accessed 15 
January 2014; A Mossoff, ‘Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
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Drawing upon this principle, the U.S. Constitution granted the Con-
gress the power  
[…] to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries24.  
Hence, the US Code, chapter 35, section 101 declared  
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
fore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.25 
As a matter of fact, the broad language used in the section reported 
above left the Courts with the responsibility to define the limits of using 
patents to secure protection and, in reality, a number of different argu-
ments were suggested to draw a clear line between patentable and non-
patentable subject matters.26 Considering that the patent law was in-
troduced to protect the invention incorporated in physical objects, the 
main conclusion of the Courts was that ideas or theories, like discover-
ies, ideas, or mathematical algorithms, were not patentable27. Thus, 
from these perspectives28, only machines and devices were patentable, 
as the patent system aimed to protect technology rather than mere ab-
stractions. Up to no more than twenty years ago, business methods 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Re-evaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context’ (2007) 92 Cornell Law Re-
view 953 
24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25 Patent Act 1952 - 35 U.S.C. § 101; also Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1 (1790) identi-
fied statutory subject matter as “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or 
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.”. 
26 DL Hayes, ‘What the General Intellectual Property Practitioner Should Know about 
Patenting Business Methods’ (1999) Fenwick & West LLP 4 
<www.fenwick.com/fenwickdocuments/general_ip_practitioner.pdf>accessed 15 Jan-
uary 2014  
27 GS Fine, ‘To Issue or Not to Issue: Analysis of the Business Method Patent Contro-
versy on the Internet’ (2001) 42 BCL Rev 1195, 1199 
28 RP Merges, ‘As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. LJ577, 581 
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were also deemed pure concepts, and “vaporous and intangible”29 . 
Thus, they were excluded from patentability in the US,30 and on the 
grounds of the same reasoning, also in Europe.31  
 
3.2 Arguments against the patentability of business methods 
Two main arguments were raised to support the claim that business 
methods are not a patentable subject matter.  
3.2.1 Business methods as intangible abstractions  
First, it was pointed out that business methods were no more than in-
tangible abstractions, so that they could not fall within the “useful arts” 
in the sense contemplated by the US Constitution.32 Based on Jeffer-
son’s opinion, it was strongly asserted in the US patent system to 
proscribe patenting of abstract ideas in view of the fact that exclusive 
property of ideas had to be accepted only when it was needed to ensure 
the progress of science and technology. 33 By this line of reasoning, a 
patent could have been granted only in those specific areas where the 
assignment of an exclusive right, i.e. the creation of a temporary mo-
nopoly, were the best way to ensure the development of the technique.34 
 
However, Courts and scholars soon realized the difficulties of identifying 
such areas. The expression “useful arts”, already mentioned in the Pa-
tent Act, was taken into consideration with the purpose to identify the 
technological area. But, what meaning could have been attributed to 
																																																								
29 J Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. Times (New York, 12 March 2000)<www. nytimes. 
com/2000/03/12/magazine/patently-absurd.html”> accessed 16 January 2014 
30 [ie] Hotel Security Checking Co (10) 470, In re Patton (12) 327  
31C. Waelde et al. (18) 415  
32 BC Wright, ‘Business Method Patents: Are There Any Limits?’ (2002) 2 J. Marshall 
Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 30, 40 
33 SJ Marsnik, RE Thomas, ‘Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter Sands: Does 
Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem?’ 
(2011) 34 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 242; DL Burk, ‘The Role of Patent Law in 
Knowledge Codification’ (2008) 23 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1009, 1010. More on this issue 
on Chapter 3   
34 See O’Reilly v. Morse 56 U.S. 62 (Supreme Court 1853), 133 
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the concept of “useful arts”?  With regard to this issue, the United 
States Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA)35 ruled that 
  
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of oper-
ational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is 
that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance 
with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 
‘useful arts.36  
Moreover,  
The phrase 'technological arts,' as we have used it, is synony-
mous with the phrase 'useful arts' as it appears in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.37  
The message was clear: the only arts that could be considered useful 
were the technological ones. Hence, the Court established a strict iden-
tity between what is useful and what is technological. However, it did 
not solve the problem entirely.38 The attempt to identify useful arts as 
the technological ones, such as those that required an industrial im-
plementation or the application of some technical devices, merely 
shifted the problem of the definition to another concept equally difficult 
to circumscribe39; thus, doubts still remained on what was to be re-
garded as technological.  
 
Forthwith, liberal arts, social sciences and theoretical mathematics 
were defined as non-technological arts and excluded from patentability 
for their lack of physical consistency. It made no difference if they were 
practical and useful 40. Nevertheless, the requirement of “technologicali-
																																																								
35 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is the predecessor of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which was established during the reform of the judicial 
system in 1982  
36 In re Musgrave 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), 893 
37 In re Waldbaum 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972),1003  
38 Wright (32) 40  
39 Ibid. 41; JR Thomas ‘The Patenting of the Liberal Professions’ (1999) 40 BCL Rev 
1139,1164  
40 Thomas (39) 1145  
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ty” was not strictly applied over the years. Since the 1940’s the US Su-
preme Court had ruled  
 
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, 
is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure 
created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be41.  
Over time, the Federal Courts adopted a permeable concept of techno-
logical arts by either adopting more expansive views of statutory subject 
matter, or drawing attention to the specificity of each case.42 As a re-
sult, a definition of technological arts was eventually adopted as those 
that involved the physical transformation or the creation of an object 
through the systematic manipulation of natural forces or other forms of 
human activity. In particular, the Patent Office Guidelines suggested 
the exclusion of patentability only for those claims, which were “devoid 
of any limitation to a practical application in the technological arts”,43 
and Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions added 
that “the claimed process must be limited to a practical application of 
the abstract idea or mathematical algorithm in the technological arts”.44 
 
According to this point of view, it was asserted that business methods 
were not statutory subject matters as they were an intangible and ab-
stract methodology for managing a transaction. Hence, like 
fundamental scientific instruments, such as mathematical formulae or 
physical principles, business methods, even if fundamental for further 
inventions, were considered outside the scope of useful or technological 
arts45. In conclusion, following the argument that useful arts could be 
																																																								
41 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am. 306 U.S. 86 (Supreme Court 1939), 
94 
42 Marsnik et al. (33) 255 
43  USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (Aug. 2001 ed.), § 2106 II.A, 
<www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/index.htm> accessed 18 January 2014  
44 Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inven-
tions (28 feb.1996) 61 Fed.Reg.7478, 7484  
45 SJ Shumaker, Business Method Patents: Navigating the Sea of Controversy (Shumak-
er & Sieffert Publications 2000) <www.ssiplaw.com/publications/busmethpat.pdf > 
accessed 18 January 2014, 7 
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identified with the technological arts related to physical transfor-
mations,46 business methods, like all other mere abstractions, were 
excluded from patentability, at least until their physical side was even-
tually uncovered.  
3.2.2 Business methods as mental processes  
As previously mentioned, another argument was developed against the 
patentability of business methods: they were thought to be no more 
than a mental process. Since the US Patent Act of 1952 extended pa-
tentability to “any new and useful process”, the ban on patenting ideas 
became the problem of clarifying the meaning and boundaries of “pro-
cess” as a statutory subject matter a crucial and pressing task. 47 In 
particular, the definition of process as “process, art or method[…] [that] 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, compo-
sition of matter, or material” was viewed as incapable of clarifying the 
concept of process itself due to its circularity (i.e., the process is a pro-
cess).48   
 
Furthermore, the broad meaning of the term enabled any action that 
could be articulated into a series of steps to be considered as a statuto-
ry process. 49  Considering that every process was no more than a 
planned series of steps leading to a creation or a transformation, it was 
argued that a useful process could also refer to a series of mental steps 
capable of producing something new without operating physically upon 
things. Thus, in principle, intangible processes were patentable.50 The 
Supreme Court argued that it was true that, broadly speaking, a pro-
cess could have been any detailed sequence of steps aimed to perform a 
predetermined task, even those that took place in the human mind. 
																																																								
46 Wright (32) 42  
47 DS Chisum, ‘The Future of Software Protection: The Patentability Of Algorithms’ 
(1986) 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959, 963  
48 WD Wiese, ‘Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business Models after State 
Street Bank’ (2000) 4 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 17, 20  
49 Thomas, (39) 1141; P Samuelson, ‘Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Pro-
tection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions’ (1990) 39 
EmoRY LJ. 1025, 1033 
50 In re Prater 415 F.2d 1393, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1969) 
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Nevertheless, patents could be granted only to processes including “a 
series of acts performed on the subject matter to be transformed and 
reduced to a different state or thing”.51  
 
Hence, in the Court’s view, only the physical implementation of the pro-
cess, i.e. its connection with a device, could connect mental abstraction 
to concrete and tangible application, and, thus, allow the patenting of a 
process.52 In this sense, physicality still remained the criterion for dif-
ferentiating non-patentable processes from those that are statutory 
subject matters. Not all processes could therefore have been patentable, 
but solely those capable of being incorporated into tangible products or 
capable of triggering some physical transformation even if no machine 
to do this actually existed. 53 Thus, an "idea of itself is not patentable, 
but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is”.54 
 
Along this line, business methods were often taken as an example of 
non- patentable subject matter  
[…] there is nothing peculiar or novel in preparing a sheet of 
paper with headings [...] and whatever peculiarity there may 
be about the headings in this case is a peculiarity resulting 
from the transactions themselves.55  
The necessity to have something physical - either in the inputs or in the 
end product - was still central in the patent system.56 Therefore, busi-
ness methods, with their congenital absence of mechanical devices and 
tangible results, were easily thought as a paradigmatic example of what 
had to remain in the public domain. 
																																																								
51  Cochrane v. Deener 94 U.S. 780, 788 (Supreme Court 1876) 
52 R III Del Gallo, ‘Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally Out of Business as a Statu-
tory Rejection?’ (1998) 38 IDEA 403, 428 
53 RH Stern ‘Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of 
Doing Business’(1999) 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 105, 116 
54 Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. Howard 87 U.S. 498, 507 (Supreme Court 1874) 
55 Hotel Security Checking Co v Lorraine Co 160 F 467,472 (2nd Cir1908) 
56 Del Gallo (52) 410 
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3.3 What was ruled without being ruled: The US Courts’ decisions  
 
A brief historical overview of US jurisprudence about the patentability of 
business methods will be undertaken in this subsection to shed light on 
what happened over the last twenty years, ultimately changing business 
methods into statutory subject matters. The first statement about busi-
ness method non-patentability dates back to the end of the XIX century. 
It was held that ‘it is contrary to the spirit of the patent law construed 
by the Office for years, to grant patents for methods or analogous sys-
tems of bookkeeping’ 57  and, also, that the method of “transacting 
common business” 58 was not a patentable subject matter. Over that 
period, a widely popular decision was taken in Hotel Security Checking 
Co vs. Lorraine Co 59 that was advocated by most as the beginning of the 
so-called “business method exception” to patentable subject matters.  
 
As the claims were about a “method [...] for cash-registering and ac-
count-checking' designed to prevent frauds […,] by waiters”, 60  the 
Circuit Court ruled that a  
[…] system of transacting business disconnected from the 
means for carrying out the system is not, within the most lib-
eral interpretation of the term, an art. Advice is not 
patentable. As this court said in Fowler v City of New York 121 
Fed 747, 58 CCA 113: 'No mere abstraction, no idea, however 
brilliant, can be the subject of a patent irrespective of the 
means designed to give it effect.61 
The Court did not invalidate the claim due to the presence of a business 
method though. The real reason was that  
																																																								
57 Ex parte Abraham (8) 
58 United States Credit System Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co. 53 F. 818, (S.D.N.Y. 
1893) 
59 Hotel Security Checking (55) 
60 Ibid. 467  
61 Ibid. 469 
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[…] the physical means described by [the inventor], - the 
sheet and slips, - apart from the manner of their use, [do not] 
present any new and useful feature [...]. The fundamental 
principle of the system is as old as the art of bookkeeping62.  
Thus, the decision was not concerned with what could be a patentable 
business method as “ this question seems never to have been decided 
by a controlling authority and its decision is not necessary now”.63 
However, even if the issue of recognizing a business method as a pa-
tentable subject matter was obiter dicta, 64  the ruling was read as 
holding the principle that all business systems were per se non-
patentable.  
This position was not reviewed for almost a century, since courts avoid-
ed dealing with that issue. For example, in 1934 the CCPA (United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals)65 held In re Wait that  
[…] it was suggested that an opportunity is here afforded this 
court to render a decision which might possibly clarify ques-
tion growing out an applications for patents relating to what is 
called “methods of doing business”. However inviting this field 
may be, the court does not deem it proper to deviate from its 
usual practice of determining only the relevant question pre-
sented by the application actually before it, avoiding dicta 
insofar as possible.66  
Some 34 years later, In re Howard, the CCPPA confirmed its propensity 
to decide cases on grounds other than patentability of business meth-
ods, stating that  
																																																								
62 Ibid. 469  
63 Ibid. 472  
64 Del Gallo (52) 408 
65 CCPA is the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) 
66 In re Wait (13) 982  
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Our affirmance of this ground of rejection makes it unneces-
sary to consider the issue of whether a method of doing 
business is inherently non-patentable.67  
Nevertheless, a new propensity to patent business methods started to 
be shown. “As early as 1942, In re Patton the Court held that  
[…] a system of transacting business, apart from the means 
for carrying out such a system, is not within the purview of 
[...] patentable subject matter68. 
 Moreover, in Loew's Drive-In Theatres it was held that  
[…] a system for the transaction of business, such, for exam-
ple, as the cafeteria system for transacting the restaurant 
business, . . . however novel, useful, or commercially success-
ful is not patentable apart from the means for making the 
system practically useful69.  
Hence, without discussing the exception, the possibility emerged to 
grant patents also to methods of doing business. The stratagem devised 
by the Courts was to look not at the final intangible product, but at the 
combination of process and means that were reviewed for novelty and 
inventiveness of business method 
Patentability does not turn on whether the claimed method 
does ‘business’ instead of something else, but on whether the 
method, viewed as a whole, meets the requirements of patent-
ability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent 
Act.70 
																																																								
67 In re Howard  (15) 872  
68 In re Patton (12) 327  
69 Loew's Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In Theatres, 174 F.2d 547,552 (1st Cir. 1949) 
70 In re Schrader 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 298  
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Thus, until the State Street Bank’s decision,71 formally the business 
method exception continued to be declared, but the emphasis placed on 
the apparatus and on all tangible things utilised to carry out the meth-
ods, allowed to patent them although, in effect, it was not always easily 
understandable whether it was the apparatus or the method to be pa-
tented.72 
 
3.4 What was stated without being stated: The EPO Boards of Ap-
peal’s decisions  
 
With regard to the European patent system, as suggested before, the 
excursus on the patentability of business methods is less dated, and 
probably less structured than the one on the American system. In Eu-
rope there was not a centralised patent system until 1973, when the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC) was signed.73 On 
the other hand, the EPC was not an instrument of the European Un-
ion. 74  Thus, it did not automatically replace Contracting State 
substantive patent laws, rather it constituted a measure of administra-
tive rationalisation of the granting procedure. 75  Hence, the non-
patentability of business methods, although generally accepted as a pa-
tent system principle,76 was established as a rule in the Contracting 
States only when they changed their national laws as conforming to 
EPC.77   
 
																																																								
71 State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This decision was known as the one that abrogated the busi-
ness method exception as an unwarranted limitation to statutory subject matter.  
72 Del Gallo (52) 415-420 
73 EPC 1973 
74 Marsnik, Thomas (33) 267 
75 H Ullrich, ‘Patent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into the Community or 
the Community into Europe?’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 433, 436 
76 Text to section a 
77 ie the 1977 UK Patent  Act, section 1, subsection (2), the German Patent Law, Part I, 
§ 1 (1980) 
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The EPC, unlike the US Patent Act, clearly indicated the method of do-
ing business among the excluded subject matters.78 Art.52 declares 
 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions 
which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new 
and which involve an inventive step. (2) The following in par-
ticular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning 
of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathe-
matical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules 
and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or do-
ing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations 
of information. (3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude 
patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to in 
that provision only to the extent to which a European patent 
application or European patent relates to such subject-matter 
or activities as such. 
To understand the reason for the exclusions of article 52 (2), it is im-
portant to point out that these reflect the idea of invention developed in 
the European state patent laws and jurisprudence79 before the ECP 
came into force: 
Neither from the terms of Article 52 EPC, nor from the legisla-
tive history of that Article as appearing from the preparatory 
documents can it be deduced that these Contracting States 
would have intended to deviate from their national laws and 
jurisprudence in this respect. On the contrary, it seems to be 
borne out by the list of exceptions in Article 52(2)(a) to (d) EPC 
that they did not wish to do so.80  
Thus, as the EPC’s aim was not to change Contracting State patent 
laws but rather to clarify and unify their patent systems, the list of ex-
																																																								
78 Marsnik, Thomas (33) 272  
79 G Paterson, The European Patent System. The Law and Practice of the European Pa-
tent Convention (2nd edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2001) 409 
80 IBM/Document abstracting and retrieving  (T 22/85) (1990) E.P.O.R  100, 103  
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clusions was the summa of national general patent principles that had 
already formed the basis of the EPC. Consequently it can be useful to 
critically review the pre EPO case law ruled on this topic in the Con-
tracting States and also those judgments declared soon after the EPC 
came into force, that formed an unbroken continuum in ruling that 
business methods were non-patentable. Before analysing the EPO 
Board of Appeal decisions, therefore, the UK and German law cases will 
be discussed, considering that the significance and the extent of both 
the UK and German Court decisions on the business methods patenta-
bility.  
  
3.4.1 A starting point: the UK and the German case law  
 
The analysis starts with the United Kingdom. A milestone on the sub-
ject matter is Hickton's Patent Syndicate vs. Patents & Machine 
Improvements Co Ltd,81 in which the ratio of patent protection was ex-
plained as 
 
invention may lie in the idea and it may lie in the way in 
which it is carried out, and it may lie in the combination of the 
two; but if there is invention in the idea plus the way of carry-
ing it out, then it is good subject matter for letters patent. 
Similarly, the Permutit Co. vs. Borrowmann 82 case suggested that 
It is not enough for a man to say that an idea floated through 
his brain; he must at least have reduced it to a definite and 
practical shape before he can be said to have invented a pro-
cess. 
Moreover, Morton, J., In Re GEC's Application 83 clarified that 
																																																								
81 Hickton's Patent Syndicate v. Patents & Machine Improvements Co. [1909], 26 RPC 
339, 348 per Fletcher-Moulton LJ 
82 Permutit Co. v. Borrowmann [1926], 43 RPC 356 per Viscount Cave 
83 In Re G.E.C.'s Application  [1942], 60 RPC1, 4 
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[…] a method or process is a manner of manufacture if it (a) 
results in the production of some vendible product. 
Post the EPC was signed, in the Merrill Lynch decision,84 the principal 
examiner affirmed that 
If the task performed is non-technical, for example […] a busi-
ness method, then the mere fact that it is being performed by 
a suitable machine [...] does not of itself provide a technical 
feature. I consider this to be a logical extension of the general-
ly accepted view that there is no invention in merely stating 
that a known manual function is performed automatically.85  
A similar analysis was conducted also in relation to the decision on Fu-
jitsu Limited’s Application. 86  After briefing about general principles 
stated by UK Patent Office and Courts, the UK Patents Court held that 
 
The types of subject matter referred to in section 1(2) UK Act, 
following EPC, are excluded from patentability as a matter of 
policy. This is so whether the matter is technical or not.87  
 
Also in Pintos Global Services Limited, 88 the examiner reported that the 
invention was related to a business problem as it was not more than a 
quick and easy way to exchange information between lenders and bor-
rowers, and informed the applicant that "a method of doing business is 
not patentable irrespective of whether or not there is a technical ad-
vance”, thereby motivating his objection on the basis of what was 
issued in the judgment of Merrill Lynch’s Application.89 The review of the 
debate on “whole contents approach” and “contribution approach” aris-
ing from these decisions is postponed to the next section. In the 
																																																								
84 Merrill Lynch’s Application [1988], RPC 1 (Pat Ct) 
85 Merrill Lynch’s Application (n. 81) 6  
86 Fujitsu Limited’s Application [1996], RPC 511 (Pat Ct) 
87 Fujitsu Limited’s Application (n. 83) 530 
88  IPO, Pintos Global Services Limited, Patent decision O/171/01, (2001), 
<www.ipo.gov.uk/p-challenge-decision-results-bl?BL_Number=O/171/01>accessed at 
1st  February 2014  
89 Ibid. para 15  
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meantime, what emerges from the UK experience is the centrality of the 
technical feature as the drawing line between patentable and non-
patentable subject matters. 
  
The German Courts also articulated a new approach to the patentability 
of business methods. Like the UK Courts, the German judges based the 
possibility to grant patent protection to business method to the availa-
bility of technical means in the invention.90 After EPC was signed, in 
Dispositionsprogramm (Disposition Program),91 the BGH92 rejecting the 
application of a process for calculating certain commercial results using 
electronic data processing devices, argued that  
 
The rule, which by itself constitutes a mental-logical instruc-
tion does not become technical by the fact that during its 
application technical means [...] are used [...] the use of these 
technical means must be an integral part of the problem solu-
tion itself. 93 
Years later, in Automatische Absatzsteuerung (Automatic sales con-
trol),94 the BPatG95 examined claims on a process that automatically 
controlled sales prices using a computer and consistently with previous 
decision concluded that  
 
As the subject matter in the sales machine auxiliary claim is 
clearly a device rather than a mathematical model, the tech-
nical character is already given by the term ’sales machine.96  
																																																								
90 RM Ballardini, ‘Software Patents in Europe. The Technical Requirement Dilemma’ 
(2008) 3 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 563; EPO, 10th European Pa-
tent Judges’ Symposium Luxembourg, 19 to 23 September 2000 (OJ EPO 2nd Spec. 
edition 2001) 
91BGH GRUR 1977, Dispositionsprogramm. Available in English in (1977) Int'l Rev. In-
dus. Prop. & Copyright L. 558 
92 Bundesgerichtshof, the German Supreme Federal Court of Justice 
93 Dispositionsprogramm (91) 560  
94 BPatG GRUR 1999 - Automatische Absatzsteuerung - Re IBM Corp.'s Patent Applica-
tion (“Automatic Sales Control”) (2000) E.N.P.R. 309  
95 Bundespatentgericht, the German Federal Patent Court  
96 Automatische Absatzsteuerung (94)  
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Thus, according to the Court, only the presence of a technical device 
could have allowed for patenting claims even when purely commercial 
considerations were involved.  
 
3.4.2   The EPO Boards of Appeal case law  
 
As the above case law confirmed, the practice under patent law of the 
majority of Contracting State suggested the centrality of the technical 
nature as national courts and patent offices excluded from patentability 
all those activities that were not directly carried out by a technical de-
vice, and as a result that did not have a technical character. Thus, even 
if it was not mentioned by the EPC, the concept of “being technical” be-
came fundamental for the definition of invention in the EPO system 97 
 
Although Article 52 EPC does not use the word "technical", 
nevertheless ….the proper interpretation of the word "inven-
tion" as used in the plural in Article 52(1) EPC requires a 
claimed subject-matter or activity to have a technical charac-
ter, and thus in principle to be industrially applicable.98 
Technical character, also, was essential to demarcate the boundaries of 
excluded subject matters, among which are business methods. In this 
line of reasoning the EPO Technical Board of Appeal stated  
Such a method is part of a business operation. Of course, the 
claimed method does include steps which include a technical 
component ... But the presence of such technical components 
does not alter the fact that the claimed method is a business 
method as such, rather than a technical method (just as the 
																																																								
97 RE Thomas, LA Di Matteo, ‘Harmonizing the International Law of Business Method 
and Software Patents: Following Europe’s Lead’ (2007) 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J.1, 14 
(“While there is no explicit requirement in the EPC for technical character or a ‘tech-
nical contribution,’ the patent courts initially interpreted the EPC as including such a 
requirement.”) 
98 IBM/Card Reader (T 854/90)(1994) E.P.O.R. 89, 94. See also, IBM/Text clarity pro-
cessing( T38/86) (1990) E.P.O.R. 384, FUJI/Coloured disk jacket (T119/88) (1990) 
E.P.O.R. 395. 
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use of a typewriter to perform a business activity would not 
change such an activity into a technical method).99   
Scholars and judges have attempted to find a formal justification for the 
technical character.100 For most of them,101 this extra requirement is 
conforming to rules 27 and 29 of the Implementing Regulations (1974 
version) 102, which introduced the requirements for the technicality of 
the invention, as they stated that 
 
the description shall: (a) specify the technical field to which 
the invention relates;(b) indicate the background art which, as 
far as known to the applicant, can be regarded as useful for 
understanding the invention...;(c) disclose the invention, as 
claimed, in such terms that the technical problem ... and its 
solution can be understood  
and  
The claims shall define the matter for which protection is 
sought in terms of the technical features of the invention.  
However, some commentators disagreed, arguing that the requirement 
was implicit in the meaning of "industrial” as it was expressed in Article 
57 of the European Patent Convention.103 At the same time, others not-
ed that the requirement of the technical character of inventions could 
not be found in the Implementing Regulations, as those did not define 
substantive law and, hence, were incapable of modifying the EPC by 
setting an additional patentability requisite.104  
 
																																																								
99 IBM/Card Reader (98) 95 
100 See the next Chapter for all their arguments on technical effect test, technical con-
tribution approach and any hardware approach 
101 G Paterson (79) 409, ME Fink,  ‘Patenting Business Methods in Europe: What Lies 
Ahead?’ (2004) 79 Ind. LJ 299, 306 
102 Council of the European Patent Organisation, Implementing Regulations to the Con-
vention on the Grant of European Patents (1974) 13 I.L.M. 310  
103 Thomas (39) 1179 
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The EPO Boards continued stating that the technical character of the 
invention was an implicit requirement of the EPC, so that 
according to the case law of the boards of appeal the use of 
the term "invention" in Article 52(1) EPC in conjunction with 
the so-called "exclusion provisions" of Article 52(2) and (3) 
EPC, which mention subject-matter that "in particular shall 
not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of para-
graph 1", is understood as implying a "requirement of 
technical character" or "technicality" which is to be fulfilled by 
an invention as claimed in order to be patentable.105 
The dispute was eventually settled. The requirement of the “technical 
character”106 is now clearly established in the European patent law as 
the phrase “in all fields of technology” has been added to Article 52 at 
the EPC 2000 Revision Conference to reflect the wording of Article 27.1 
of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
As the above analysis has suggested, the main reason advocated for 
justifying the non-patentability of business methods, both in the Euro-
pean and the US patent systems, was concerned with their intangibility 
and abstraction. However, there were nuances in the arguments under-
pinning the two systems. Indeed the US Patent Law did not explicitly 
decree on this subject matter, and the non-patentability of business 
methods arose from case law that emphasised, first, the concept of use-
ful art, and subsequently, the need for “technologicality”, thus the 
request of something physical either in the inputs or outputs. Instead, 
the EPC expressly includes business methods among the non-
patentable subject matters, since either the Contracting State Courts or 
																																																								
105 PBS PARTNERSHIP/Controlling pension benefits system (T931/95) (2002) E.P.O.R. 
522, 527 
106 R Bakels, PG Hugenholtz, The Patentability of Computer Programs: Discussion of Eu-
ropean-Level Legislation in the Field of Patents for Software (European Parliament, 
Comm. on Legal Affairs and the Internal Mkt., Working Paper, 2000) 54  
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the EPO Boards regard “technicality”, and therefore the technical fea-
tures, as the fundamental character of inventions.  
 
4. A fresh start: e-business methods 
 
As discussed in the previous section, until about twenty years ago a 
business method developer could not be granted a patent since his or 
her invention was not carried out by physical means or, especially in 
Europe, due to the lack of technical character. Major changes occurred 
that affected the patentability of business methods as a result of the 
advent of computers and the computerisation of processes. The wide-
spread use of computer software contributed toward an increase in the 
ambiguity of the concept of physicality (and that of technicality in Eu-
rope), since, even if computer software were simply numerical codes, 
they were able to solve practical problems, as was the case with physi-
cal tools.107 
 
As previously mentioned, theories of patentability exception were rooted 
in the opinion that inventions needed either physical manipulation and 
transformation or technical features. Thus, for many years, the re-
quirement of “physicality” or “technicality” was certainly a useful 
criterion for patent eligibility. However, advances in computer technolo-
gy changed this framework108  as computer programs were abstract 
codes implemented by circuits and electricity and, thus, the confluence 
of ideas, as well as tangible and technical assets.109 Therefore, to the ex-
tent that computer-based inventions were regarded as lying at the 
interface between physical hardware and virtual software, the emphasis 
on the technical or physical properties soon became too vague and in-
adequate to the purpose of informing coherent decisions as to what was 
patentable. Courts and Patent Offices were indeed puzzled by the task 
																																																								
107 RP Merges, ‘As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. LJ577, 
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108 Thomas (39) 1148 
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of distinguishing matters that were technological from those that were 
not110. 
 
In this context, new perspectives and opportunities opened up for the 
patentability of business methods when they were implemented by 
means of software. To this end, an illustrative example is the US Patent 
Office Examination Guidelines for Computer-related Inventions that in 
1996 pointed out that 
 
The utility of an invention must be within the ‘‘technological’’ 
arts. A computer-related invention is within the technological 
arts. A practical application of a computer-related invention is 
statutory subject matter. An invention that has a practical 
application in the technological arts satisfies the utility re-
quirement.111 
In line with this, the case law held that 
Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a fundamen-
tal part of computer technology, we have had to re-examine 
the rules that govern the patentability of such technology. The 
sea changes in both law and technology stand as a testament 
to the ability of law to adapt to new and innovative concepts, 
while remaining true to basic principles [...] As the technology 
progressed...some of the earlier limiting principles regarding § 
101, announced more expansive principles formulated with 
computer technology in mind [...] this court (and its predeces-
sor) has struggled to make our understanding of the scope of § 
101 responsive to the needs of the modern world.112 
Furthermore,  
																																																								
110 Thomas (39) 1165 
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[…] the focus of analysis should be on the operation of the 
computer program and not on the product of the computer 
program [...] It stressed that the operation of the computer is 
within the "technological arts" and a computer program, 
which affects the operation of the computer is also patenta-
ble.113 
Likewise, the use of computers for implementing business methods led 
the European patent system to critically reconsider their nature and 
their potential for being a subject matter of patents. In the famous Vi-
com case that will be examined in detail in the next Chapter it was 
stated that 
Generally speaking, an invention, which would be patentable 
in accordance with conventional patentability criteria, should 
not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that for its 
implementation modern technical means in the form of a 
computer program are used.114  
Regarding computer-implemented business methods, it was added that 
The claimed apparatus is clearly technical in nature (cf. Deci-
sions T 22/85 OJ EPO 1990, 12, T 854/90, OJ EPO 1993, 
669), and has practical application to the service of "custom-
ers". The fact that one such practical application of such 
apparatus concerns the service of customers of “a business 
equipment” does not mean that the claimed subject-matter 
must be equated with a method of doing business, as such.115  
Along the same line, the EPO Guidelines For Examination specified that  
[…]a scheme for organizing a commercial operation would not 
be patentable. However, if the claimed subject matter specifies 
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an apparatus […] for carrying out ….the scheme, that scheme 
and the apparatus have to be examined116. 
E-business methods117 thus marked the beginning of a new phase in 
the debate over patentability: methods of doing business became pa-
tentable because the scope of technological or technical activities was 
enlarged so as to embrace, over the course of the years, any slightest 
spark of technicality, regardless of the final aim of the methods.118 How 
this change in perspective took place will be examined in the next 
Chapter. In particular, the jurisprudence developed over the last twenty 
years that validated business methods as a legitimate subject matter for 
patentability will be analysed. On this purpose, the evolution of the Eu-
ropean and US case law and how their interplay affected the current 
status of the subject matter will be discussed, thereby investigating how 
the two patent systems influenced each other over the years and in so 
doing eventually produced unexpected consequences. 
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Chapter II 
How business methods became patentable? 
 
1. Introduction  
Since the 1980s, business methods have increasingly been claimed as 
patentable in the form of algorithms implemented by computer pro-
grams. 1  This tight relation among business methods, software and 
mathematical algorithms has been the key factor motivating the reshap-
ing of the patent system in Europe and in the US, and the recognition of 
patent protection to business methods. This chapter summarises the 
related jurisprudence of the last thirty years, ranging from the assertion 
of software patentability up to the well-known Bilski case, the Enlarged 
Board decision, and some more recent cases. However, the analysis of 
the case law on both sides of the Atlantic will show that business meth-
od patentability is still an open issue and more than some doubts about 
their patentability still exist.  
2. A hesitant start  
2.1 The US Supreme Court patent-eligibility trilogy   
As already discussed in the previous chapter, business methods were 
not qualified as patent subject matter at first. However, something 
changed when they started to be implemented by computer because of 
the link to technical means. Nevertheless, as soon as the distinction be-
tween software and hardware was cleared up, the debate about 
patentability of business methods arose again according to the difficul-
ties to recognize patent protection to software per se.2 Referring to this 
issue, the US Supreme Court patent-eligibility trilogy about the patent-
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ability of software, i.e. Gottschalk v. Benson, Parker v. Flook, 
and Diamond v. Diehr cases, was an emblematic portrait of the relation-
ship between technological progress and need for legal protection.  
In the first of these three cases, Gottschalk v. Benson,3 the Court noted 
that the pure conversion of one set of numbers to another, performed by 
a computer program, could not be considered a patentable subject mat-
ter as the process was not tied to a particular machine or apparatus or 
meant to change objects or articles into a “different thing or state”.4 
Thus, in the Court’s opinion, the software was not a patentable process, 
considering that the claimed invention was not more than abstract 
mathematics. In the Court’s opinion, a physical transformation was al-
ways needed to obtain patent protection for those processes that were 
not linked to particular machines.5 However, the Supreme Court admit-
ted that only the Congress could provide a final answer to the problem 
of software patentability.6 
In the second case, Parker v. Flook,7 the Court held that the implemen-
tation of an algorithm in a particular industrial process was not able to 
transform a not-patentable principle into a patentable process. In the 
decision, the Court, underling that “form should not be exalted over the 
substance”,8 affirmed that the use of claimed computer program in a  
“post solution activity” was not able to justify “wholly” the pre-emption 
of an algorithm.9 Further, the decision emphasised on the nature of 
mathematical formulas as ‘they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work’ 10 and concluded that the invention was not a statu-
tory subject considering, among all, that the claimed method used the 
algorithm for computerising calculations could have been made by pen-
																																																								
3 Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63 (1972)  
4  Ibid. 70 
5 Ibid. 70 -1 
6 Ibid. 73 
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8 Ibid. 590 
9 Ibid. 589 
10 Ibid.  
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cils and paper, indeed, for not more than a merely calculation pur-
pose.11  
Nonetheless, in the last of the three cases, Diamond v. Diehr,12 the Court 
finally decided  
... when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or 
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when consid-
ered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws 
were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article 
to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the require-
ments of § 101.13 
As such in the Diehr decision, the Court based its reasoning on the link 
between the computer implemented invention and the physical trans-
formation, which ultimately result from the implementation of the 
algorithms. This statement was thought to be innovative and immedi-
ately capable of marking the beginning of a new era for patentability of 
computer software.14 Thus, the Court decided that an algorithm imple-
mented in a computer program could be patentable when it was directly 
part of a process targeted to transforming or creating things. However, 
as some scholars suggested, the decision mainly emphasised the link 
between the claimed invention and the computer, which was described 
as a machine that collected the data generated by algorithms. As such, 
the software was directly part of the industry process, playing a role 
similar to the one played by an human controller. However, the software 
was intrinsically related to a machine. Therefore, it was suggested that 
there were no significant differences between this decision and the pre-
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vious ones since the only remarkable diversity was in the applicant 
choice to claiming software inventions as part of hardware devices.15  
Nevertheless, the Diehr decision definitely introduced the idea that 
claims related to processes built on mathematical formulas needed to 
be considered and examined in their entirety. From this point of view,  
"it is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and 
then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis"16 to de-
termine eligibility of claimed invention for patent protection. On the 
other hand, the Court reasoned that  
The "novelty" of any element or steps in a process, or even of the 
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the sub-
ject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly 
patentable subject matter...The question, therefore, of whether a 
particular invention is novel is "wholly apart from whether the in-
vention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.17 
Thus, after the so-called Supreme Court trilogy, it was eventually clear 
that  
A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not be-
come non statutory simply because it uses a mathematical 
formula, computer program, or digital computer.18 
Even if these decisions opened the door to software patentability, the 
Supreme Court seemed to be willing to confirm the necessity of a physi-
cal transformation of subject matter into a different state or thing even 
when the claimed process employed mathematical formula. Therefore, 
the CCPA  (United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) apply-
ing what the Supreme Court had stated introducing a two-step test - 
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the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. 19 To decide on the patentability of inven-
tions involving a mathematical algorithm, the Federal Circuit, firstly, 
analysed if the claim, as a whole, was included among the categories of 
statutory subject matter and, subsequently, verified if the algorithm 
was applied to physical elements so that the process did not just seek to 
compute a pure number. However, the test was not applied consistent-
ly.20 
2.2 The Vicom case and the technical-contribution approach  
Even in Europe, at the beginning of 1980s, software was excluded from 
patentability because it was declared unpatentable by art 52 EPC. How-
ever, a first signal of a change toward a different direction was 
represented by the 1980’s reform of Guidelines for Examiners in the 
Field of Computer-Implemented Inventions. Inspired by the US Su-
preme Trilogy on software patentability, the Guidelines suggested  
In considering whether the subject matter of an application is 
an invention within the meaning of Art. 52(1), there are two 
general points the examiner must bear in mind. Firstly, any ex-
clusion from patentability under Art. 52(2) applies only to the 
extent to which the application relates to the excluded subject-
matter as such. Secondly, the examiner should disregard the 
form or kind of claim and concentrate on its content in order to 
identify whether the claimed subject matter, considered as a 
whole, has a technical character. If it does not, there is no in-
vention within the meaning of Art. 52(1).21 
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The endorsement of a more liberal and permissive policy was clear.22 
Since then, EPO stopped employing the analytical method. It introduced 
two major changes such as the assessment of patent applications as a 
whole and the “technical character” requirement.  The first application 
of the new procedure, focused on identifying the technical contribu-
tion23 in computerized data processing claims, was in the Vicom case24 
which proposed a new approach to assessing patent protection for com-
puter programs and other excluded subject matters.25In Vicom, the 
Board considered that 
 even if the idea underlying an invention may be considered to 
reside in a mathematical method, a claim directed to a tech-
nical process in which the method is used does not seek 
protection for the mathematical method as such.26  
 
Hence, it was finally accepted that inventive content could also be found 
in excluded subject matter. The Board emphasised the difference be-
tween a computer program claimed “as such” and a method 
implemented throughout a computer program. In the latter case, the al-
gorithm at the heart of the computer program could be examined in the 
light of technical contribution to the arts that the method implemented 
by computer was able to provide. Thus, patent protection should be 
granted once it was assessed the novelty of the technical contribution 
provided by the method. Conversely, a computer program ‘as such’ 
could not be checked from the point of view of the technical innovation 
because it was no more than a numerical  sequence without links to 
technical arts.  Accordingly, the Board stated  
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a claim directed to a technical process which process is carried 
out under the control of a program (be this implemented in 
hardware or in software), cannot be regarded as relating to a 
computer program as such within the meaning of Article 52(3) 
EPC, as it is the application of the program for determining the 
sequence of steps in the process for which in effect protection is 
sought.27 
However, the Board held that 
an invention which would be patentable in accordance with 
conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded from 
protection by the mere fact that for its implementation modern 
technical means in the form of a computer program are used.28  
 
Thus, the Board confirmed that the mere fact that software was running 
on a computer was not sufficient on its own to give the invention a 
technical character as, instead, “decisive is what technical contribution 
the invention as defined in the claim when considered as a whole makes 
to the known art”.29  
The Vicom approach, then called “technical contribution” approach, was 
applied by the Board to other cases. In Koch&Sterzel, 30 some year after 
Vicom, for example, it was reaffirmed that  
an invention must be assessed as a whole. If it makes use of 
both technical and non-technical means, the use of non-
technical means does not detract from the technical character 
of the overall teaching... it does not prohibit the patenting of in-
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ventions consisting of a mix of technical and non-technical el-
ements. 31 
Interestingly enough, this EPO Board approach was similar to the con-
clusions reached by the US Supreme Court in the “patent-eligibility 
trilogy cases”, i.e.	the Gottschalk, Parker, Diehr cases. So as it stated in 
Diehr, 32 patent was not granted to a mathematical algorithms but to a 
mathematical sequence direct to carry out and control an industrial 
process33, i.e. the moulding of rubber in Diehr and the digital processing 
of images and X rays in Vicom and in Koch.  
Furthermore, in Vicom, the Board underlined, like the Supreme Court 
had done in Diehr, 34 that claimed inventions should be considered as a 
whole thus they must not be excluded from patentability only for being 
implemented by a computer program.35 Therefore not only in the US but 
also in Europe, the patentability of excluded subject matter was based 
on the idea that all the features of the invention and all patent claims 
must be considered as a “whole”. In the EPO’s approach, however, to 
grant a patent it was not sufficient that interaction between software 
and hardware produced physical changes, but the claimed invention 
needed also to produce a technical contribution to the known art.  
3. The turning point 
3.1 Towards the State Street decision  
In the early 1990s, both the European and the US jurisprudence 
seemed to justify the patentability of computer programs, likewise the 
patentability of computer implemented inventions, even if, as already 
said, the argument advanced was partially different. Thus, at that time, 
the EPO looked for the technical contribution, whilst the USPO refereed 
to physical transformation. In the US, the Freeman-Walter-Abele (FWA) 
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test,36 which was introduced after Diehr, was almost never applied con-
sidering that “it was not intended to be the exclusive test for 
determining the presence of statutory subject matter”.37 
In the Alappat 38 case, then, the physical-transformation test was com-
pletely ignored as it was stated that a software program implemented in 
a conventional digital computer could be qualified as a machine claim 
for statutory subject matter purposes.39 In the Court’s opinion, 
such programming creates a new machine, because a general 
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose comput-
er once it is programmed to perform particular functions 
pursuant to instructions from program software.40 
The In re Alappat decision strongly weakened the Supreme Court’s re-
quirement for physical transformation, owing to the fact that it was 
stated that the tangible feature request could be satisfied by any pro-
grammed general purpose computer.41 Thus, the Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test was definitively emptied of all meaning as the Federal Circuit Court 
focused on a new test, whereby the claimed invention was a practical 
application of an abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or 
calculation). Considering that  
the plain and unambiguous meaning of Section 101 is that any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may be 
patented if it meets the requirements for patentability set forth 
in Title 35 42  
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Thus, it was concluded that mathematical algorithms should be patent-
ed if they were embodied in “a specific machine to produce a useful, 
concrete and tangible result”.43 Although In Alappat clarified that a 
practical useful application - even if a simply programming process - is 
needed to patent purely mathematical subject matter, the Federal Cir-
cuit did not clarify if the useful application must have pertained to 
technical arts.44 
This issue was subsequently analysed In re Schrader.45 In that case, 
claims were about “a method for competitively bidding on a plurality of 
related items” 46 to increase seller profits. The Court denied a patent for 
the invention for lack of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 101 as it did not involve “a process of transforming or reducing an 
article to a different state or thing”.47 Nevertheless, Judge Newman dis-
sented arguing that  
[A] statutory "process" is limited only in that it must be techno-
logically useful.... All mathematical algorithms transform, data, 
and thus serve as a process to convert initial conditions or in-
puts into solutions or outputs, through transformation of 
information.... The test is simply whether the mathematical 
formula ... is all that is claimed, or whether the procedures in-
volving the specified mathematics are part of a useful process. 
When the latter requirement is met the subject matter is statu-
tory.48 
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Indeed, Judge Newman thought that "transformation of information" 
would be a statutory subject matter, and in only few years moved from 
the dissent to the majority. 49 
The turning point was the State Street case.50 The ruling involved a pa-
tent about a computerized accounting system used to allocate returns 
for mutual fund shareholders.51 The District Court of Massachusetts 
found patent claims invalid at a first step. 52  Relying on the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test, the Court held that the patent disclosed nothing more 
than a non-patentable mathematical algorithm. 53  Additionally, the 
Court stated that "business 'plans' and 'systems' are not patentable 
even though they may not be dependent upon the aesthetic, emotional, 
or judgmental reactions of a human"54 and ruled that the invention 
claims were so broad and generic as "to foreclose virtually any comput-
er-implemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of 
financial structure”55. In the District Court’s point of view, patent could 
grant  a monopoly over an idea 56 considering that  
patenting an accounting system necessary to carry on a certain 
type of business is tantamount to a patent on the business it-
self. Because such abstract ideas are not patentable, either as 
methods of doing business or as mathematical algorithm, the 
'056 Patent must fail. 57 
Nevertheless, deciding the subsequent appeal, the Federal Circuit 58 de-
cided in favour of business method patentability. 59  According the 
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CAFC’s opinion, both a method and a supporting structure were 
claimed in that specific case. As such, the claimed invention was with-
out any doubt a machine.60 The Federal Court, however, suggested that 
the question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject 
matter should not focus on which of the four categories of sub-
ject matter a claim is directed to --process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter--but rather on the es-
sential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its 
practical utility.61 
Moreover, reviewing some of its prior cases, the Court affirmed that 
mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter to 
the extent that they are merely abstract ideas...until reduced to 
some type of practical application, i.e., "a useful, concrete and 
tangible result.62 
Thus, based on this line of reasoning, the Court decided to employ the 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test to evaluate if the mutual fund 
accounting method was a statutory subject matter63 and, eventually, it 
drew the conclusion that    
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar 
amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical cal-
culations into a final share price, constitutes a practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calcula-
tion, because it produces a useful, concrete and tangible 
result.64   
Crucially, the decision validated the claimed invention underlying both 
the innovativeness of the investment package and the programmed ma-
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chine used to implement the method, so that the rationale for patenting 
the claimed method was its usefulness in introducing a new process. 
Therefore, the State Street case marked the end of Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test and also the end of the physical requirement, and it definitively in-
troduced another patentability requisite: the utility of the result of the 
process. 65 Furthermore, State Street also signed the end of the business 
method exception as the Court  
take(s) this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to 
rest. Since its inception, the "business method" exception has 
merely represented the application of some general, but no 
longer applicable legal principle. Since the 1952 Patent Act, 
business methods have been, and should have been, subject to 
the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any 
other process or method.66  
In the State Street decision, the Federal Circuit ultimately rejected the 
argument that business methods were per se outside the scope of statu-
tory subject matter and affirmed that they were proper objects of patent 
protection when implemented by computer programs and capable of 
producing a useful, concrete and tangible result.67 
3.2 The Pension Benefit System decision and the “any-hardware” 
approach  
Meanwhile, in Europe the contribution approach introduced in Vicom 
was starting to be applied to business methods. In the Patterson case, 
the claimed invention involved a system for determining the queue se-
quence for serving customers at a plurality of service points. 68 The 
system, indeed, consisted both of a method of doing business and of 
technical items belonging to the category of an apparatus. Thus, the 
Board underlined that “ in such a case…a mix of technical and non-
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technical elements shall not be excluded from patentability under Arti-
cle 52(2) and (3) EPC”69 and it concluded by granting patent protection 
to the claimed subject matter considering the fact that even if one of the 
technical applications of the system involved customer service, it was 
not sufficient to qualify the invention as a method of doing business “as 
such”. 70 
Similarly, in the Sohei decision,71 the Board recognised business meth-
ods patentability. The claim was a method of operating a general-
purpose computer management system for processing, inter alia, inven-
tory and financial management data. Although the overall purpose of 
the invention was managing a business, the Board granted patentability 
to the method considering that it satisfied the technical requirement.72 
As such the Board stated  
the implementation, in the claimed system and by the claimed 
method, of the said "interface" in the form of said "transfer slip" 
is not merely an act of programming but rather concerns a 
stage of activities involving technical considerations to be car-
ried out before programming can start.73   
Hence, the Sohei decision gave no weight to the end-use of the hard-
ware.74 The Board ultimately indicated that the mix of technical and 
functional features had to be considered to find “contribution to that art 
either in a technical problem (to be) solved, or in a technical effect 
achieved by the solution”.75 Therefore, after Sohei it became clear that 
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the technical character of the invention played a key role in reaching 
business methods patentability. 76 
Further corroboration came from the Pension Benefit Systems case77 
where the claimed invention was both a method that processed data to 
control pension benefits for subscriber employers and, as apparatus, 
and a computer programmed to run the method.78 In the decision, the 
Board of Appeals immediately confirmed that  
 
if the method is technical or, in other words, has a technical 
character, it still may be a method for doing business, but not a 
method for doing business as such.79  
However, the Board distinguished between means conferring technical 
character to the claimed method from those that were not capable of 
that, thus  
The feature of using technical means for a purely non-technical 
purpose and/or for processing purely non-technical infor-
mation does not necessarily confer technical character to any 
such individual steps of use or to the method as a whole….in 
fact, any activity in the non-technical branches of human cul-
ture involves physical entities and uses, to a greater or lesser 
extent, technical means.80 
 
Hence, under this new approach, technical features themselves were 
not as relevant as was their use for a technical purpose. Indeed, the 
Board suggested that in PBS  
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All the features of this claim are steps of processing and pro-
ducing information having purely administrative, actuarial 
and/or financial character. Processing and producing such in-
formation are typical steps of business and economic methods. 
81   
Subsequently, the Board of Appeal concluded that the method claimed 
in PBS was a method for doing business “as such” and, thus, denied pa-
tent protection to invention. However, the PBS ruling revealed 
significant differences from the earlier decision in defining what an in-
ventive apparatus could be. 82  The Board, based on this line of 
reasoning, indeed affirmed that a claimed apparatus embodying a phys-
ical entity or concrete product suitable for performing or supporting an 
economic activity was an invention within the meaning of Article 
52(1).83 Thus,  
in the Board's view a computer system suitably programmed for 
use in a particular field, even if that is the field of business and 
economy, has the character of a concrete apparatus in the 
sense of a physical entity, man-made for a utilitarian purpose 
and is thus an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) 
EPC.84 
The Board, moreover, suggested that the distinction “between "new fea-
tures" of an invention and features of that invention which are known 
from the prior art when examining whether the invention concerned 
may be considered to be an invention within the meaning of Article 
52(1) EPC” was not based on EPC. 85  In the Board’s opinion, hence, the 
difference between new and known features of a claim would be relevant 
not for determining whether an invention is excluded from patentability 
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or not,86 but for testing the requirements of "novelty" and "inventive 
step” within the meaning of Article 56EPC.87 Thus, the Board concluded 
“there is no basis in the EPC for applying this so-called contribution 
approach” 88 since   
the basic test of whether there is an invention within the mean-
ing of Article 52(1), is separate and distinct from the questions 
whether the subject-matter is susceptible of industrial applica-
tion, is new and involves an inventive step.89 
Therefore, just as with State Street in the US, the PBS decision repre-
sented the turning point in the European patent system, considering 
that, with this decision, the Board dismissed the contribution approach 
and stated that the use of any physical entity, such as a programmed 
computer, could bring the claim outside the Articles 52(2) and (3) exclu-
sions, subsequently referred to as “any-hardware approach”.90 
3.3 Harmonization   
The changes outlined so far were not uniformly applied to all EPC Con-
tracting States. In the previous chapter both the German and UK 
decisions have been investigated to understand how those decision had 
influenced the EPC conclusions on business method patentability, 
namely the solution adopted in the Article 52 EPC. On this basis, it 
could be interesting to understand how the EPO Board of Appeal deci-
sions ultimately affected the business-method patentability issue in the 
UK and in Germany.  
In Germany, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, the pres-
ence of a technical device was essential in determining whether claims 
were eligible for patent protection. However, a more liberal interpreta-
tion of what technical is started from the early 1990s when the BGH 
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introduced the so-called “cumulative reflection theory”. In the opinion of 
the German Court, claimed invention has to be considered as a whole 
so that a device involving industrial application, including different con-
trols and consuming energy, is technical regardless of the type of 
software running in the machine.91 Thus, the BGH held that when 
claimed inventions were on both software and hardware, the inherent 
technical character of the hardware was sufficient for granting a patent 
even if the claimed invention was implemented by non-technical soft-
ware.92Moreover, on business method patentability the German Courts 
did not exclude the possibility that business methods could have tech-
nical aspects so long as they involved any system with industrial 
applications.93 Therefore, in the German patent system as happened in 
the EPO system, at the beginning of this century it was clearly asserted 
that business methods related to computer programs could be patenta-
ble when they had a technical nature and produced a technical solution 
to some technical problem. However, in the German jurisprudence, the 
technical requirement had been construed more generously than by the 
EPO.94 
Something different happened in the UK patent system as the UK 
Courts were unwilling to patent business methods even if they were im-
plemented by software programs. In the Merrill Lynch case,95 the Court 
of Appeal stated that it 
cannot be permissible to patent an item excluded by Section 
1(2) under the guise of an article which contains that item— 
that is to say, in the case of a computer program, the patenting 
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of a conventional computer containing that program. Some-
thing further is necessary.96 
The decision, thus, citing the EPO’s Vicom ruling, made the technical 
contribution approach part of the UK precedent97 holding that “a tech-
nical advance over the prior art in the form of a new result” 98 was the 
necessary assessment for patenting any invention. However, this ap-
proach seemed soon to fall out of favour as the High Court held in the 
CFPH case 99 that  
a patentable invention is new and non-obvious information 
about a thing or process that can be made or used in industry. 
What is new and not obvious can be ascertained by comparing 
what the inventor claims his invention to be with what was part 
of the state of the existing art. So the first step in the exercise 
should be to identify what it is the advance in the art that is 
said to be new and non-obvious (and susceptible of industrial 
application). The second step is to determine whether it is both 
new and not obvious (and susceptible of industrial application) 
under the description 'an invention' (in the sense of Article 
52).100  
The major patentability requirement on this two-step method was novel-
ty and non-obviousness, rather than the technical nature of the 
invention. 101 Thus, it was suggested that the UK Courts were moving 
towards the EPO approach, and just as happened in the PBS decision, 
towards abandoning the technical contribution approach.102 
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Nevertheless, in the Aerotel v Telco decision,103 the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales marked the inconsistencies of the EPO “any-
hardware approach” and confirmed the Vicom principles proposing a 
new test, named the “technical effect approach with the rider” test.104 
Lord Justice Jacob stated on the claimed business method  
it is true that it could be implemented using conventional com-
puters, but the key to it is a new physical combination of 
hardware. It seems to us clear that there is here more than just 
a method of doing business as such.105  
Therefore, the UK Court continued following the technical effect ap-
proach as it considered the EPO’s conclusion in PBS invalid.106  Thus “a 
contribution which consists solely of excluded matter will not count as a 
technical contribution”.107 Conclusively, the UKIPO continued to reject 
most of the claims directed to patent business methods, even if they 
were computer implemented.108 
3.4 Summing up  
As already said, the business method exclusion was initially based on 
the mental steps doctrine so that, even if computer implemented, meth-
ods were not patentable subject matter because they were regarded as 
processes, and thus sequences of mental steps, that did not use tech-
nical means for the solution of a technical problem. Vicom and some 
other rulings introduced the contribution approach in the beginning of 
the 90’s, and subsequently the further technical effect approach, so 
that computer-implemented business methods were patentable as long 
as  
																																																								
103 Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd [2007], 7 RPC 117  
104The test consisted into four steps included: “(1) properly construe the claim; (2) 
identify the actual contribution; (3) ask whether it falls solely within the excluded sub-
ject matter; (4) check whether the actual or alleged contribution is actually technical 
in nature.” 
105 Aerotel Ltd (103) 136 
106 Shemtov (25) 508 
107 Aerotel Ltd (103)135 
108 J Pila,’Software Patents, Separation of Powers, and Failed Syllogisms: A Cornucopia 
from the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office’  (2011) The Cam-
bridge Law Journal 203, 209 
	 60	
the program, when running on a computer or loaded into a 
computer, brings about, or is capable of bringing about, a 
technical effect which goes beyond the ‘normal’ physical inter-
actions between the program (software) and the 
computer(hardware on which it is run).109 
The PBS decision rejected this point of view as the Board held that any 
programmed apparatus could be granted a patent, even if used in a 
business field. Thus, in this scenario the presence of a physical entity, 
such as a programmed computer, turned into a sufficient criterion to 
achieve the technical requirement. 
Therefore, in the last twenty years, changes occurred on the concept of 
technicality as patentability requirement. The Board, in this point of 
views, firstly suggested that 
the technical contribution to the art rendering a claimed inven-
tion an invention in the sense of Article 52(1) and thus 
patentable, may lie either in the problem underlying, and 
solved by, the claimed invention, or in the means constituting 
the solution of the underlying problem, or in the effects 
achieved in the solution of the underlying problem.110  
Then, as noted,111 the PBS decision enlarged the concept of technicality 
and, finally, elevated the form of the claim over its substance owing to 
the fact that  
 
the formal category  of such a claim does in fact imply physical 
features of the claimed subject-matter which may  qualify as 
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technical features of the invention concerned and thus be rele-
vant for its patentability.112 
Therefore, the PBS decision circumvented the major obstacle to the 
business methods patentability, bringing the EPO jurisprudence closer 
to the American one, and in particular, to the State Street conclusion 
that, based on “useful, concrete and tangible result” test, affirmed the 
equation between programmed computer and practical utility of the in-
vention.113 
Hence, at the beginning of the new millennium, the EPO’s conclusion 
on the patentability of business methods was very similar to the 
USPTO’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, showing the newly estab-
lished tendency to bring European practices closer to the US ones. 
Ergo, although the European technical requirement could be more ap-
propriate than the American practical utility to deny patent protection 
to vague computer-implemented methods, the PBS case added elements 
of uncertainty to the EPO system, considering that the Board seemed to 
conclude that patent eligibility had to depend more on the formal cate-
gory of the claim than the real purpose of the invention.114 Doubts, 
therefore, grew in Europe about granting patent to business methods, 
as was happening in the US.   
4. Doubts  
4.1   The Bilski case 
In 1999, in the AT&T case,115 the Federal Circuit took the opportunity 
to strengthen the position taken in the State Street case pushing the 
principles announced in its earlier cases.116 Unlike the State Street and 
Alappat cases, the claims here were targeted at a method, not at a sys-
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tem or a machine. The claims, in fact, were on a message record for 
long-distance telephone calls providing differential billing treatment, 
depending upon subscribers’ long-distance carrier.117 The Federal Cir-
cuit, however, based on its ruling in the State Street case, only tested if 
the claimed invention determined a useful, concrete, and tangible result 
considering that “whatever may be left of the earlier test,118 if anything, 
this type of physical limitations analysis [Freeman-Walter-Abele test] 
seems of little value.”119  Thus, in the Court’s opinion, the physical 
transformation “is not an invariable requirement, but merely one exam-
ple of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful 
application”.120 Hence, in the AT&T case, the evaluation of utility was 
the criterion for scrutiny of the patentability of business methods as it 
was for all other subject matters, since the Court stated that no special 
treatment would be needed for them.121 
Based on this line of reasoning, in 2005 the USPTO Guidelines 122 quot-
ing the State Street decision stated that  
the claimed invention as a whole must be useful and accomplish 
a practical application. That is, it must produce a "useful, con-
crete and tangible result”. The purpose of this requirement is to 
limit patent protection to inventions that possess a certain level 
of "real world" value, as opposed to subject matter that repre-
sents nothing more than an idea or concept, or is simply a 
starting point for future investigation or research. 
Moreover the PTO in a memo clarified that  
Based on the Supreme Court precedent and recent Federal 
Circuit decisions, the Office’s guidance to examiners is that a 
§101 process must (1) be tied to another statutory class (such 
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as a particular apparatus) or (2) transform underlying subject 
matter (such as an article or materials) to a different state or 
thing. If neither of these requirements is met by the claim, the 
method is not a patent eligible process under Section 101 and 
should be rejected as being directed to non-statutory subject 
matter. An example of a method claim that would not qualify 
as a statutory process would be a claim that recited purely 
mental steps. Thus, to qualify as Section 101 statutory pro-
cess, the claim should positively recite the other statutory 
class (the things or product) to which it is tie, for example, by 
identifying the apparatus that accomplishes the method steps, 
or positively recite the subject matter that is being trans-
formed, for example by identifying the material that is being 
changed to a different state.123  
Nevertheless, doubts were raised about the validity of such reasoning 
process.124 In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange125, L.L.C., Justice Kennedy, 
concurring Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer underlined “the bur-
geoning number of patents over business methods”126 and focused on 
the diffusion of those firms that used “patents not as a basis for produc-
ing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing 
fees”. 127  Moreover, in LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories 128  Justices 
Breyer, Stevens, and Souter rejected the CAFC’s useful, concrete, and 
practical test and underlined that “this Court has never made such a 
statement.”129 
Echoing these concerns, the CAFC ruled on In re Bilski.130 The claims 
were on a method for hedging the seasonal risk in commodity trading. 
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Considering that the claimed system did not require any computer for 
execution,131 the Federal Circuit pointed out that the invention was not 
more than a method that “merely manipulates abstract idea and solves 
a purely mathematical problem” 132. From this point of view, the Court 
showed concern about the possibility to patent the method, and the 
mathematical algorithms itself, as it “would pre-empt substantially all 
uses of that fundamental principle”133. Hence, the Court stated that the 
machine or physical transformation test discussed in earlier cases134 
was successful in rejecting overreaching patent claims, so that, the 
CAFC concluded the machine or physical transformation test was valid 
law despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to explicitly adopt the test.   
Nonetheless, the CAFC decision was appealed. Even though the non-
patentability of the claimed invention was confirmed, in the Bilski v. 
Kappos case 135  the Supreme Court’s lengthy decision set out the 
court’s view on the physical transformation test validity issue, and on 
the patentability of business methods, too.  Concerning the business 
methods, the Supreme Court confirmed their patentability, but Justice 
Stevens raised some doubts about that decision, and argued that “alt-
hough a process is not patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for 
conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of doing 
business” should not be patentable.136According to this line of reason-
ing, there was not textual justification for the patentability of business 
methods. 137 In particular, Justice Stevens argued that  
the term ‘useful arts’ was widely understood to encompass the 
fields that we would now describe as relating to technology or 
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‘technological arts. Thus, fields such as business and finance 
were not generally considered part of the “useful arts”.138 
However, these arguments were ultimately dismissed and the Court 
stated that “ by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit's development of 
other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and 
are not inconsistent with its text”. 139 As such, the patentability of busi-
ness methods was recognized, in accordance with the State Street 
decision.  
Regarding physicality test, in Bilski the Supreme Court held in favour of 
the “machine or physical transformation” test. However, it was clarified 
that “is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent- 
eligible ‘process”. 140 On this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court as-
serted that the test “is a useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes 
under 35 USC §101”.141 However, the Court underlined that, while it 
could have been sufficient for evaluating processes “similar to those in 
the Industrial Age”,142 it was not without doubt that the test was still 
useful in the “Information Age” 143 in which “new technologies may call 
for new inquiries”.144 Therefore, without stating a new test, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and re-
duced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable 
abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.” 145 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Bilski case, thus, reopened the de-
bate in the US about the patentability of business methods and created 
further uncertainty on the eligibility of the subject matter as the Su-
preme Court did not suggest if and how processes could be granted a 
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patent when a claim did not provide a physical transformation of mat-
ter.146 
 4.2 The EPO Enlarged Board decision  
In Europe, during the same years in which the Bilski cases took place, 
the case law seemed to endorse different conclusions. Perhaps chasing 
the USPTO’s practice, the EPO widened the subject matter that was pa-
tentable. The rationale expressed in the Pension Benefit System was, in 
fact, further revisited in the subsequent decision Hitachi/Auction meth-
od147  where the “any-hardware” approach began to be shaped in a 
clearer way. In the Hitachi case, the claimed invention was about both a 
method of implementing an automated auction system (Dutch auction) 
and a programed apparatus for running the auction via a network. Alt-
hough the Examining Division refused to grant patent “on the grounds 
that its subject-matter, an auction method, was a business method as 
such”,148 the Board of Appeal underlined, following previous cases, that 
both technical and non-technical features had to be tested for the pa-
tentability of the claimed invention.149 However, the Board held that  
the verification that claimed subject-matter is an invention 
within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC is in principle a pre-
requisite for the examination with respect to novelty, inventive 
step and industrial application since these latter requirements 
are defined only for inventions (cf Articles 54(1), 56, and 57 
EPC). The structure of the EPC therefore suggests that it 
should be possible to determine whether subject-matter is ex-
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cluded under Article 52(2) EPC without any knowledge of the 
state of the art.150  
Thus, on this ground, it was concluded, as in the PBS case, that the 
“technical-contribution” approach was incorrect considering that tech-
nical features, rather than subject matter, needed to be regarded more 
appropriately for determining novelty and inventive step.151 Moreover, 
the Board indicated that  
what matters having regard to the concept of "invention" with-
in the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC is the presence of 
technical character which may be implied by the physical fea-
tures of an entity or the nature of an activity, or may be 
conferred to a non-technical activity by the use of technical 
means...Hence, in the Board's view, activities falling within the 
notion of a non-invention "as such" would typically represent 
purely abstract concepts devoid of any technical implica-
tions.152 
Therefore, the Hitachi decision departed from the “technical-
contribution” approach considering that technical requirement could be 
found already in the use of a technical feature such as “server comput-
er”, “client computer” and “network” device. Thus, the Court confirmed 
the PBS rationale and the “any-hardware” approach.  
Moreover, in the Hitachi case, the Board broadened the concept of in-
vention 153  introducing a new test named “the problem-and-solution 
approach”.154 In the Board’s opinion, the achievement of technical char-
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acter in the light of Article 52 EPC did not require consideration of pos-
sible novel or inventive contributions to the prior art. 155  The non-
obviousness, the Board suggested, would be verified at a later stage 
when, according to Article 56, novelty and inventive assessment of the 
invention would be tested.156 Thus, the analysis of prior art could take 
place only after testing the technical character of the claimed invention.  
Therefore, owing to this new three-step test, the EPO would grant pa-
tentability to claimed invention that both used technical (o physical) 
features and was non-obvious to a skilled person starting from the clos-
est prior art.157  
Hence, in the Board's view, activities falling within the notion of a non-
invention "as such" would typically represent purely abstract concepts 
devoid of any technical implications.158 The refinement of this new ap-
proach continued in the Microsoft/Clipboard formats case where the 
Board applied a reasoning process similar to Hitachi. 159 Examining the 
claimed invention both for a method and a computer program that per-
formed the claimed system,160 the Board confirmed “a method using 
technical means is an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) 
EPC”. 161  Furthermore, the Board underlined that “a method imple-
mented in a computer system represents a sequence of steps actually 
performed and achieving an effect.”162 Hence, the Board concluded that  
the claim category of a computer-implemented method is dis-
tinguished from that of a computer program. Even though a 
method, in particular a method of operating a computer, may 
be put into practice with the help of a computer program, a 
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claim relating to such a method does not claim a computer 
program in the category of a computer program.163 
Therefore, the ruling seemed to validate “the problem-solution ap-
proach” even if something more was stated about mixed-type-claim-
feature inventions.164 The Board suggested that computer programs had 
“technical character since [they] relate[s] to a computer-readable medi-
um, i.e. a technical product involving a carrier.”165 According to this line 
of reasoning, computer programs - but not methods - satisfied both the 
technical character requirement and the non-obviousness requirement 
since they were implemented by a computer-reusable medium.166 The 
Microsoft decision was therefore believed to eventually guarantee the pa-
tentability of computer programs in Europe.167 Not the same occurred 
for business methods.168 
On this issue, in a ruling in connection with the Duns Licensing case169 
on a claimed business method invention, the Board of Appeal clarified 
the EPC Article 52(2) and (3) on the “technical-character” requirement  
In order to be patentable, the subject-matter claimed must 
therefore have a “technical character” or to be more precise - 
involve a “technical teaching”, i.e. an instruction addressed to 
a skilled person as to how to solve a particular technical prob-
lem using particular technical means.170  
Moreover, in this holding, the Board underlined that  
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the examination whether there is an invention within the 
meaning of Article 52(1) to (3) EPC should hence be strictly 
separated from and not mixed up with the other three patent-
ability requirements.171  
Therefore, the Board confirmed that  
Since only technical features and aspects of the claimed in-
vention should be taken into account in assessing inventive 
step, i.e. the innovation must be on the technical side, not in a 
non-patentable field.172 
Thus, it concluded for the non-patentability of the claimed business 
method invention, stating that  
interaction with and exploiting information about the physical 
world belongs to the very nature of any business and assum-
ing those as technical would render the exclusion for business 
methods under Article 52(2)(c) EPC meaningless.173 
Hence, in the Board’s opinion,  
Gathering and evaluating data as part of a business research 
method do not convey technical character to the business re-
search method if such steps do not contribute to the technical 
solution of a technical problem.174  
Therefore, the Board finally suggested that business methods were pa-
tentable but only when they were automated by technical means to 
solve a technical problem. However, even if recent holdings confirmed 
the EPO’s course on the patentability of excluded subject matter, they 
did not appear capable of clarifying the criteria for determining whether 
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there was an invention and whether the invention was technical in na-
ture.175 
Casting doubts on the patentability of computer-implemented inven-
tions, the EPO’s President referred under article 112(1)(b) EPC to the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal on four points of law.176 The first question 
addressed was about computer programs and if they were statutory 
subject matter. On this issue, the Enlarged Board underlined that “the 
reference to a "computer program" intended to encompass claims to var-
ious matters which involve a computer program without necessarily 
literally being one.”177 Moreover, reconstructing the Technical Board’s 
decisions, the Enlarged Board focused on the conclusion that “with re-
gard to the exclusions under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC, it does not make 
any difference whether a computer program is claimed by itself or as a 
record on a carrier.”178  
However, the Enlarged Board suggested that it did not mean that com-
puter programs would have always been eligible for patent protection 
considering that  
a claim which specifies no more than "Program X on a com-
puter-readable storage medium," or "A method of operating a 
computer according to program X," will always still fail to be 
patentable for lack of an inventive step under Articles 52(1) 
and 56 EPC.179 
Thus, the Enlarged Board declined the Referral conclusion that   
if one were to follow the reasoning of T 424/03 [Mi-
crosoft/Chipboard format decision] overcoming the exclusion of 
programs for computers would become a formality, merely re-
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quiring formulation of the claim as a computer implemented 
method or as a computer program product.180  
Thus, the Enlarged Board seemed to confirm that technicality was al-
ways to be tested, even it was not be clarified how the technicality of 
claimed computer- implemented subject matter could be determined. 
With the second and the third questions, the Enlarged Board was asked 
to clarify whether a computer program and a computer-implemented 
method were different, and furthermore, if technical character could be 
conferred merely by explicitly mentioning the use of a computer or a 
computer-readable data storage medium or if it was necessary to identi-
fy a technical effect brought about on a physical entity. The Enlarged 
Board indicated the existence of a logical distinction “between a method 
carried out by a computer and the sequential list of instructions which 
specify that method.”181 Moreover, the Enlarged Board confirmed, refer-
ring to the Board of Appeal’s case law, that all claimed features, both 
technical and non-technical, should be considered as a whole in evalu-
ating the technical character of the invention. The Enlarged Board 
underlined the EPO’s consistency in applying the approach that 
starts with a consideration of all the features together to de-
termine whether the claimed subject-matter has a technical 
character. Only once this determination has been made can 
the Board turn to the question of which claimed features con-
tribute to that technical character and therefore should be 
taken into account for the assessment of whether there is an 
inventive step. It is in fact a well-established principle that 
features which would, taken in isolation, belong to the matters 
excluded from patentability by Article 52(2) EPC may nonethe-
less contribute to the technical character of a claimed 
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invention, and therefore cannot be discarded in the considera-
tion of the inventive step.182 
Nevertheless, the Enlarged Board did not provide an answer to the main 
concerns of the EPO’s President about what conferred technicality to 
the invention and how to test this requirement either by the “technical-
contribution” approach or the “any-hardware” approach. The fourth 
question, at last, introduced the main issue on the patentability of 
computer-implemented invention, namely whether the activity of pro-
gramming a computer  - thus, the intellectual activity of working out 
what steps were to be included in a computer program - necessarily in-
volved technical considerations. The Enlarged Board ruled that  
although it may be said that all computer programming in-
volves technical considerations since it is concerned with 
defining a method which can be carried out by a machine, 
that in itself is not enough to demonstrate that the program 
which results from the programming has technical character; 
the programmer must have had technical considerations be-
yond "merely" finding a computer algorithm to carry out some 
procedure.183  
However, the Enlarged Board refrained from discussing the technical 
nature of algorithms, and pointed out only that even if “the abstract 
formulation of algorithms” was not sufficient to regard them as “belong-
ing to a technical field”, 184 computer programs could be patentable 
considering   
the fact that fundamentally the formulation of every computer 
program requires technical considerations in the sense that 
the programmer has to construct a procedure that a machine 
can carry out, is not enough to guarantee that the program 
has a technical character … by  analogy one would say that 
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this is only guaranteed if writing the program requires “further 
technical considerations”.185 
Therefore, the decision of the Enlarged Board, finally confirmed the pa-
tentability of computer-implemented invention, including business 
methods. However, as was underlined by one scholar,186 not all doubts 
were dismissed. The Enlarged Board, in fact, did not clarify the definite 
EPO’s approach to assessing the exclusion of subject matter as well as 
the criterion to be used for ascertaining whether the requirement of 
technicality was satisfied. 
5. Alice vs. CLS Bank and the future of business method patentabil-
ity 
Four years after the Bilski decision, the theme of business method pa-
tentability reappeared on the list of the US Supreme Court arguments. 
The case, namely Alice vs. CLS Bank,187 was about the patentability of a 
computer system tracking the balances of different trading parties in 
settlements in financial markets to reduce the risk of lack of funds. i.e. 
the system only allowed to execute the settlement if both parties to the 
trade had sufficient funds. The Alice decision, indeed, gave the Court 
the opportunity to reconsider its position on the “machine or transfor-
mation” test as already established in the Bilski decision.  
Based on the conclusion drafted in the Mayo case,188 the Court has fo-
cused in the Alice decision on the necessity of a double analysis to be 
conducted on claims regarding “judicial exception”, i.e. claims with ab-
stract ideas and claims with laws of nature.189 On one hand, the Court 
has clearly stated that ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
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stract ideas are not patentable.’190Thus, a first step in the examination 
of an abstract idea, namely “Part1” of the analysis, has been detailed, 
thereby aiming to identify whether an invention is more than just an 
abstract idea.191 On the other hand, the Court has imposed a further 
step in the analysis of abstract ideas, namely  “Part 2” of the Analy-
sis,192 which has to determine whether the invention has any “ inventive 
concept”. Thus, according to the “ two-part analysis”, computer-
implement inventions will be patented when one element or a combina-
tion of elements are introduced in the patent claims that could ensure 
that the invention ‘amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea 
itself.’193  
In the light of arguments already discussed, the Court has decided on 
the invention challenged in the Alice case concluding  
the claims at issue here amount to “nothing significantly 
more” than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of inter-
mediated settlement using some unspecified, generic 
computer… the method claims, which merely require generic 
computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea 
[intermediated settlement] into a patent-eligible invention.194 
Hence, a new test, namely the “patent-eligibility” test, has replaced the 
“machine or transformation” test, according to the Alice decisions. Nev-
ertheless, the new test is vaguely defined. Indeed, the Court does not 
give enough indication on what a patent eligible invention is. Only a 
negative definition is provided  
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Neither stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘ap-
ply it,’ ” ... nor limiting the use of an abstract idea “to a 
particular technological environment”..., is enough for patent 
eligibility. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words 
“apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, 
with the same deficient result. Wholly generic computer im-
plementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature” 
that provides any “practical assurance that the process is 
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ab-
stract idea] itself. 195 
The Alice decision as well as previously the Bilski decision, therefore, 
avoids saying clear words against the patentability of business methods 
or software. Conversely, the US Court seems to confirm its quite open 
approach to this kind of inventions.196 As such, business methods are 
general patentable, whereby they are innovative, according to the con-
clusions drafted in the Alice case. Even if a tougher analysis is depicted, 
indeed, only methods that consist in ‘well-understood, routine and con-
ventional activities previously known to the industry’ are ultimately 
excluded from patent protection ex 35 USC. 197 Furthermore, this ap-
proach has been empathized by some recent Federal Circuit’s 
decisions198 that have confirmed that software and business methods 
are quite often patentable in the US.199 Hence, the debate on this issue 
is expected to continue.  
6. Some conclusions  
The analysis conducted in this chapter has revealed more similarities 
than differences between the European and the US legal framework on 
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the patentability of business methods. Based on a consistent jurispru-
dence of the US Supreme Court on 35 USC § 101, business methods 
are usually patented at the USPTO. This is especially true when busi-
ness methods are implemented by computer. And this is true also in 
Europe. However, the technical requirement ex Article 52 and ex Article 
56 EPC is taken into particular account in testing business patentabil-
ity in Europe. As such, business methods are patentable in Europe 
whereby based on technical considerations. Thus, business methods 
that are not computer-implemented, as well as those whose inventive 
step is not a technical feature, are not patentable in Europe. Converse-
ly, in the US, business methods are patented even if the inventive step 
does not refer to some technical improvement.  
Nevertheless, a more strict examination seems to be ultimately required 
with regard to the US Supreme Court decisions in the Bilski and Alice 
cases. As such, abstract methods, i.e. pure methods as well as mere al-
gorithms, are not patentable anymore even in the US. Thus, a possible 
rapprochement has been suggested to be occurred between the more 
sever European point of view and the USPTO broad approach. However, 
differences remain. Lacking of  a coherent regulations, the European 
policy on business method patents is not completely clear, as is evident 
from the decision of the EPO Enlarge Board of Appeal. Indeed, EPO is 
often more hesitant than USPTO in granting patent protection to busi-
ness methods.  
Such a hesitation has been often linked to the difficulties in identifying 
the effects of business method patents on innovation and especially on 
competition. In particular, concerns have arisen regard to the possibility 
that the EPO would develop a more positive attitude towards business 
methods, i.e. a wider interpretation of the technical requirements as 
that adopted in the US. All this considered, the economic effects of 
business method patents will be examined in the next chapter, namely 
Chapter 3. In particular, the chapter will be aimed at understanding if 
any of the traditional economic rationales can be applied to explain the 
patentability of business methods, or if a new point of view is necessary. 
Chapter III 
What economic and social effects can be expected from 
patenting business methods? 
 
1. Introduction  
The analysis on Chapter II has made clear that patentability of business 
method is now generally accepted both in the US and in Europe. Ac-
cording to the proper nature of this type of inventions, however, doubts 
have been expressed about the beneficial effects to society that could 
come from granting patent protection to business methods. In particu-
lar, business methods tend to be poor in technicality and rather quite 
abstract. As such, patent claims are often generic and inventions are 
broadly defined. Thus, business method patents tend to cover more 
than the real core of the innovative process behind the invention. As re-
sult, enlarged pieces of common knowledge can be excluded from the 
public use. Therefore, patent monopolistic privileges issued on business 
methods easily result in stifling innovation. Similarly, competition in the 
market could be affected whereby granting such a broad patent protec-
tion to processes and methods could prevent firms, specifically the 
small one, to implement similar technologies. Hence, it cannot be ex-
cluded that beneficial effects traditionally associated to patents could be 
overcome by detrimental effects in the case of business methods.   
All this considered, this chapter mainly focuses on the debate on the 
possible and expected social and economic effect of business method 
patents. On this purpose, the traditional theoretical justifications for 
patent monopolistic privileges will be critically examined to ascertain 
whether one of them would be able to explain business method patents 
and what beneficial effects would result from offering exclusive rights to 
business method inventors. The chapter will be divided into three parts. 
In the first part, the literature on the economic rationales commonly 
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recognised to be served by patents will be synthetically reviewed. Specif-
ic focus will be given to incentive, disclosure, signalling and transaction 
rationale. Nevertheless, as will be explained in the second part, the 
business method innovation presents some peculiarities that make it 
difficult to understand what economic and social results can be 
achieved troughs business method patents, according to one of the four 
above rationale. My suggestion, in the third part, will be to place the 
phenomenon into context; thus, I will compare the generally recognized 
beneficial effects of patents to the suggested possible negative conse-
quences of patenting business methods.  A new perspective, hence, will 
be offered to explain, on one side, the firm’s purpose in so keenly seek-
ing patent protection for business methods and, on the other side, the 
economic efficiencies that can be ultimately achieved. 
2. Possible economic rationales behind patent protection   
The upshot of the issuing of a patent is the awarding of a temporary 
monopoly to the inventor. Thus, patent holders have exclusive rights to 
exploit their inventions. Nevertheless, these privileges could result in 
market distortions and other social costs such as high price, decline in 
consumption, decrease in gross domestic product and deadweight loss.1 
Consequently, achieving a fair balance between reducing in competition 
and a benefit to society is deemed indispensable when an invention, or 
rather a category of invention, is considered for patent protection.2 This 
line of reasoning holds that patent restraints can be justified only if 
granting exclusive rights to inventors can result in some beneficial ef-
fects on the economy.3 Thus, ill effects, such as a reduction in the 
output or an increasing the prices of the final products, should be over-
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come by positive effects on innovation and consumer welfare in order to 
provide patent protection to innovative technologies.4  
From an economic perspective, a number of different theoretical frame-
works have been developed to determine whether patent protection 
could achieve the predicted growth in the market and the wider benefit 
to the society. Regarding the literature on this topic, four rationales 
have been mainly presented in the attempt to provide support for grant-
ing exclusive use of inventions to patent holders. Namely, incentive, 
disclosure, signalling and transaction have been highlighted as positive 
and final economic outcomes of patents. Thus, each of these purposes 
is the reason for their focus in this part of the research on a principal 
reason monopolistic rights have been granted to inventors.  
2.1 Incentive  
According to most traditional economical theories on patenting, the 
main beneficial effect achieved by granting patent protection to inven-
tions is the promotion of innovation.5 In particular, a firm’s decision 
concerning how much to spend on research, i.e. to invest in innovation 
developing new products etc., is mainly based on the possibility of re-
ceiving lucrative economic rewards from marketing their inventions. 6 
However, competitors can easily copy inventions that are marketed. 
And, firms, who copy someone else’s inventions, are able to reduce price 
significantly, as they do not have to cover costs for research and innova-
tion.7 Therefore, if inventions were not patentable, their disclosure and 
general exploitation would drive prices down so low that costs to devel-
op inventions could not be ultimately recouped by the inventor.8 Hence, 
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according to the traditional view, patent protection is essential in pro-
moting innovation considering that firms are encouraged toward the 
development of new technologies by the confidence to grant monopoly 
rights on inventions; thereby, receiving high returns from their exclu-
sive use.9 Indeed, the strong connection between exclusive rights and 
technological innovation is a key point according to this traditional ap-
proach. 10   As suggested by Joseph Schumpeter, investments in 
innovation are made in the expectation of monopoly profits; thus, the 
social benefit of technical progress is assured by the presence of mo-
nopolistic players in the marketplace.11  
The Schumpeterian model has been elaborated in the Prospect Theory 
by Kitch.12 In particular, from Kitch’s point of view, firms have an incen-
tive to innovate only if they have been assured of having the power to 
control all uses relating to the new technology by granting patent pro-
tection for it. 13  Specifically, inventors have an incentive to make 
investments to improve new technologies only when they are sure to 
appropriate in advance, thus before their exploitation, all the technolog-
ical uses that result from their innovations. 14  Hence, according to 
Prospect Theory, preventing, or at least, reducing competition is essen-
tial for improving innovation and a strong patent protection is 
fundamental in serving this purpose. 15 However, the idea behind the 
prospect theory that only “strong and broad patent rights are conducive 
to economic progress” 16 has been rejected by some commentators, who 
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Property’  (2002) 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 209, 209  
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contend that monopolists are less interested in innovation than firms in 
a competitive market.17  
According to Arrow’s arguments, in a competitive market the develop-
ment of innovative products can result in significant gains for the firm 
that decides to invest in innovation.18 Instead, the firm profit is cut if an 
innovation takes place in a monopolistic market. Specifically, the new 
product substitutes the previous one, according to the replacement ef-
fect.19 Thus, unlike firms in a competitive market, a monopolist can 
capture only a small part of the profits coming from the new invention 
because the new profits will simply replace the previous source of prof-
its.20 Recently, Arrow’s conclusions that patent protection can result in 
reducing firms’ investments in innovation have gained more support. In 
particular, looking at the digital revolution, the lack of patent protection 
has been put forward to explain the incredible growth of innovation in 
software technologies, especially at their very outset.21 Therefore, the 
idea has been promoted that innovation would be best encouraged in 
the absence of patent protection.22   
Notwithstanding the perspective above, recent studies have shown that 
conferring strong monopoly privileges to firms can still be useful in 
stimulating innovation.23 Indeed, arguments both for and against patent 
protection have been made and peculiarities of each industrial sector 
have been stressed in order to justify the possibility of tailoring patent 
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systems according to the specific of each industry.24  In particular, 
doubts have been cast on the efficiency of property rights regarding 
those industrial sectors such as software whereby no large investment 
in R&D is required, and where being the first mover in the market is 
enough to produce satisfying returns.25 Hence, no patent protection is 
thought to be ultimately needed to recoup the R&D investment in such 
a type of industries.26 On the other hand, patents have been said to 
best promote innovation in those industries that are knowledge based 
and there is a low-cost to reverse engineering.27 This is because invest-
ment in R&D is so high in such contexts that only the monopolistic use 
of inventions can get returns for the firms.28 Therefore, the idea is 
commonly supported that patent protection can still produce social 
benefits in promoting innovation, but only in conjunction with those 
technologies for which companies would not stay in the market, devel-
oping their inventions, unless granted monopoly rights.29 This is simply 
because only a long-term patent protection appropriate to the value of 
the invention can recoup the incurred costs.30  
2.2 Disclosure  
To explain the economic rationale of patent systems, some authors have 
pointed out that the prospect of granting exclusive rights can encourage 
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the disclosure of innovation.31 Since innovation is commonly built on 
previous technical knowledge, firms tend to keep their technical infor-
mation secret as disclosure can result in reducing rivals’ costs for 
improving innovation and the creation of new competitive products.32 
However, being sure in the knowledge that no one can copy or use the 
technology without a licensing agreement makes firms keener on shar-
ing their information and expertise, instead of keeping them secret. As 
such, granting temporary property rights to inventors could result in a 
fair exchange for disclosure of technical information.33 Thus conceived, 
patents could be described as a contract between the inventor and soci-
ety, so that IP rights are offered as result of diffusion of innovative 
knowledge.34 
 
According to the economic framework of the disclosure theory,35 patents 
can serve the purpose of circulating knowledge and facilitating the 
widespread diffusion of innovation,36 ultimately encouraging a growth in 
productivity.37 Taking this view, certain social benefits can come about 
from granting exclusive rights to inventors according to the fact that 
disclosure allows other entrepreneurs to implement inventions around 
technologies already patented both during patent terms (paying royal-
ties) and once the terms are expired (without paying royalties).38 The 
spill-over effect resulting from patent disclosure has been presented, 
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indeed, as the evidence that improvement in innovation could emanate 
just as easily from other people than from the same inventor.39 Moreo-
ver, disclosures, even better if earlier disclosures, have been linked to 
follow on effects on inventors and the fair distribution of profit among 
all the inventors, especially in those contexts where innovation comes 
from cumulative efforts.40 Therefore, from an economic point of view, 
patent disclosure can serve in achieving goals such as overcoming the 
deadweight loss commonly associated with secrecy (such as the risks of 
duplications or involuntary discovery)41 or producing spill-over effects 
with beneficial consequences in those sectors where firms are not natu-
rally willing to give assistance to other subjects in implementing 
inventions.42  
Nevertheless, some arguments have been advanced against the effec-
tiveness of patents in inducing disclosure and in achieving the other 
stated goals. In particular, in several technologies, for example in 
pharmaceutical industries, trade secrecy represents a major output and 
patent applications can affect this confidentiality because the more pa-
tents companies apply for, the more information they reveal. 43 
Additionally, the quality of disclosure and its usefulness is strongly af-
fected when patent claims use unclear language and provide incomplete 
information, as studies have indicated.44 Indeed, the use of unclear lan-
guage and incomplete information usually reflects the aim of reducing 
the risk of disclosing confidential information.45 This is particularly the 
case of software patent applications, where use of abstract language has 
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been highlighted.46 Indeed, claims in the software sector are often draft-
ed in such a way that more than one implementation can be covered by 
the same patent application. Rarely, if ever, it is the source code dis-
closed, whereas usually it is the functions instead of the structures of 
the invention that are described.47 Thus, very little substantive infor-
mation about the software is disclosed to the public, whereas patent 
protection is broadly granted to the technology underpinning the inven-
tions. As such, software industry is commonly held up as an example of 
incapacity of disclosure theory in explaining the rationale for patent 
protection.48 
2.3 Signalling  
A new perspective has been recently adopted to explain the rationale 
behind patent protection, which is mainly based on the correlation be-
tween the monopolistic use of inventions and the achievement of an 
appropriate allocation of resources.49 In particular, in some industries 
such as biotechnology, the implementation of inventions often requires 
time and it is prohibitively expensive. Thus, the reality of getting some 
kinds of inventions into the market is extremely costly, and firms do not 
always have adequate resources to market their inventions.50 As a re-
sult, disclosing the invention and receiving early patent protection can 
result in the possibility of firms raising venture capital. As such, pa-
tents allow the development and marketing of innovative technology 
that generate positive effects on economic growth.51  
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In terms of the start-up phase, the signalling purpose of the patent sys-
tem is well established.52 According to recent studies,53 patents and 
patent applications are considered to be important in securing access to 
the resource by new entrepreneurs. In particular, the relationship be-
tween inexperienced entrepreneurs and prominent venture capital 
investors seems to be brought about by patents.54 Similarly, several in-
ventions are believed to be made marketable in recent years by the 
meeting of inventors and investors made possible by patents.55 Indeed, 
patent applications can serve as an indicator of the quality of innovative 
products and methods and can be used to draw attention to the profit 
potentiality of new technologies. 56 
The wider benefits to the economy, other than the ones already men-
tioned, are thought to occur as a result of the role played by patent 
applications in signalling the developing of news technologies. Most evi-
dently, in a competitive system, it can easily be the case that firms seek 
the same invention at the same time, thereby causing inefficiency such 
as overfishing effects.57 Hence, according to some scholars, the role of 
the patent system would be to avoid the wasting of resources.58 In par-
ticular, inefficiencies can result when two or more firms invest in the 
same innovation. Indeed, a duplication of effort can easily occur when 
the development of new products or technologies is not promptly an-
nounced. However, throughout the patent application process, firms 
advertise their inventions so other competitors can be made aware of 
developing research, and therefore decide to stop their inventive efforts 
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in favour of cross licensing.59 This will ultimately enable companies to 
avoid the overuse of resources for improving the same innovative tech-
nology. 60 
Nevertheless, doubts have been cast on signalling role in explaining the 
economic rationale for patent protection. In particular, patents seem to 
be able to act as a signal to attract investors and capital only in specific 
technological area, namely in knowledge intensive industries where a 
long and costly research is needed for the development of innovative 
products.61 Furthermore, patents appear to be capable of attracting 
capital and investors only in the early stage of the development of this 
kind of invention. This is often because the more is known about a 
technology, the more investors and firms tend to have the same amount 
of information. As such the patent value of signals decreases because 
investors can based their decisions on a more large range of elements. 
These are the conclusions of a recent study on biotechnological start-
ups.62 It has proved that venture capital firms are more prone to provide 
funds to star up in the first stages of invention, i.e. when a patent ap-
plication have been just filed, than after a while when investors know 
more on the its development.63 Therefore, the patent signalling rationale 
appears to be confirmed only with regard to some type of industries and 
in the early stage of invention development.   
2.4 Transaction  
Emerging industries, such as those engaged in software, have increas-
ingly brought to the fore a different model of innovation. According to 
this model, “newness” results from an incremental improvement or a 
recombination of existing inventions rather than from a “moment of 
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epiphany”. 64 Indeed, the cumulative nature of innovation has been re-
marked with regard to those products that basically embody existing 
technologies.65 As such, in cumulative innovation novelty is no more 
than a minor implementation of what has already been patented.66 In 
focusing on cumulative innovation and second-generation products, 
some concerns have been expressed about the effectiveness of patent 
protection in implementing innovation.67 A major issue has been to de-
termine what beneficial effects could result from granting patent 
protection to those inventions that do not have a significant value in 
their own right, but can, nonetheless, be a springboard for valuable se-
cond generation innovations.68 Indeed, granting strong property rights 
to the first inventor could deter others from developing more useful 
products.  Hence, according to the cumulative innovation theory, a fair 
balance of patent prerogatives between the original inventor and subse-
quent implementers needs to be brought about. 69  This is because 
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patent protection should be aligned to every single invention improve-
ment, rather than the granting of broad patents to pioneers.70   
One of the merits of the cumulative innovation theory is that it high-
lights the significance of interactions among new and previous patented 
inventions in the development of new products, as well as the magni-
tude of sharing and transferring technologies; thereby, spurring 
innovation among firms.71 According to this theory, licensing and prior 
agreements  - i.e. research joint venture- are presented as effective tools 
in developing technology improvement and promoting innovation. 72  
From this point of view, creating an environment where there is the 
possibility of enhancing licensing agreements should be the main objec-
tive accomplished by the patent system.73 In particular, granting a 
proportionate level of property rights, i.e. a different level depending on 
the nature of the invention, is presented as the better way to enable the 
use of the same technologies by more than one company, and therefore 
ultimately fostering innovation and entrepreneurship.74  
According to this line of reasoning, the enlargement of patent protection 
to every little piece of innovation – albeit with differing treatment in rela-
tion to the respective technology- as well as the increase in the number 
of patents and patent owners, are important features in creating a fair 
competition in patent market and in encouraging patent licensing 
agreements.75 Additionally, an organised patent system can result in 
the creation of harmonization in terms of registration procedures and 
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fees, for example.76 Furthermore, transaction costs can be reduced, 
thereby generating, according to this line of reasoning, an increase in 
negotiations made possible by such an enlarged patent protection. 77 
This can be regarded as one of the most beneficial outcomes of the pa-
tent system on economic growth; especially in new, high-tech 
industries.78  
However, criticism has been made about using the increasing in trans-
actions to explain the rationale behind patent protection. 79  In 
particular, it has been argued that the possibility to patent each and 
every small invention (from early versions to the subsets of products) 
leads to an excessive fragmentation of patent rights; thus, numerous li-
censing agreements need to be reached to complete broader 
developments so that transactions ultimately stifle innovation instead of 
implementing it.80  In this vein, the aggregation of the different innova-
tive contributions can be difficult and costly when several companies 
own those patents that are related to the same technology.81 Additional-
ly, firms can struggle to develop new products when in the process of 
reaching agreements. This could be made particularly complicated by a 
rival’s refusal of licensing or by a request of exorbitant fees. As such, 
the idea of an enlarged patent protection as the best way to improve in-
novation has been questioned. According to the anti-commons theory,82 
the proliferation of patents can determine opportunistic behaviours 
when the access to multiple patented inputs is needed to create a sin-
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gle, useful product.83 In particular, in cumulative innovation technolo-
gies, any restrictions on access to the patented discoveries is thought to 
impede the full development of new technologies and inventions are ul-
timately underused as is the case when resources are scarce and 
multiple owners have the right to exclude one another.84 Therefore, the 
possibility that inventions can be underused has been put forward as 
well as the possibility that patent protection can be detrimental to the 
economical growth, based on the tragedy of anti-commons theory.  
3. Invention, innovation and business method patents 
As suggested in the previous section, incentive, disclosure, signalling 
and transaction refer to the main purposes that patent protection can 
serve with regard to innovations. However, none of the traditional ra-
tionale for patent protection seems to be clearly achieved by granting 
exclusive rights to software or other similar cumulative innovations.85 
Thus, offering patent protection to computer-implemented inventions, 
including business methods, might not provide enough beneficial effects 
to society, especially with regard to improve technological progress or 
competition.  Admittedly, some beneficial effects have been pointed out 
as results of patenting computer implemented business methods. Both 
enhancing start up reputation, avoiding technology from being copied, 
increasing the opportunity to attract venture funding are positive out-
comes identified in the US as result of granting patent protection to 
business methods. 86 However business methods are a rather atypical 
kind of invention in terms of their source, purpose and use. Thus, con-
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cerns have been raised about the possibility that such beneficial effects 
could be outweighed by negative ones. In particular, doubts on the pa-
tentability of business methods have been cast according to some of the 
key features of innovation in these kinds of inventions. Most succinctly, 
innovation in business methods has been described in the following 
terms: 
 a) Spontaneous and general  
 “Valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing among candidates 
for a job”87 are all possible areas of business method patents. In partic-
ular, claims in business method patents relate to economic activities 
and financial relationships. Nevertheless, practices set out in business 
method patents are often no more than a codification of emulative and 
competitive behaviours, which have already been identified in the mar-
ket arena.88 Business method patents even embedded basic tools such 
as the business general rules that govern trader’s behaviours in the 
market.89 Hence, the lack of novelty is considered one of the main issue 
in granting patent protection to business methods according to the fact 
that often practices codified in these types of patents are not the result 
of an innovative intuition.90 In most cases business method patent ap-
plications intend to cover some well-known modus operandi generated 
and developed spontaneously in the market. Therefore, doubts have 
been cast about the necessity of patent protection for business meth-
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ods. 91 In particular, the circumstances have been noted where innova-
tion occurs automatically, alongside natural developments in trading 
behaviours. As such, business methods are viewed as products that 
would be invented in any case.92 Consequently, innovation does not 
need any incentive to be fostered in the business method arena, and 
consequently granting of exclusive rights to firms is needed. Hence, 
from this perspective, the rationale for business method patents cannot 
surely originate from incentive purposes.93   
b) No cost 
Historically, patents have been put forward as one of  the means to find 
the resource to ultimately reward the labour, skill and effort that were 
expended in producing new outcome.94 However, business methods are 
often the formalization of recurrent behaviours and practices related to 
trade procedures already adopted in the market. Most of the times, 
therefore, no direct investment is needed to produce a new business 
method or, at least, the R&D costs are extremely low.95 Unlike to other 
type of innovation requiring long and costly experimentation, hence, the 
development of a business method does not require that firms attract 
venture capital for commercialising new products.96 Thus, there is a 
significant difference between business methods and other subject are-
as regarding patentability costs. This is evident in manufacturing or 
biotechnological industries, where the development of new products re-
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quires a large amount of time and money, and firm tend to make signif-
icant investments in R&D. As such, patent protection is keenly sought 
to facilitate the possibility of attracting the capital necessary for imple-
menting the new invention.97 Mostly obviously, IP protection is sought 
to signal the value of the invention in cases like these.98 Conversely, in 
business methods, innovation can frequently derive from a simply 
translation in binary code of practices that can be already observed 
among traders and consumers. Therefore, it does not seem that a ra-
tionale for patent protection of business methods can be provided by 
either a cost-recovery or signalling purpose.99  
c) Benefiting from head starting  
Doubts on the need of patent protection for computer-implemented 
business methods have been raised according to the results of some 
studies about the software industry.100 In particular, it has been shown 
that being the first mover in the software context has often allowed 
companies to make huge profits, even though the technology is only 
protected by copyright.101 Frequently, firms introducing new software 
have been able to establish strong relationships with customers that 
would remain intact even when competitors have begun to offer similar 
products.102 Hence, great advantages are thought to be gained from be-
ing the first, or early, mover in the market and the idea has been often 
expressed that a head start can be sufficient to enable firms to recover 
invention costs to the effect that property prerogatives are not necessary 
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to address inventive efforts.103  Moreover, in the a fast moving IT world, 
the first-mover effect appears to be particular significant according to the 
fact that lock-in and network effects usually secure clients and aligned 
them to the first inventor.104 Henceforth, there has been scepticism 
about business method patentability since being the first to use a busi-
ness method can be a more than sufficient reward for companies.105 
Factored into such scepticism is the idea that customers are not likely 
to change when it requires more work and implies losing created net-
works. Likewise, other IT products as well as business methods, when 
new to the market, are often able to get standardisation benefits and 
strong brand recognitions is established with consumers. 106 According-
ly, scholars have suggested that patent protection is not needed for 
business methods, considering that the first mover advantage assures 
firms returns that recoup costs, but can, and often do, generate net 
profit.107 
d) Obvious  
As discussed in section 2.1, patent exclusive rights are granted to en-
courage the disclosure of technical knowledge and information. 
Nevertheless, business methods often consist of processes and proce-
dures whose terms can be easily knowable, especially by experts in the 
sector.108 In particular, business method patents tend to cover schemes 
and techniques of selling and buying that are already practised in the 
market and tend to incorporate basic elements that are already 
known.109 Thus, the content of the invention can on many occasions be 
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known even without the publication of the patent application. As such, 
exclusive rights cannot be a pay-off for the disclosure of the inventions 
as supported by the patent disclosure theory.110  
On the other hand, doubts have been cast about the aim of supporting 
the circulation of technical knowledge due to the lack of clarity of busi-
ness method patent claims.111 In particular, business method patent 
claims are often vague and, as already said above, applicants are used 
to describing business method inventions employing terms, expressions 
and words that ultimately have the effect of reducing any understand-
ing of any precise ideas about the boundaries of the innovative process 
and the step sequences behind the process itself.112 Additionally, it has 
been pointed out that the lack of clarity in the descriptions of inventions 
in business method patents results from a lack of technicality in lan-
guage and the broadness of verbal expressions. 113  Under these 
circumstances, argument is advanced that business method patents do 
not achieve the purpose of bringing about the disclosure of an innova-
tion as well as widespread circulation of the technical knowledge 
embedded in those inventions.114   
e) Naturally competitive  
Sharing and transfer of knowledge are deemed essential to ensure eco-
nomic growth. Thus, one of the purposes for granting patent protection 
to inventions is to create such certainty about an innovation’s property 
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prerogative that inventors are encouraged to give others the right to use 
them. 115  This, therefore, encourages transactions, namely licensing, 
cross-licensing and patent-pool agreements, and has been viewed as an 
essential rationale of patent protection. Ultimately, patent systems re-
sult in beneficial effects both on innovation and competition that are 
fostered from such an exchange of information and practicalities. How-
ever, it has been pointed out that business methods are commonly 
developed and implemented in competitive arenas due to the fact that 
they are often the codification of behaviours exhibited by rivals in the 
markets.116 In most cases, therefore, firms that implement business 
method patents are already engaged in economic competition.117 Hence, 
property prerogatives might not be so important in increasing competi-
tion in a business method context as in the case in less competitive 
sectors. Additionally, it has been underlined that the monopoly privilege 
is not only unnecessary in fostering innovation in the business method 
technical area, but that patent protection can even produce some det-
rimental effects. 118  These are particular evident in cumulative 
innovation. It has been pointed out that often several patents are need-
ed to manufacture a valuable product. Consequently, a certain number 
of licensing agreements are needed. However, individual entrepreneurs 
or start-ups cannot often bear the costs associated with processing and 
licensing several patents at the same time. Thus, granting exclusive 
rights can result in deterring firms, small ones in particular, to enter 
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the market when innovation is cumulative as is often the case of busi-
ness methods implemented by computers.119 
4.  Detrimental effects of business method patents  
Based on the previous observations, traditional economic theories ap-
pear to fail to provide an economic foundation and rationale for granting 
patent protection to business methods.120 According to the particular 
features of innovation in business methods, side effects that outweigh 
positive effects can result from granting patent protection to this subject 
matter. By placing the phenomenon in context, it is possible to provide 
clues for understanding what kind of negative consequences can come 
from patenting a business method. Especially, in the sections below cer-
tain detrimental effects commonly associated to business method 
patents will be analysed alongside the beneficial ones that are common-
ly linked to patents. All this would assist in understanding the 
underlying reason that has made business methods such a popular 
subject matter at the EPO and in other patent systems around the 
world. 
4.1 Restraining competition vs. spurring innovation 
As pointed up in the previ section, in a business method context, inno-
vation is not costly and large investments in R&D are often not 
required.121 Thus, in most cases, firms that apply for business method 
patents are not seeking exclusive rights to recoup their investment in 
innovation. Additionally, business method firms are not commonly 
thought to be interested in using their property prerogative to attract 
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capital to implement innovation.122 As matter of fact, recent investiga-
tions into the phenomenon of business methods patents have shown 
that firms filing patent applications are not mainly driven from a desire 
to develop and implement their inventions; instead, firms seem to be 
more focused and interested in creating a large patent portfolio per se. 
123 There is clear evidence of this approach. This is demonstrated most 
obviously by significantly high number of applications that are filed 
each year in the category of business method patents and the lack of 
novelty as well as the obviousness of claims, which is often interpreted 
as an indication that firms do not seek patent protection for business 
methods to spur on innovation. Conversely, the practice of filing nu-
merous applications in the category of business methods has been 
correlated with a firm’s high-risk chance of being engaged in expensive 
lawsuits. It has been pointed out that in the business - method techno-
logical area the chances of future infringement lawsuits is perceived as 
highly probable, and thus proceeds with a genuine threat of costly com-
pensation hanging over both firms already in the market, which could 
have to defend suits for invalidity, and new comers which could be suit-
ed for infringement. However, the probability of being sued for 
infringement is believed to be lower when several patents are held be-
cause, an alleged infringer can, effectively, counter by alleging 
infringement of its own patents. Thus, firms tend to build large patent 
portfolios, irrespective of the quality and the validity of the patents, to 
avoid litigation. Therefore, it appears that patent applications are main-
ly filed in the attempt to create a bundle of property rights that can be 
used to discourage rivals to file an infringement lawsuit rather than for 
securing future innovation.  
Additionally, the filing of numerous patent applications can result in 
preventing new and small firms from entering the market, especially in 
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those markets related to the digital economy.124 In particular, the per-
spective of prohibitively expensive highly costly licensing can discourage 
competitors, specifically start–up ones, to use the same technology or 
develop similar technologies.125 Indeed, patent examiners have been of-
ten accused to validate assertions of inventiveness in business method 
applications even if novelty was not completely proved, according to the 
difficulties in searching the prior art.126 As such, business method pa-
tents are considered to be likely to be challengeable by competitors. On 
the other hand, the cost of filing a lawsuit is great. Thus, patents tend 
to remain granted even when they are invalid. The result is the grantee 
gains unmerited licence fees that new comers in the market need to 
pay, increasing their costs. The combined effect of all this is to distort 
the market. 
Therefore, instead of promoting innovation, business method patents 
seem to be ultimately used by firms to restrict competition and block 
competitors off.127 As will be discussed in the following chapters, con-
cerns have been expressed about this strategic use of business method 
patents considering the role that start-up firms have had in the spread 
of new technologies in the last two decades.128 In particular, a possible 
decrease in inventiveness has been stressed as result of granting patent 
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protection to business methods together with the risk that big portfolios 
could be used to ward off competitors from entering the market.129 
4.2 Quantity vs. quality  
Empirical observations show that business method represent a very 
popular subject matter at patent offices around the world when viewed 
from the constant growth in number of application in this category over 
the last twenty years.130 Since the mid – 1990s, the volume of patent 
applications filed in computer industries has significantly increased, in-
cluding the patent applications referring to business methods. Further, 
the number of claims for each patent application has grown significant-
ly in the same time frame, as Lemley and Allison have 
indicated.131Thus, patent offices around the world have been literally 
inundated by new computer-implemented inventions. Notably, thou-
sands of applications have been submitted over the recent decades, 
which refer to this new type of innovation, namely the digital; naturally, 
applications have needed to be examined to assess their eligibility for 
patent protection. This phenomenon has been labelled as a “patent 
flood” capable of pushing several patent offices to breaking point, there-
by casting doubts about the feasibility of granting protection to these 
new products.132   
As a matter of fact, business method patents, as well as most of com-
puter-implemented inventions, are widely perceived to have dubious 
quality.133 Commonly, quality in patenting has been identified as the 
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‘capacity of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards 
of patentability – most importantly, to be novel, non-obvious, and clear-
ly and sufficiently described’.134 It has been argued that in terms of 
business method patents, applications submitted in these contexts have 
tended to be poor quality ones because of their low levels of novelty and 
inventiveness. 135 The poor quality of business method patents in par-
ticular has been associated with the difficulties that patent officers have 
to ascertain the novelty.136 In point of fact, the locating of the previous 
art has been one of the main difficulties in the area of computer-
implemented inventions.137 Indeed, the lack of reliable and complete da-
tabases in the field has been often highlighted.138  
Additionally, the lack of resources has been linked to the growth in the 
number of applications and the difficulties for patent offices to cover the 
consequent increase of search costs. In this light, the non-obviousness 
requirement as well as the novelty one, has been often diminished due 
to the so-called pro-applicant approach. The latter assumes invention 
patentability until proven otherwise.139 Above all, the incapability of pa-
tent officers to prove the obviousness and lack of novelty has resulted in 
the granting of patent protection also to weak applications. The result-
ant uncertainty over the breadth and the validity of exclusive rights has 
been a source of complaint.140 Ultimately, a growing number of lawsuits 
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in business method patents have been witnessed, as a direct result of 
the low quality.141 
4.3 Monopoly vs. open innovation 
As mentioned above, business methods implemented by computers pro-
vide examples of cumulative inventions. Thus, patent fragmentation is 
one of the main features of this kind of invention. Indeed, business 
methods typically rely on technical advances, i.e. some piece of comput-
er software or hardware, which have already been patented. 142 As such, 
the possibility of using and implementing some components of the 
technology without paying fees can promote innovation, whereas strong 
patent protection can easily inhibit it.143 As a result, open innovation is 
often preferred to exclusive rights in a cumulative invention context.144 
Particularly in view of this, granting patent protection to business 
methods has been a hotly debated issue, especially when the method is 
a computer-implemented one. Indeed, offering exclusive rights to every 
piece of innovation, i.e. every piece of software that is implemented in 
the innovative methods, can involve a tenfold increase of costs for fu-
ture development since subsequent inventors need to license all the 
previous inventions on which the new method will be based.145 Addi-
tionally, the possibility of leveraging rivals and gaining extra profits by 
demanding high royalties has been pointed up. 146 Hence, patent protec-
tion in cumulative inventions, including business methods, is often 
associated with an increasing in cost of implementation and production, 
and ultimately towards curtailing the development of new technologies 
and final products. Additionally, monopolistic rights have been held re-
sponsible for discouraging innovation in business methods due to 
another side effect that patents can produce. In monopolistic markets 
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revenues gained from patenting could prevent companies undertaking 
other research and developing second-generation products, whereas in 
the absence of patent protection, the urgency to safeguard first-mover 
privileges could encourage firms to constantly strive towards more in-
novation. 147 
4.4 Implementation vs. exploitation  
In computer- implemented inventions, patent implementation can result 
in lower than expected profits due to the ease for competitors to imitate 
a successful product.148  Moreover, the rapid evolution of consumer 
preferences and tastes of can strongly affect the capacity of computer-
implemented inventions to maintain consumer loyalty. The effect is that 
patents are eventually implemented for less than 20 years. Thus, pa-
tents tend to be too costly for patentees as the amount of maintenance 
fees, i.e. that which is to be paid to maintain a granted patent in force 
over the years, ends up as a loss; a loss which revenues are not able to 
cover.149 On the other hand, as suggested above, business method pa-
tent claims are often broadly described and lacking in inventiveness. 
These circumstances increase both the risk of infringement and the 
costs - sometimes extremely high - paid by firms to defend the legality of 
their products.150 Therefore, the implementation of business methods 
patents is often thought to be incapable of securing net earnings 
against the amount of costs that are likely to arise from maintenance 
and legal disputes.     
This incapacity of business method patents to secure profits has coex-
isted with a new phenomenon that has been observed in the recent 
years. This is that more and more entities are inclined to seek patent 
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protection for business methods to collect royalties and earn through li-
censing and patent infringement suits rather than directly 
implementing inventions and developing products.151 Hence, patenting 
has started to be thought of as an economic activity in itself. Studies 
have shown that innovative firms, especially in business methods, are 
targeted in patent infringement lawsuits by entities that do not produce 
innovative products themselves but simply obtain patents for new 
products invented by others. 152  Initially, such entrepreneurs were pejo-
ratively reported as “patent trolls”. It suggested that these entities acted 
like brigands jumping out from under the bridge to demand a toll to 
those that bring their products to market.153 Now, and less pejoratively, 
those entities are defined as “non practicing entities” (NPEs) or as “pa-
tent assertion entities” (PAEs), and represent a new and important front 
in the patent arena. This includes in a single category a wide range of 
applicants - from universities holding their researcher patent portfolios 
to firms applying for patents exclusively for speculative purposes154 - 
that purchase patents and assert them not to implement invention but 
purely and simply to exploit them by collecting payments from royalties 
and licensing fees.155  
5. Patent thickets:  a different point of view  
The analyses in the previous sections have investigated both the main 
features of innovation in business methods and the ill effects commonly 
cited in business method patents. Thus conceived, it appears to confirm 
the inadequacy of the traditional economic rationale in explaining the 
patentability of business method. Therefore, this inadequacy needs to 
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Costs%20of%20Patent%20Trolls.pdf > accessed on the 20th June 2017   
154 S Fusco, ‘Markets And Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation Of Non-
Practicing Entities In The United States And Europe’ (2013) 20 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. 
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155 T Klein, ‘eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme 
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls’ (2007) 112 Penn St. L. Rev. 295, 295-6  
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be examined from a different perspective so as to address the question 
concerning the possibility of balancing both beneficial and ill effects of 
granting patent protection to this subject matter. On this note, it is thus 
essential to understand the underlying reasons for such a growing de-
mand for patent protection for business methods. As discussed above, 
business methods, such as software, have not revealed a strong correla-
tion between patent protection and incentive to innovate. 156  The 
software industry has provided evidence that its rapid growth in the 
1980s occurred without any patent protection whatever.157 Moreover, 
when referring to IT industries, studies have suggested that the faster 
and wider the use of new technologies is, the more significant is the de-
velopment of new products due to the considerable rewards reaped by 
first-mover inventors. 158  Therefore, traditional theories, such as the 
“prospect theory”, cannot explain why so many firms decide to apply for 
a business method patent.  
Attempts have been made to find an alternative rationale that can ex-
plain why business methods are one of the most popular patent subject 
matters at the EPO and, indeed, at most other patent offices around the 
world. Accordingly, the different behaviours exhibited by US and Euro-
pean companies can provide useful clues. US companies, in particular, 
tend to apply rapidly and widely for business method patents compared 
to European counterparts that file less and often defensively to retain 
their position in the market.159 Such different behaviour has been ex-
plained as the consequence of differences in litigation costs and in 
amount of awarded damages: legal costs are lower in Europe than in 
																																																								
156 RP Merges, ‘Patent Law and Policy: cases and materials (2d ed., Michie 1997) 155; 
Dreyfuss(104) 263 (2000) 274 
157 SJH Graham, DC  Mowery, ‘Software  Patents: Good News Or Bad News?’ in Intel-
lectual Property Rights in Frontier Industries (Robert Hahn Ed., 2005); BH Hall, T Grid, 
S Torrisi, ‘Financial patenting in Europe’ (2009) 6 European Management Review 45, 
48 (Referring to business method patents “In general, however, the lack of legal protec-
tion has not prevented the introduction of important product innovations (such as a 
multitude of financial instruments) and process innovations (such as trading plat-
forms and pricing algorithms) in the financial industry, similar to the situation in the 
software industry prior to 1994/1995”). 
158 LC Thurow, ‘Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights’ (1997) 75 Har-
vard Business Review 94, 95-100  
159  Likhovski (103) 273  
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the US. 160 This, the effect of litigation on US firms, is more onerous 
and, in order to prevent lawsuits, US companies tend to amass a larger 
number of patents than European companies. As such, US firms tend 
to devote a larger amount of resources in developing big patent portfoli-
os compared to European firms.161 This behaviour has been regarded as 
a classic example of the prisoner's dilemma.162 In particular, firms’ deci-
sions to apply for patents are not based on the value of the invention 
and the expected profits, but instead on the possibility of deploying pa-
tents for both offensive and defensive purposes. In other words, firms 
are driven by strategic purposes such as preventing rivals to file patent 
application on related inventions, i.e. patent application are used to 
block rivals to implement similar technologies, or forcing rivals into 
costly negotiations, i.e. competitors are compelled to agree on licensing 
several patents if they want to implement a certain technology.163 As a 
result, decisions relating to patenting are no longer a question about 
the quality of innovation and the recouping of costs. Indeed, filing pa-
tent applications is seen as a way of creating a protective barrier against 
competitors.  
This phenomenon has been captured and explained by way of so-called 
patent thickets. The expression was coined by Carl Shapiro to describe 
patent overlapping caused by the granting of broadly termed patents. 164 
Examples of this attitude towards patents has been observed in certain 
technological industries, such as semiconductors and software, where 
claims are built to cover as many achievable goals of the invention as 
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Meurer (132) 309-310 (“a thicket of patents may stultify development of technology 
because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the large numbers of patent own-
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possible.165 Seen from a wider perspective, this approach brings about 
overlap among patent applications to the extent that several patents 
cover the same technology. Hence, competitors seeking to improve that 
technology should agree on licensing all the related patents, thereby in-
creasing costs. Indeed, the boundaries of each patent will be unclear 
and a certain degree of uncertainty will be created on what is covered by 
each patent. 166 At the same time, the created uncertainty can act as a 
deterrent to competitors, discouraging them to develop around that 
technology to avoid to be sued for infringement.167 Ultimately, a barrier 
is built around invention that is more powerful than temporary mo-
nopoly privileges. Competitors, indeed, are restricted from using and 
implementing not only the single invention but also the entire technolo-
gy.  
As will be discussed in detail later, namely in Chapter V and Chapter 
VII, patent thickets are often created through choice in order to reduce 
or eliminate competition. In particular, the high costs needed to build 
these patent barriers has been indicated as one of the main reasons be-
hind the reluctance of small companies to apply for patents. 168 
Similarly, the uncertainty created by patent overlapping is used to force 
rivals to licence more patents than those genuinely necessary to imple-
ment the technology, increasing their transactional costs considerably. 
																																																								
165 C Schneider, ‘Fences and Competition in Patent Races’ 26 International Journal of 
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169 As such, patent thickets have demonstrated their usefulness in stra-
tegically avoiding the entrance of new subjects in certain arenas by 
establishing strong bargaining positions.170 Additionally, patent uncer-
tainty created by overlapping can easily result in rising firms’ concerns 
of being sued for infringements; 171 thus, firms are more prone to reach 
agreements that they would not have otherwise agreed to avoid legal ac-
tions. Therefore, competitors can be forced into paying high royalties 
increasing their costs.172 Hence, it can be concluded that patenting in 
certain technological area, i.e. cumulative innovation context, is no 
longer aimed at improving innovation, but rather firms use patents for 
other purposes. All this considered, it couldn’t be excluded that hinder-
ing the entrance of new competitors could be the underling motivation 
behind seeking patent protection for business methods in Europe. 173 
6. Some conclusions  
Some conclusions can be drawn based on the analysis conducted in 
this chapter and the previous ones. First, firms have shown a growing 
interest in granting patent protection for business methods. Indeed, the 
Court’s rulings of business method patentability have met the strong 
demand for securing property prerogatives raised by firms that, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, started to develop computer technologies. At 
the outset, granting patent protection for a firm’s own business meth-
ods was deemed an effective means to provide economic incentives to 
																																																								
169 BH Hall, RM Ham, ‘The Patent Paradox Revisited: Determinants of Patenting in the 
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innovate and signal the value of the new technologies.174 Patent protec-
tion was, then, mainly sought to adapt to the inherent changes in 
industrial policies and productions sparked by the Information Tech-
nology revolution. Nevertheless, later developments have shown that the 
patentability of business methods has complicated rather than simpli-
fied company business, creating a cold-war environment where patents 
were thought as weapons for offending and defending, for neutralising 
the threat of infringement suits, and for strengthening bargaining posi-
tions in licensing agreements.175 Therefore, in current time, it seems 
that neither securing further implementation nor recouping investment 
in innovation are the main driving force behind firms’ demands for 
computer-implemented business method patentability.  
The other conclusion that can be drawn is that business method pa-
tentability does not harmonize with any of the traditional economic 
theories developed to support patent protection. Indeed, neither innova-
tion improvement nor knowledge disclosure has appeared to be 
encouraged by patents in the field of business methods.  Instead, a 
strategic use of patents and patent applications has been the result 
turned out in the business method sector. In particular, firms in this 
technological area tend to file several patent applications to cover the 
same piece of invention, thereby overlapping patents themselves. Thus, 
intentional uncertainty is created on the contents of each patent. As 
such, the boundaries of the inventions are often not clear and the 
threat of infringements can be used to discourage rivals to enter the 
market. Therefore, concerns about reducing in competition as conse-
quence of business method patentability have been raised. The cause 
for such concerns will be the topic of the following chapters. Patent 
thickets and patent portfolios will be analysed in the chapter V, whereas 
in the following chapter, I will perform a quantitative analysis of a data-
base including all the patent applications referring to G06Q 
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classification, examining features and numbers of business method pa-





Who applies for business method patents at EPO? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As discussed in the first two chapters, business methods are now a pa-
tentable subject matter under the umbrella of the Europe Patent 
Convention (EPC). Ultimately, a legal framework  - probably not the 
most clear and stable - has been developed regarding this type of inven-
tion by referring to the EPO Board of Appeal decisions together with the 
general principles set out in the EPC and in the EPO Guidelines. In par-
ticular, the stratification of the decisions of the EPO Board of Appeal 
has led to the development of practices that have provided patent pro-
tection to business methods, specifically, when computer-implemented. 
Hence, the EPO has to deal with patent applications for business meth-
ods, and possibly has to grant patent protection to them, even if the 
article 52 EPC clearly states that business methods are not patentable. 
But, what is the extent of this phenomenon? Are only a few applications 
involved, or are they a significant number as it has happened in the 
USPTO? 1 Could the volume or the temporal patterns in the number of 
patent applications suggest some strategic uses of business method pa-
tents?  In the attempt to answer these questions, a quantitative 
empirical analysis has necessarily to be added to the doctrinal research 
carried out in the first chapters. All this will help to provide a complete 
overview of the phenomenon of business method patents at the EPO.  
 
Nowadays, socio-legal research is often used to address legal issues.2 In 
socio-legal researches, methods that are commonly adopted in the so-
cial sciences are applied to legal researches to investigate social 
																																																								
1 J Bessen, MJ Meurer, Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put inno-
vators at risk (Princeton University Press 2008)  




phenomena generated by legal rules. As such, empirical data referring 
to the investigated field are collected and used either for a qualitative or 
a quantitative analysis. In the first case, the attention is brought to 
small samples so that motivations or opinions are mainly focused, 
whereas in quantitative analyses a considerable amount of measurable 
data are usually collected, then to be transformed in statistic surveys. 
Hence, socio-legal researches result in a multidisciplinary approach 
that combines together statistical techniques and analytical methods for 
understanding the effects of rules already enforced or to be applied. 
Thus, this type of investigation moves away from the doctrinal analysis, 
based on a ‘stand and stare approach’,3 and tries to find out possible 
solutions to social concerns by “ a law reform research”.4   
 
Over the years, patents as well as other IP rights have attracted a great 
deal of attention from socio-legal researchers. Especially, the effect of 
patents on innovation and competition has been often investigated in 
the attempt to assess the economic consequences of patent regulations. 
Some of the conclusions drafted by these analyses will be briefly fo-
cused in the next section of this chapter. However, this chapter will 
mainly report the results of the original quantitative analysis that has 
been performed in this thesis to understand the extent of business 
method patent phenomenon at the EPO. For this purpose, the chapter 
will be divided into three parts. As already said, the first part will offer a 
brief overview on some socio-legal researches that have been conducted 
on business method patents. The second part will discuss the research 
methods employed in the quantitative analysis performed in this thesis, 
and the following sections will report and discuss the results obtained. 
Both the number of business method patent applications filed at the 
EPO over the years, and the key features of the applicants will be high-
lighted.  
																																																								
3  R van Gestel, HW Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research In Europe: What 
About Methodology?’ (2011) EUI Working Papers LAW 2011/05 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16825/LAW_2011_05.pdf?sequence=
> accessed on the 24th   June 2017   




2. Socio–legal researches on business method patents  
 
In last decades, the socio–legal approach has gained ground in examin-
ing the effects of patent legislations. In particular, both quantitative and 
qualitative researches have been performed in attempt to understand 
the potentials of patents in improving innovation.5  In this field, the Yale 
Survey (Yale I Survey)6 and the Carnegie Mellon Survey7 are seminal 
works. Conducted between 1980 and 2000, both surveys were based on 
questionnaires administered to US firms, from a few hundreds in the 
first one, until more than one thousand in the Carnegie Mellon Survey. 
In particular, the two surveys have succeeded in collecting a large 
amount of data regarding not only IP rights but also investments in 
R&D. Thus, a full picture of the interaction between patents and inno-
vation has been provided with regard to small and big firms in the US, 
ultimately casting doubts on the effectiveness of patent system in pro-
tecting investment in R&D and providing appropriate financial 
rewards.8  
 
Also in Europe, the interaction between patents and innovation has 
been investigated by socio-legal analyses.9 Increasingly, surveys per-
																																																								
5  ex multis,  BH Hall, D Harhoff, ‘Recent Research on the Economics of Patents’ 
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nis, ‘The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the US 
semiconductor industry, 1979-1995’ (2001) 32 The RAND Journal of Economics 101 
6 R Levin, ‘Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development’ 
(1987) 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 783 
7 W Cohen, J Walsh, R Nelson, ‘Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)’ (2000) NBER working 
paper w7552 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552> accessed on the 20th June 2015  
8 Hall, Harhoff (5), BH Hall et al.,  ‘The Choice between Formal and Informal Intellec-
tual Property: A Review’ (2014) 52 Journal of Economic Literature 375 
9 N van Zeebroeck, B van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, D Guellec, ‘Claiming More: The 
Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and Its Determinants’  (2009) 38 Re-
search Policy 1006; E Archontopoulos et al., ‘When small is beautiful: Measuring the 
evolution and consequences of the voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO’ 
(2007) 19 Information Economics and Policy 103; D Harhoff, ‘The battle for patent 
rights’ in C Peeters and B Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie (eds),  Economic and Man-
agement Perspectives on Intellectual Property Rights  (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006); D 
Harhoff, ‘Patent Quantity and Quality in Europe – Trends and Policy Implications’ in 
	 116	
formed in the IP field have examined relations among patent protection 
and economic growth and possible consequences on competition.10  In 
particular, a comprehensive analysis of patents at the EPO has been 
performed by Harhoff et al.11 Based on a large-scale patent databases 
provided by the EPO, the study focused on patent features, patent ex-
amination and on opposition proceedings in order to verify possible 
changes in firm approach to patent protection. The study draws specific 
attention to the “escalation mechanism”,12 i.e. the process of escalating 
expenditures on patent applications, which has resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of patent applications at the EPO.13 Particularly, 
the work of Harhoff et al. correlates this propensity to patent with some 
long-term strategic plans, recently adopted by firms applying for patents 
at the EPO.14 With regard specifically to firms in cumulative innovation 
areas, the work suggests that firms exacerbate the proper nature of this 
type of innovations by patenting separately every small pieces of the 
technology. In point of fact, the value of patents holding jointly is great-
er than the sum of the individual patents, especially when several 
patent are necessary to implement a technology.15 Holding several pa-
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tents related to a technology, therefore, firms are likely to obtain ‘a stra-
tegic advantage over technological rivals’. 16  Especially, firms are 
facilitated to extract part of rivals’ profit by threating to stop them from 
exploiting some of the patents necessary to implement the relevant 
technology. Hence, Hartoff et al. discuss the possible ill effects on com-
petition that can result from hold-up practices, whereby the decrease in 
efficiency can force firms off the market.17  
 
Possible strategic uses of patents have also been revealed in recent so-
cio-legal researches performed with specific regard to business method 
patents at the EPO.18 As already discussed in Chapter III,19 by cluster-
ing several patents around the same technology, firms are able of 
building dense thickets gaining them large competitive advantages. In 
particular, patent thickets can facilitate practices such as those result-
ing in rising rivals’ transactional costs, extracting high royalties or 
posing the risk of costly legal litigations. As such, in cumulative innova-
tions tactical use of patents can result in foreclose the market, 
especially to small firms that cannot bear such costs. In 2006 Wagner 
carried out a survey on this topic.20 In his seminal work, the scholar ex-
amined both the business method patent phenomenon as a whole, and 
the specific case of the franking device industries. In particular, the 
study findings revealed that business methods were granted at the EPO 
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on a regular basis, in opposition to the common assumption of non-
patentability of business methods.21 However, the quality of business 
method patents is questioned according the high rate of oppositions 
that the data analysis indicates.22 Additionally, the interaction among 
amount of patents and opposition proceedings at the EPO was focused 
to conclude that the degree of litigation increased when business meth-
od patent holders show a propensity to built large patent portfolio.23 
Similarly, possible strategic uses have been highlighted in the quantita-
tive analysis of patents related to financial activities by Hall et al.24 
Especially, the study provided a comparison between financial patents 
and a sample of patents filed in other technical categories at the EPO.25 
Considering the outcome of the analysis, the researchers concluded 
that patents granted on financial subject matters were “less likely to be 
granted, and slightly more likely to be opposed”26 and that all this cor-
roborates the idea of “a by-product of strategic patenting by large 
established computing firms”.27 In addition to the significant conclusion 
on the possible strategic use of business method patents, the two stud-
ies interestingly have brought to the attention another issue often 
linked to socio-legal analysis performed on this subject matter: the diffi-
culties in identifying business method patents.  
 
In this chapter a quantitative analysis will be performed to understand 
the extent of the phenomenon of business method patents at EPO. As 
the attention will be on studying how firms try to use business method 
patents strategically, then all patent applications, instead of granted pa-
tents only, will be considered because patent applications show what 
firms are trying to do, and the mere existence of an application has stra-
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performed by Josh Lerner, J Lerner, ‘Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at 
Finance Patents, 1971 to 2000’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 901  
25 Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 50    
26 Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 57 
27 Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 61  
	 119	
tegic effects. This will shed light on the entities interested in patenting 
business methods, and furthermore on the possible reasons that can 
explain why business methods are so popular nowadays.  
 
3. Business method patents and the category G06Q  
Patents and patent applications at the EPO are classified according the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) system.28 The IPC, which is 
commonly adopted by several patent offices around the world, consists 
in “a system of codes that groups inventions according to technical ar-
ea”.29 Thus, the first letter of the IPC system identifies the technical 
category of the invention, whereas sub-categories are classified by the 
addition of further letters and numbers, as the technical features of the 
subject matter becomes more specific. However, the IPC system did not 
have a specific class for business methods when it was originally estab-
lished. Only in 1995 a class for ``Electrical Digital Data Processing” was 
introduced (G06F).30 Then, in 2000 a sub-class of G06F, namely class 
G06F17/60 relative to digital computing or data processing equipment 
and methods was added.31 The latter class was used to cover business 
method inventions until 2006, when a new class specific to business 
method patents was finally created.32 The class, named G06Q – ‘Data 
processing Systems or Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, 
Commercial, Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purpos-
es; Systems or Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, 
Commercial, Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purpos-
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es, not otherwise provided for’, is divided in six sub-categories accord-
ingly to the specific field of applications of the methods.33  
 
Surely, the hesitant attitude toward business method patents shown by 
the EPO Boards of Appeal has greatly contributed to the delay in the 
IPC introduction of a specific category for business method patents.34 
Conversely, the consistency in the US Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has driven the USPTO to introduce an apposite class for business 
method patents (class 705 “Data processing: financial, business prac-
tice, management, or cost/price determination”) as early as 1997.35 
Based on such clarity in identifying business method patents at the 
USPTO, in his seminal work Wagner decided to identify business meth-
od patents at the EPO referring to patents already granted at the 
USPTO in the class 705. In particular, register numbers and priority 
dates of USPTO patent applications in class 705 were used to identify 
the equivalent patent applications at EPO.36 On the other hand, Hall et 
al. identified their sample not only referring to those EPO patents that 
were equivalent to patents already granted at the USPTO in class 705, 
but also using other two methods. The first method was based on the 






(“G06Q – ‘Data processing Systems or Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, 
Commercial, Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purposes; Systems or 
Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, Commercial, Financial, Managerial, 
Supervisory or Forecasting Purposes, not otherwise provided for’ -G06Q 10/00 Admin-
istration, e.g. office automation or reservations; Management, e.g. resource or project 
management -G06Q 30/00 Commerce, e.g. marketing, shopping, billing, auctions or e-
commerce -G06Q40/00 Finance, e.g. banking, investment or tax processing; Insur-
ance, e.g. risk analysis or pensions- G06Q 50/00 Systems or methods specially 
adapted for a specific business sector, e.g. health care, utilities, tourism or legal ser-
vices-G06Q 90/00 Systems or methods specially adapted for administrative, 
commercial, financial, managerial, supervisory or forecasting purposes, not involving 
significant data processing 
- G06Q 99/00 Subject matter not provided for in other groups of this subclass”)  
34 Wagner (20) 180  
35 USPTO < https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-
patent-applications/utility-patent/business-methods-20> accessed 20th June 2017 
(“Class 705 was created in 1997 from the business and cost/price sections of comput-
er classes 395 and 364. These two sections having originally evolved from class 235 - 
Registers, beginning in the late 1960's.”) 
36 Wagner (20) 185  
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IPC system related to financial inventions were taken into considera-
tion. Additionally, the researchers took into account patent claims. 
Thus, keywords such as financial, credit, or money, were used to identify 
patents that could be relevant for the investigation.37  
 
However, the choice to rely on equivalent patents should be put into 
context, since both the analyses mentioned above investigated the phe-
nomenon of business method patents (or the narrow one of financial 
patents) before the IPC 8 came into effect in 2006. Thus, the connection 
with the USPTO, as well as the scrutiny of patent claims, were needed 
mainly due to the lack of a specific category for business method pa-
tents at the EPO. Nowadays, an analysis of business method patent 
based only on the patents and patent applications registered under the 
category G06Q should be considered appropriate, according to the new 
framework established by IPC8.  On the other hand, the use of data sets 
built on the records resulting from the patent offices’ registers is a 
common approach in the socio-legal analysis of patents; thereby, all the 
patents or the patent applications listed under a specific class or cate-
gory are collected and investigated. 38  Notably, the majority of 
quantitative studies on patents conducted after IPC 8 entered into force 
are based on the categorisation provided by the EPO.39  
 
All this considered, namely given that now a specific category has been 
introduced for business method patents at the EPO, the quantitative 
study performed in this research does not need to examine USPTO data 
on business method patents. Instead, an analysis of all the patent ap-
plications that have been filed at the EPO in the category G06Q can be 
considered adequate to provide a complete practical description of the 
																																																								
37 Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 50  
38 ex multis, SJH Graham, D Mowery, ‘Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. 
Software Industry’ in Nation- al Research Council Patents in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy (The National Academies Press 2003), 7-13  
39 Harhoff et al. (11); R Kapoor, ‘Intellectual property and appropriability regime of in-
novation in financial services’ in AL Mention and  M Torkkeli (eds) Innovation in 
Financial Services: A Dual Ambiguity (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2014), 113; M 
Komulainen, T Takalo, ‘Does state street lead to Europe? The case of financial ex-
change innovations’ (2013) 19 European Financial Management 521,535  
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phenomenon of business method patents at the EPO. Thus conceived, 
the socio-legal analysis provided in this chapter as well as in Chapter VI 
has been based on a data set collected accordingly to the established 
classification system at the EPO. Specifically, all the patent applications 
registered at EPO and listed under the category G06Q - Data processing 
Systems or Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, Commercial, 
Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purposes; Systems or 
Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, Commercial, Financial, 
Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purposes, not otherwise provid-
ed for, have been considered.  
 
In connection with the analysis framework, two main points need to be 
clarified about the category G06Q. The first aspect concerns the time 
frame of this research. Although, as said above, the category G06Q has 
been introduced in 2006, the data collected in the data set and used for 
the quantitative analysis carried out in the following sections of this 
chapter and in Chapter VI, also contains patent applications filed before 
2006, hence before the category G06Q was introduced.  This is because, 
over the years, technical boards at the EPO have acted to reclassify and 
list under the category G06Q also those patent applications implying 
business method inventions that were filed before 2006. Therefore, the 
research performed in this work covers a period going back to 1991, 
that is the first year in which the filing of a patent application at the 
EPO in the category G06Q has been reconstructed and reported.  
 
A second point refers to the possibility that business method patent ap-
plications are classified in a different category than G06Q. As 
highlighted also by Hall et al., patent claims can intentionally describe 
inventions focusing on some elements rather than others.40 Thus, some 
relevant patent applications could have been classified under a different 
category, instead of under the category G06Q, even if the cornerstone of 
																																																								
40 Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 50 
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the invention is a business method.41 This issue has been raised in the 
context of the USPTO scenario specifically after the introduction for 
business methods patent applications of the “second pair of eyes re-
view”42, which has led applicants towards other less examined classes. 
Nevertheless, this is not the case in Europe43, where business method 
patent applications do not face any deeper scrutiny than applications in 
other classes, so that applicants do not tend to migrate towards catego-
ries different from G06Q. Based on this, there are no doubts that the 
investigation of all the patent applications in the category G06Q can be 
itself able to offer a general overview of the phenomenon of business 
method patents at the EPO. Therefore, no further methodology other 
than collecting patent applications in the category G06Q has been used 
in this research work.  
    
4. Data  
 
As already mentioned, a data set has been specifically created to per-
form the empirical analysis of business method patents at the EPO 
reported in this chapter and in Chapter VI. The database has been set 
up in December 2014 in collaboration with the  “Complex Systems and 
Networks” research group at the School of Mathematics Sciences of 
QMUL. All the patent applications classified under the category G06Q, 
namely “data processing systems or methods, specially adapted for ad-
ministrative, commercial, financial, managerial, supervisory or 
forecasting purposes; systems or methods specially adapted for admin-
istrative, commercial, financial, managerial, supervisory or forecasting 
purposes, not otherwise provided for”, were downloaded from the Euro-
																																																								
41 Lerner (24); BH Hall, M MacGarvie, ‘The Private Value of Software Patents’ (2010) 39 
Research Policy  (2010) 994; for an overview on this concerns relating to software pat-
ens, J Bessen, R Hunt, ‘An Empirical Look at Software Patents’ (2007) 16 Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 157, 165   
42 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Se-
cond-Pair-of-Eyes Review 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3p17a.htm> accessed on 
the 20th June 2017 
43 See text to n.16 Chapter I 
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pean patent register (https://register.epo.org/regviewer). 44   No time 
boundaries were set, so that all patent applications published in the 
Web site until December 2014 under the category G06Q were accessed. 
In this way, a data set of 34,446 files corresponding to all the patent 
applications filed before or on the date of 2nd June 2014 at EPO was 
produced.  
 
Some clarifications on the construction of the data set and on the re-
tained information are necessary. First of all, in the effort to investigate 
the business method patent phenomenon from the broadest possible 
perspective, it has been chosen to collect all the files relative to pub-
lished patent applications, instead of gathering only the files 
corresponding to granted patents. Patent applications are, of course, 
more numerous than granted patents. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
Section 7, the difference between number of applications and number of 
granted patents in the category G06Q at the EPO is huge, considering 
that only less than 1% of the patent applications have been granted. 
Thus, an analysis based on granted patents only would give a very lim-
ited picture of the phenomenon. Granted patents show to some extent 
the success of a firm, although the mere existence of a patent applica-
tion has strategic effects. Therefore, a comprehensive examination 
including all the patent applications filed in the category can offer in-
formation not only on the extent of the phenomenon, but also on the 
possible strategic use of business methods as a patentable subject mat-
ter.45 Support to this approach is provided by the fact that applicants 
have the same right of patentees if the patent is ultimately granted. 
Thus, during the interim period, users of the technology risks infringing 
																																																								
44  EPO < https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/legal/register.html#tab1> ac-
cessed on the 20th June 2017(“The European Patent Register contains all the publicly 
available procedural information on European patent applications as they pass 
through each stage of the granting process. This free online service contains proce-
dural information on all European patent applications from the moment they are 
published. It includes links to the patent registers of many of the EPO member states, 
showing the status of European patents after grant, when the national patent offices 
take over responsibility for them.”) 
45R Kapoor, AL Mention, ‘Patenting financial innovation in Europe’ (PICMET, Portland 
September 2015)  
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if the patent is granted, and the treat of future legal action is often 
enough to discourage competitors to use the invention even before the 
patent is granted. All this considered, the entity of the phenomenon of 
patenting business method inventions can be revealed in its full extent 
only through a comprehensive analysis of both patents and patent ap-
plications in the category G06Q.46 Furthermore, an investigation based 
on an enlarged data set including also patent applications could be use-
ful also to better intercept possible detrimental effects due to an extend-
extended use of patents and patent applications for strategic reasons.47 
 
With regard to the available information, a report for each of the pub-
lished patent applications is accessible from the Web page of the 
European patent register. A typical patent application report, as it is 
appears in the Web page, is shown in Figure1 and in Figure 2. Each re-
port contains detailed data about the content of the patent application, 
its status, and also some references to previous patents patent applica-
tions. First of all, the status of the application and both the name of the 
applicant and the name of the inventor are indicated in the report. This 
is because patent protection is often sought by entities different from 
the inventors, such as the firms or societies that are finally going to ex-
ploit the invention. Then, the report mentions the date when the patent 
application was filed. Also, the publication date of the patent application 
and the priority date, if different, are indicated. In addition to this, and 
to other information such as examination procedures, fees paid, etc., all 
the references related to the previous art are reported in a specific field 




46 N van Zeebroeck, B van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, ‘Filing strategies and patent 
value’ (2011) 20 Economics of Innovation and New Technology 539 
47A Palangkaraya, PH Jensen, E Webster, ‘Applicant behaviour in patent examination 











For each of the reports, as the one shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, it is 
possible to download the corresponding metafile from the EPO website. 
For the purpose of this research, the metafiles regarding all patent ap-
plications classified under the category G06Q have been downloaded. In 
particular, the downloaded material includes two different types of 
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metafiles. 48 This is because some of the metafiles are directly created by 
the EPO, since the corresponding patent applications have been filed for 
the first time at the EPO. Instead, some other patent applications have 
been originally filed at other patent offices; thereby, the EPO has im-
ported the corresponding metafile, which is in a format prescribed by 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). However, except for 
the different format, the information contained in the two type of meta-
files, i.e. metafiles created by EPO and metafiles imported by EPO, is 
the same; thus, both the name of the applicants and the date of filing 
are provided in all the downloaded metafiles. Also, details about the pri-
ority art, namely the citations to previous applications or granted 
patents, are shown in all the downloaded metafiles.  
 
Regarding the status of applications, this information is provided in 
each of the report published on the EPO Web site; specifically, it is indi-
cated at the top of the report if the application is approved, rejected or 
withdrawn. However, the downloaded metafiles do not have a specific 
field where it is recorded if the patent has been eventually granted. Nev-
ertheless, this information can be retrieved from the documentation 
related to the patent application process that is linked to the metafile. 
In particular, all documents related to a patent application are recorded 
in the report and labelled with a letter A or B.  Specifically, B is used to 
identify official papers related to applications that have been approved. 
Thus, if a patent application report contains a document labelled with 
the letter B, it gives evidence of the fact that the patent has been grant-
ed; whereas, documents labelled with an A only indicate that a patent 
application has been published but not granted. 49  
																																																								
48 Patent application can be entered in different way: under article 75 EPC, through 
direct filing (“EPdirect”); under Art. 76 EPC, as a divisional application; under article 
153 EPC, as a PCT application entering the regional phase (“EuroPCT”).  
49  EPO < https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/helpful-resources/first-time-
here/definitions.html> accessed on the 20th June 2017  
A document 
European patent application, published 18 months after filing with the EPO or 18 
months after priority date (A1 document European patent application published with 
European search report; A2 document European patent application published without 
European search report (search report not available at the publication date); A3 docu-
ment Separate publication of the European search report; A4 document Supplementary 
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Initially, the information necessary to perform the planned socio-legal 
analysis has been identified in the reports publishes for each applica-
tion on the EPO Web site. Then, the identified information has been 
selected in the metafile and extracted. In particular, the following infor-
mation needed for the further analysis has been collected: application 
number, filing date, applicant/company, official paper label A or B, ap-
plication numbers and patent numbers linked to the document cited 
section. This information has been maintained in a file named 
SUM_UP_FILE. As an example, for the patent shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, the record in SUM_UP_FILE reads as follows:  EP2271976, 
21.03.2009, Microsoft Corporation, A1, US2005198172, 
US2005198031, KR20060070982, US7359894, US2005267766, 
US2008030496.  
 
5. How many patent applications in the category G06Q?  
 
The volume of applications published at the European Patent Register 
in the category G06Q has been the first quantity considered in the 
quantitative analysis performed in this thesis. As shown by previous 
analyses, the digital revolution has brought a substantial increase in 
the number of patent applications at the EPO, especially in those cate-
gories related to inventions that are implemented by computer. 50  
																																																																																																																																																																		
search report; Corrected A document: A8 document Corrected title page of an A docu-
ment, i.e. A1 or A2 document, A9 document Complete reprint of an A document, i.e. 
A1, A2 or A3 document.) 
B document  
European patent specification (B1 document European patent specification; (granted 
patent); B2 document New European patent specification (amended specification); B3 
document European patent specification (after limitation procedure); Corrected B doc-
ument: B8 document Corrected title page of a B document, ie. B1 or B2 document, B9 
document Complete reprint of a B document, ie. B1 or B2 document) 
50 Ex multis, E Archontopoulos, ‘Spot the difference: a computer implemented inven-
tion or a software patent?’ (6th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association, Brussels, 
September 2011) <www.epip.eu/conferences/.../ARCHONTOPOULOS%20Eugenio.pdf 
>accessed 25 February 2014, 4; BH Hall, G von Graevenitz, C Rosazza-Bondibene, ‘A 
Study of Patent Thickets’ (The Intellectual Property Office, 2013) 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf > accessed 20th June 2017, 22; Har-
hoff et al. (11). With regard to the US experience, DH McQueen, ‘Growth of software 
related patents in different countries’ (2005) 25 Technovation 657; Allison, Tiller (18) 
991; JR Allison, SD Hunter, ‘On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Tech-
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Business methods are believed to be among them, as most of the busi-
ness methods are software or Internet implemented.51 Indubitably, the 
contribution of business methods in increasing the total number of pa-
tents applications at EPO is demonstrated by the database created to 
conduct this research. In point of fact, the collected data indicates that 
almost 35.000 patent applications have been filed in the category G06Q 
between January 1991 and July 2014.52 This number is in itself im-
pressive, especially so because the first patent applications in this 
category were recorded only in 1991. Although a relatively new subject 
matter at EPO, business methods have grown to be a very popular one. 
As such, business methods have largely contributed to the growth in 
the total number of patent applications filed at the EPO, specifically in 
the decade between 2000 and 2010.53  The following two plots give a 
quantitative indication of the increase in the volume of patent applica-
tions in the G06Q over the years, starting from the year 1991, when the 
first patent applications in this category were filed.  
																																																																																																																																																																		
nology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods’ (2006) 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 
730-31; Bessen, Meurer (1); K Rivette, D Kline, ‘Discovering New Value in Intellectual 
Property’ 2000 Harvard Business Review 54;  USPTO, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar 
Years  1790-2015, < 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.> accessed 20th June 
2017, showing an increased of five-fold between 1980 and 2014 
51 See Chapter I, 3 
52  X Qu,‘Should business methods be patentable?’ (2010) 5 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice 412, 415; UPTO, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Is-
sued Data <https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-
patent-applications/utility-patent/business-methods-18> accessed 20th June 2017 










The plot in Figure 3 reports the cumulative number of patent applica-
tions in the category G06Q as a function of time. Namely, it indicates, 
for each year, the total number of applications with a filing date in that 
year, or in one of the previous years. Overall, the graph points out how 
business methods have been since their beginning. Indeed, the applica-
tions filed at the EPO under the category G06Q have followed an 
exponential increase and have gone from a few in the 1990 to almost 
35.000 in 2014. To better highlight this fast growth, a logarithmic scale 
for the vertical axis, which is the typical scale used when the quantity of 
interest, as in this case the number of applications, changes rapidly 
and takes a wide range of value, has been adopted in Figure 4.  


























In the base-10 logarithmic scale adopted, the first segment on the verti-
cal axis indicates numbers going from 1 to 10, the second segment has 
the same length as the first one and indicates numbers from 10 to 100, 
and so on. In this way, it is much easier to read the actual value of the 
cumulative number of patents from the plot. For instance, we can ex-
tract that there were 307 patent applications standing in year 2000, 
thus 307 is the total number of applications that were filed at EPO un-
der category G06Q before the end of year 2000. Analogously, the plot 
indicates that there were 19,903 patent applications that were filed at 
EPO before the end of year 2010, and so on. 
 
More information on the growth of the volume of patent applications in 
the relevant category can be obtained from the plot in Figure 5, which 
reports instead the number of patent applications filed year by year.  
Again a logarithmic scale as the one in Figure 4 was adopted here for 
the vertical axis. 





























The number of applications filed each year shows clearly the important 
relation existing between the decision of the EPO Boards of Appeals and 
the trends in the volume of business method patent applications. Signif-
icantly, the beginning of the success of business method inventions can 
be set around the first years of this century, in parallel with the issuing 
of the PBS decision54 that represents a first step towards the acceptance 
of the patentability of business methods in Europe. We can indeed no-
tice that, while there were only 53 business method patents filed in year 
1999, this number raised to 126 in year 2000 and to 182 in 2001.  
 
Moreover, the plot points out that the number of applications has 
sharply increased again around the years 2004-2007. Mainly, the intro-
duction of the category G06Q explains this trend. Nevertheless, the 
																																																								
54  Text to n. 79 in Chapter II, PBS Partnership/Controlling pension benefits system 
(T931/95), (2002) E.P.O.R. 52  
 
















growth of the applications coincides also with the strengthening of the 
EPO Boards of Appeal position in favor of business method patens.  In 
those years, the EPO Board of Appeals issued both the Microsoft55 and 
the Hitachi decision.56 Thereby, further assurances were ultimately of-
fered about the patentability of business methods in Europe, and this 
encouraged firms to seek patent protection for this kind of inventions. 57 
 
Interestingly, the increase in the number of applications slightly re-
duced again around 2008-2009, which is the period when the Bilski 
case58 in the US and the Referral to the EPO Enlarged Board in Eu-
rope59 started to cast doubts on the patentability of business methods. 
In particular, the uncertainty created by those decisions drove firms to 
a more caution approach towards business method patents. Neverthe-
less, this attitude did not last for a long time and the number of 
applications per year started to rise again after 2010. Indeed, it was in 
2010 that the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision was issued making 
clear that no drastic step would have taken against patentability of 
business methods in Europe.60 Consequently, firms resumed their nor-
mal patenting activities as the consistent increase in number of 
applications in the category G06Q indicates in the plot above. Notice 
that, while in the data set it results that 2013 is the year with the larg-
est number, namely 4,767, of filed patents in the category G06Q, no 
definitive conclusions can be drawn about the year 2014, because the 
reported number 1,567 represents only a fraction of the patents, name-
ly those filed before the 2nd June 2014. This explains the decrease in 
the last point of the plot. 
 
																																																								
55 Microsoft/Clipboard formats  (T424/03) (2006) 39 E.P.O.R. 414   
56 Hitachi/Auction Method T 258/03 (2004) 55 E.P.O.R.550 
57 DF Spulber, ‘Should Business Method Inventions be Patentable?’ (2011) 3 Journal 
of Legal Analysis 265, 316  
58 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); M la Belle, HM Schooner, ‘Big Banks and 
Business Method Patents’ (2013) 16 U.Pa.J. Bus. L. 431, 458  (“Before Bilski, the PTO 
issued 1,177, 1,694, and 1,996 Class 705 patents in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respec-
tively. Following Bilski the number of Class 705 patents increased to 4,059, 4,064 and 
4,854 between 2010 and 2012”) 
59 Programs for Computers (G3/08) (2010) 36 E.P.O.R. 349  
60 Ibid 362  
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6. Who applies for business method patents at the EPO?  
  
Nowadays, patent protection is more sought by entities than individu-
als. The picture of inventors filing applications to grant patent 
protection for their single invention is a thing of the past. Now patents 
are markedly a company business. Production, marketing and develop-
ment of goods or services increasingly requires the economical and 
financial capacity to hold and/or to license several patents. Additional-
ly, patents are valued for their own commercial potential, so the 
importance of the so-called “market for innovation” is increasing, and 
transactions in patent rights are becoming a vital component of eco-
nomic growth.61 Thereby, to investigate what type of entities – if only 
firms or other groups - have played a leading role in the success of 
business method patents at the EPO is relevant to understand the phe-
nomenon. The dataset created for this work offers the possibility to 
investigate quantitatively who has filed the largest number of patent 
applications in the category G06Q. Names of firms and other entities 
will be explored in chapter VI, while the focus of this section is mainly 
on categories of applicants filing the largest number of patent applica-
tions in the category G06Q at the EPO.  
 
Results, as detailed below show that firms are without any doubt the 
category filing the majority of patent applications related to business 
method inventions at the EPO. Firms have been identified in the data 
set by looking at applicants with words or abbreviations in their name 
that indicate that they are entities running a business to make profit, 
i.e.corporation, incorporated, limited, company, inc., co., ltd., n.v., s.a., ab, 
ag, l.l.c, gmbh, b.v., plc,  s.a.s, l.p.,c.v., s.r.o., s.p.a, oy etc..62 The num-
ber of applications filed by firms in the category G06Q at the EPO is 
plotted in Figure 6. In particular, the green line shows the number of 
																																																								
61 A Galasso, M Schankerman, ‘Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation’ 
(2010) 4 RAND Journal of Economics 472 
62 These are all abbreviations used to indicate entities running a business to make 
profit accordingly with some of the legal system around the word 
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patent applications that firms have filed year by year in the relevant 
category. Comparing this plot to the one reported as green curve in Fig-
ure 5, it emerges clearly that the main contribution to the curve 
describing the total volume of applications in category G06Q comes 
from patent applications filed by firms, as the differences between the 
two curves is almost unnoticeable. As such, the primary role of firms in 




In Figure 6, the volume of patent applications filed by firms is also com-
pared to the number of patent applications submitted by universities 
year by year, which is reported as a red curve.63 The main reason for 
looking in parallel to entities such as universities is indeed the intrinsic 
difference between firms and universities. 64  In particular, making prof-
its is not the aim of universities, as their principal institutional role is to 
improve knowledge and to stimulate scientific research and science pro-
gress. Universities are in some sense the polar opposite of firms, 
according to the fact that universities cannot be institutionally commit-
																																																								
63 University have been identified by selecting in the dataset  all the applicants  with 
word university in their name. 
64 Wipo, World Intellectual Property Report 2011- The Changing Face of Innovation 
(WIPO-Economics & Statistics Series 2011) 14 (“Accordingly, there has been a marked 
increase in patent applications by universities and PROs – both in absolute terms and 
as a share of total patents filed”).  


















ted to implementing or developing inventions as firms are. Until recently 
such a difference was easily identifiable in the university attitude to-
wards patents. In the past, universities used to file patent applications 
only occasionally. 65 However, some recent studies have pointed out that 
more and more universities are interested in patents.66 In particular, 
possible strategic uses of patents have been highlighted in the tendency 
of universities to legally enforce their patents. 67  As already discussed 
in Chapter III,	recent years have witnessed the emerging of new entities 
in the patent context, the so-called non-practising entities (NPE).68 Such 
bodies are commonly identified in those entities that do not implement 
patent inventions. Conversely, non-practising entities are interested in 
filing patent applications as well as in building large patent portfolios 
with the main purpose of aggressively enforcing patent rights to secure 
high revenues. Such approaches have been mainly observed in the IT 
																																																								
65 Ibid 15 
66 With regard to the US experience, D Foray, F Lissoni, ‘University research and pub-
lic‐private interaction’ in BH Hall, N Rosenberg (eds) Handbook of the Economics of 
Innovation, (Elsevier 2010); DC Mowery et al. Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: 
University-Industry Technology Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act  (Stanford 
University Press 2004)  
67 BJ Love, ‘Do University Patents Pay Off-Evidence from a Survey of University Inven-
tors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering.’ (2013) 16 Yale JL & Tech. 285, 
290 (“ However, things are changing in the world of university patenting. In recent 
years, tech transfer tectonics have shifted strongly in the direction of computing and 
telecommunications. Increasingly, universities are pursuing patents on high-tech8 in-
ventions9 and, moreover, enforcing those rights widely and aggressively”); AK Rai, JR 
Allison, BN Sampat, ‘University Software Ownership and Litigation’ in M Abramowicz, 
JE Daily, FS Kieff (eds) Perspectives on Patentable Subject Matter (CUP 2014) 338 (“As-
sertive university patenting has attracted attention in both scholarly and popular 
literature. Additionally, because universities and sometimes even their exclusive licen-
sees are non manufacturing patentees, the intense debate over whether such 
patentees employ “holdup” strategies deleterious to innovation when they assert pa-
tents against successful commercializers directly implicates universities”); BH Hall, D 
Harhoff, ‘Recent Research on the Economics of Patents’ (2012) NBER Working paper 
n. 17773 < http://www.nber.org/papers/w17773 > accessed on the 20th June 2017, 
24  
68  Text to n.152, 153 in Chapter III. With regard to the “patent troll” phenomenon in 
Europe, BJ Love, C Helmers, L McDonagh, ‘Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the UK?’ 
(2014) 24 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 509, 510 (“Conventional wisdom 
states that “patent trolls”—entities that obtain patents not to facilitate the develop-
ment of new products, but instead for the purposes of suing those who do—are a 
uniquely American phenomenon”); Hall, Grid, Torrisi (24) 61 (Referring to financial pa-
tents in Europe “Moreover, oppositions mostly involve, as opponents or as defendants, 
firms that are also important contributors to financial innovations and the underlying 
IT infrastructure. This result points to an important difference with the US system, in 
which the most active plaintiffs in patent litigation are patent holder firms specializing 
in licensing and patent litigation”); S Fusco, ‘Markets and Patent Enforcement: A 
Comparative Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the United States and Eu-
rope’  (2013) 20 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 439, 454 
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and in the biotechnology sector. 69 And, universities appear to have em-
ployed this strategy precisely in those areas. 70  For this reason, 
universities have also been included among the non-practising entities. 
Hence, a deep economical and institutional divide runs between firms 
and universities. Thus conceived, a joint analysis of the volume of pa-
tent applications filed by firms and universities can provide an 
additional insight into the growth of the business method patent phe-
nomenon.  
 
Referring in particular to Figure 6, the plot emphasises the main role of 
firms in the increase of the volume of patent applications in the catego-
ry G06Q at the EPO. However, the two curves demonstrate that firms 
are not the only player, as other types of entities, namely universities or 
other NPEs, have shown interest in the category G06Q. Significantly, 
the figure reveals that universities only started to seek patent protection 
for their business methods in 2006 when a specific category for this 
type of inventions was finally introduced. Thus, universities have taken 
a more cautious approach towards patenting business methods com-
pared to firms, which have instead shown a pioneering spirit and have 
started to file patent applications in the category G06Q already in the 
1990’s. Moreover, the smaller volume of applications by universities 
leads to relatively larger fluctuations in the number of applications year 
by year. This is clearly visible in the sharp drops in the red curve in 
Figure 6, which are unparalleled in the green curve, the firm’s curve.  
 
Universities are not the only entities being surprisingly passionate 
about business method patents at the EPO. From the analysis of the 
data set, it clearly emerges that also banks have demonstrated a certain 
degree of interest in filing patent applications in the category G06Q. The 
attitude toward patenting of banks started to change a decade ago when 
																																																								
69 CV Chien, ‘From arms race to marketplace: the complex patent ecosystem and its 
implications for the patent system’ (2010) 62 Hastings LJ, 297; T Sichelman, ‘The 
Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in Patent Bullying’ (2014) 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 543 
70  Rai, Allison, Sampat, (67) 339 (Rai et al. recall “an IBM vice president that 
“[u]niversities have made life increasingly difficult to do research . . . because of all the 
contractual issues around intellectual property”); Graham, Mowery (38)7-24 
	 139	
a stream of innovative products based on IT methods were produced in 
the financial sector.71 However, this spur of innovation coincided with 
an increase in litigations; thus, banks turned from trade-secret agree-
ments to patents in order to better protect their relevant inventions.72 
This change in the bank approach towards patents has been recently 
examined in research based on the USPTO Patent Register.73 The study 
suggests that banks’ lobbyists in the US have strongly contributed to 
business method patentability, even persuaded Congress in passing 
some ad-hoc regulations on this issue.74  
 
The role of banks in building patent protection for business methods 
has not been specifically analysed in Europe. However, as already indi-
cated in Section 2, several analyses have highlighted the growing 
attention to patent protection in the financial sector also in the Europe-
an context.75 In particular, the data collected for this research indicate 
a certain degree of interest of banks, as an increasing number of appli-
cations is filed in the category G06Q by applicants that have the word 
‘bank’ in their name or that are well known entities operating in the fi-
nancial market. In the following two figures, Figure 7 and Figure 8, the 
number of patent applications filed in the category G06Q at the EPO by 
entities operating in the financial sector have been compared to the 
number applications submitted by firms in the same category and in 
the same Register.  
 
																																																								
71 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Of-
ficial Government Edition 2011) 53 (“In 2003   speech, Fed Vice Chairman Roger 
Ferguson praised “the truly impressive improvement in methods of risk measurement 
and management and the growing adoption of these technologies by mostly large 
banks and other financial intermediaries.”) 
72 S Fusco, ‘Is the use of patents promoting the creation of new types of securities’ 
(2008) 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. LJ 243; Lerner (24) 906; Belle, Schoon-
er (58) 434 
73 Belle, Schooner (58) 
74 ibid 460 (“Although the financial industry took some interest in the earliest patent 
reform efforts, it became a real priority in 2007. That year, bank lobbyists (particularly 
the Financial Services Roundtable) stepped up their efforts with Congress, and it paid 
off.191 In April 2007, parallel patent reform bills were introduced in both houses of 
Congress.”)  







In particular, Figure 7 reports the number of applications filed by each 
firm and each bank. This type of plot is known as a ranked distribution, 
since firms are sorted by their activity, so that the firm corresponding to 
Rank=1 in the x-axis is the firm with the largest number of applications, 
the one corresponding to Rank=2 is the second largest in terms of 
number of applications, and so on. Notice the logarithmic scale adopted 
in the plot, both for the x-axis and for the y-axis. The almost linear be-
havior observed in the plots in the double-logarithmic scale indicates 
that the distribution of the number of applications is a power-law func-
tion of the ranking, thus it is an extremely heterogeneous distribution. 
Mathematically, this means that we can write:  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =
𝐴 ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘!!, with A and 𝛾 two positive constants. This is true for all firms 
in general, but also for banks only, independently from the big differ-
ence in the volume of their applications. Notice, that the bank with the 
largest number of applications has filed only 183 applications, whereas 
there are more than 20 firms with a number of applications larger that 
this. Considering also that the firm with the largest number of applica-

















tion has 922 applications, banks can be considered a relatively small 
player in the business method patent arena, compared to firms. Never-
theless, their attention over time to this subject matter after year 2004 





This figure shows the curve of the number of yearly applications filed by 
banks (black), and compares it to the same plot corresponding to firms 
(green) already reported in Figure 6. As in Figure 6, a logarithmic scale 
has been adopted on the vertical axis. The two curves show strong simi-
larities but also some differences in their trends. Proportionally, the 
increase in the number of bank patent applications seems to be more 
rapid at the beginning of the phenomenon, i.e. in the years 2004-2007, 
while the plot shows a more marked decrease in the last years than that 
of firm applications. Thereby, banks demonstrate to be interested in 
business method patents, though their attention to the subject matter 
has started only in 2004 and more recently has shown signs of slowing 
down. In conclusion, banks seem to have played a relevant role, 
thought not the major one, in the success of category G06Q at EPO.  


















The plot in Figure 8 reveals also a remarkable similarity with the trends 
in business method patent at the USPTO.76 In particular, the number of 
patents granted in the class 705 at the USPTO has increased signifi-
cantly after 2004; in the same way, banks started to file patent 
applications in the category G06Q at EPO in 2004. Additionally, a grow-
ing trend has been identified in class 705 after the 2009, as well as we 
can observe a peak of patent applications in the category G06Q in year 
2010 in our plot for banks. Such similarities are not surprising accord-



















As highlighted by the list reported in Table 1, most of the banks apply-
ing for patent protection of business methods at the EPO are American, 
with Bank of America being the one with the largest number of applica-
																																																								
76 Belle, Schooner (58) 448 (“Before State Street, the most Class 705 patents granted 
in a year since 1992 was 249; that number increased to 489 in 1998, 720 in 1999, 
and 736 in 2000. Between 2001 and 2004, however, there was a marked decline in is-
sued business method patents compared to the previous three years, most likely 
resulting from the PTO’s heightened examination procedures for these types of inven-
tions. The trend began to reverse in 2005 when the PTO granted 776 business method 
patents; by 2009, that number had grown to just shy of 2000”) 
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tions, namely 183. These results indicate that American banks have 
triggered a wave of support to business method patentability that has 
produced its effects also in Europe.77 However, in terms of volume of the 
phenomenon, the numbers are quite different. As Table 1 reveals, appli-
cations filed by banks at EPO are fewer than those filed by firms; and, 
as indicate before, they are also less than those filed by American Bank 
at the USPTO. 
 
All this considered, some conclusions can be drawn about the entity 
applying for business method patents at the EPO. First of all, it appears 
that firms are the driving force behind the business method patent 
phenomenon at the EPO. Patent applications filed by firms are utmost 
the grater number in the category G06Q. However, the collected data 
indicates that not only firms, but also other types of applicants are in-
terested in granting patent protection for business method inventions. 
Not only firms but also universities and banks - both of them usually 
not involved in patenting 78 - have focused their attention on this sub-
ject matter. Therefore, G06Q interestingly features as a cross cutting 
category, able to protect a broad spectrum of entities as well as a broad 
spectrum of interests, presumably.  
 
7. Is there any strategy behind business method patents?  
  
 As the collected data at the EPO indicates, business methods are not 
only a widely patented subject matter, but also a cross cutting category 
																																																								
77 ibid (58) 471 (“From 1995 to 2007, none of the G-SIFIs [global systemically im-
portant banks] appeared on this list.  That trend began to shift in 2008 when JP 
Morgan was issued forty-seven patents; JP Morgan has remained on the list for the 
past four years with its highest number of patent grants (eighty-four) in 2010. The 
other G-SIFIs with substantial patenting activity include BOA, Morgan Stanley, and 
Goldman Sachs. BOA received seventy-three patents in 2011 and 165 patents in 
2012, while Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have each only appeared on the list 
once since 2008.”); Komulainen, Takalo (39) 530  
78 JF Duffy, JA Squires, ‘Disclosure and Financial Patents: Revealing the Invisible 
Hand’ ( Bank of Finland-CEPR Conference, Helsinki, October 2010)< 
https://www.suomenpankki.fi/globalassets/en/research/seminars-
andconferences/conferences-and-
workshops/documents/cepr2008/cepr2008_duffysquires_paper.pdf > accessed on the 
20th June 2017; Rai, Allison, Sampat (67) 347 
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involving different entities. Nevertheless, different attitudes toward pa-
tenting business method have developed over time. Indeed, firms on the 
one hand, and banks and universities on the other hand have acted dif-
ferently over the years. This can be seen from the plot in Figure 9, 
which reports, as a function of time, the yearly percentage increase in 
the number of applications filed by the different actors. Specifically, the 
three curves shown in Figure 9 report the percentage variation in the 
number of applications as function of time for firms, banks and univer-
sities, respectively. 
 




In the figure above, for each year t, the quantity reported on the vertical 
axis is obtained by computing the ratio: 
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛  # 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡 = # !""#$%!&$'() ! !# !""#$%!&$'() (!!!)
# !""#$%!&$'() (!!!)
=
 # !""#$%!&$'() !
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and expressing it as a percentage. Finding a value of such a ratio equal 
to 300, as for instance observed for firms at year 1994, means that the 
variation in the number of patent applications submitted in year 1994 
with respect to that submitted in year 1993 is equal to three times the 
number of patent applications filed in 1993. Or, in other words, the 
number of patent applications filed in 1994 is four times as large as the 
number of applications filed in the previous year, 1993.  
 
According to the above criteria, the plots show that from 2004 the per-
centage variation in the number of new applications filed by firms per 
year assumed values always smaller than 100, and decreasing with 
time. The graph also reveals that such variation for firms, after 2004, is 
lower in percentage than the variation in the number of applications 
filed in the same time frame by banks and universities. This indicates 
that firm’s interest in business method patents have reached a station-
ary state in recent years,79 whereas, in the same period of time, banks 
and universities are still stabilizing their attention to this subject mat-
ter, as confirmed by the relatively large fluctuations in the percentage 
variation in the number of filed applications after 2005.   
 
It is noticeable that entities usually not involved in patent protection 
tend to show an interest in business method patents. Indeed, entities 
that do not implement themselves inventions, and also entities that 
usually act in non-technological areas, express interest to grant pa-
tents. Such behaviors reveal an anomaly indicating that applicants 
could seek patent protection for business methods for other reasons 
than only to be allowed the exclusive use of the invention. This conclu-
sion seems also to be supported from an analysis of the number of 
																																																								
79 A possible explanation is offered by Komulainen, Takalo, (39) (“Our findings sug-
gests that that the State Street decision created a period of uncertainty where the 
boundaries of the European patent system were tested by the U.S. firms with more 
experienced intellectual property management organizations. But contrary to what has 
been speculated, we find that the patentability standards for financial innovations 
have not weakened in Europe in the aftermath of the State Street decision. This shows 
that law matters, albeit the link from the law on the books to the actual enforcement 
might be complicated.”) 
 
	 146	
applications finally turning into a granted patent in the category of 
business methods. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 10. 
This figure, in particular, shows a scatter plot, which represents correla-
tions between the number of applications in the category G06Q and the 









In point of fact, patent applications submitted at EPO are examined by 
examination divisions, which verify the fulfillment of the requirements 
ex Article 52 EPC. The examination period can last up to six years. At 
the end of the examination, the patent can be granted or refused.80 
Therefore, not all patent applications are approved; indeed, quite the 
opposite usually happens. In the above graph the data on the volume of 
patent applications are combined with those referring to the numbers of 
granted patents. Specifically, the scatter plot reports the number of 
																																																								
80 It is also possible that the applicants decide to withdraw the application. In this 

















Fit  Y= 2.5 * X^0.28
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granted patents in the category G06Q, shown on the vertical axis, as a 
function of the number of filed applications, shown on the x-axis. Each 
point in the scatter plot represents a different entity (firm, or university, 
or bank). Only active entities, i.e. those having filed at least 10 patent 
applications in the period covered by our data set, have been consider. 
And, among them, only entities with at least one granted patent are 
shown.  
 
The most striking thing revealed by the plot is that only a small per-
centage of applications result in the issue of a patent. In particular, the 
plot shows that the productivity is in general always less than 1%.81 So, 
in the average, only one application over more than 100 filed by the 
same applicant fulfills all the requirements of Article 52 EPC, and is fi-
nally granted. Figure 10, hence, suggests that applicants in the category 
G06Q have little interest in having patent protection granted to their 
business method inventions, whereas great attention is paid to patent 
applications. Notably, the number of patent applications has increased 
over the years, while the possibility to obtain patent protection for busi-
ness method inventions has remained significantly low.82  
 
Hence, Figure 10 corroborates the hypothesis that patent applications 
are more appealing than patents themselves in the category G06Q. As 
such, patent applications are submitted, even when it is highly probable 
that they will be rejected. This might indicate that firms are interested 
in a short-period patent protection, thus, in a protection lasting only 
from the submission of the application until its rejection. Alternatively, 
this might demonstrate that firms want to overpopulate intentionally 
the category G06Q in order to slow down the work pace of the examina-
tion divisions, or with the purpose of creating uncertainties on what 
																																																								
81 About the USPTO allowance rate in the category G06Q , G Quinn ‘Business Methods 
by the Numbers: A Look Inside PTO Class 705’ (IPWatchdog, 22 January 2012)   
<http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-the-numbers-a-
look-inside-pto-class-705/id=21892/ > accessed 20th June 2017; Archontopoulos (50) 
38  
82  EPO, ‘Granted patents 2007-2016 per field of technology’ 
<https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/statistics.html#granted> 
accessed on the 20th June 2017  
	 148	
extent patents cover new business methods. All this supports the idea 
that some other strategies, different from obtaining patent protection, 
are what in fact lie behind the increasing number of applications in the 
business method category. 
 
8. Some conclusions  
 
A more detailed analysis of the data set introduced in this chapter will 
be performed in Chapter VI, where also the names of relevant firms will 
be explored more in details. However, the examination conducted in this 
chapter already offers some material for reflection. Indeed, the category 
G06Q is a very popular one at the EPO, as about 35,000 patent applica-
tions have been registered under this class. Despite the large number of 
applications, only less than 1,000 business method patents have been 
granted in the last 20 years in this category. Additionally, the analysis 
performed in this work has highlighted that patent protection for busi-
ness methods is sought not only by firms but also by entities that 
traditionally are not involved in selling or trading of goods. All this con-
firms once again the need to investigate the underlying reason for such 
a success of business method patents at the EPO. The possible strategic 
use, not only of business methods patents but also of patent applica-






A strategic approach behind patenting business methods? 
 
1.Introduction  
With the beginning of the digital revolution, there has been an increas-
ing attention towards patents has been observed in both Europe and 
the US. Surveys1 have revealed an exponential growth in the number of 
patent applications, to such an extent that some scholars have stigma-
tized the phenomenon as a ‘patent flood’ 2  o a ‘patent explosion’. 3 
Business method patents belong squarely to this phenomenon. Accord-
ing to empirical analysis carried out in Chapter VI, the number of 
patent applications in category G06Q at the EPO has greatly increased 
in the last twenty years. From only a few applications over the 1990s, 
category G06Q is now one of the most popular with more than one 
thousand applications per year. However, the business method patents 
ultimately granted at the EPO are not as numerous as might be ex-
pected from the large amount of patent applications.  
Figure 10 of Chapter IV clearly indicates that only few patent applica-
tions in category G06Q are accepted. These data are consistent with the 
strict approach toward business method patents developed by the EPO 
over the last decades. As discussed in the first two chapters, the re-
quirement of technicality established in both Article 52 and Article 56 
EPC has been applied carefully. As such business method can obtain 
patent protection in Europe only when capable of causing a change in 
																																																								
1 Ex multis, J Bessen, MJ Meurer, Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and law-
yers put innovators at risk (Princeton University Press 2008); H Hall, G von Graevenitz, 
C Rosazza-Bondibene, ‘A Study of Patent Thickets’ (The Intellectual Property Office, 
2013) <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf > accessed 20th June 2017; 
Harhoff et al., The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and compe-
tition policies - Tender for No ENTR/05/82 (2007) 
<https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/37550/1/study- 202852-2008_en_2475.pdf> accessed 
on the 20th June 2017  
2 Text to n.132 Chapter III; M Meurer, ‘Business method patents and patent floods’ 
(2002) 8 Wash. UJL & Pol’y 309  
3 Text to n. 13 Chapter IV; Harhoff et al.(1)65 
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the physical nature or technical functioning of clearly technical fea-
tures, or capable of reflecting technical considerations required to carry 
out the disclosed invention.4 Nevertheless, the EPO approach does not 
seem to have affected the interest of firms, especially the large ones, in 
filing business method patent applications. As already discussed in 
Chapter III, such a large number of patent applications in category 
G06Q has raised the suspicion that some strategy could be behind the 
growing interest to business method patents. 
Chapter III thoroughly examined some of the economic rationales tradi-
tionally associated to patent protection have been. Nevertheless, that 
analysis revealed that neither the standard or conventional motivations 
could fully explain the reasons behind the phenomenon of business 
method patents. Neither the implementation of business method inven-
tions, nor their exploitation has been observed to increase as result of 
business method patent protection. Equally, innovation in this techno-
logical area does not seem to have been encouraged by granting patent 
protection to business methods. Conversely, the increase in the demand 
for patent protection to business method has been linked to the growing 
reality of firms in holding large amount of patents.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the phenomena that are usually 
associated with firms’ attitudes of accumulating patents and patent ap-
plications. Among such phenomena are large patent portfolios and 
patent thickets. These will be examined in Section 1 and in Section 2 
respectively. Greater attention will be, however, given to patent thickets. 
The peculiarity of this phenomenon is not only the huge amount of pa-
tent applications, but also the cumulative nature of the inventions and 
the uncertainty intentionally created around the extent of patent protec-
tion ultimately granted.  And, indeed, all these features are usually 
identified in connection to business method patents and patent applica-
																																																								
4 EPO, ‘Examination of computer-implemented inventions at the European Patent Of-
fice with particular attention to computer-implemented business methods’ Official 
Journal EPO  (November 2007) 594, 597  




tions. For this reason, patent thickets will be the subject of a wider in-
vestigation, which will focus not only on features of patent thickets and 
strategic reasons, but also on the their effects and on possible ineffi-
ciencies created in the market.  
2. Patent Portfolios  
2. 1 Patent portfolio: a definition   
In general terms, a patent portfolio is defined as a “strategic collection of 
distinct, but related, individual patents that, when combined, confer an 
array of important advantages upon the portfolio holder”.5 In particular, 
firms are not interested either in the validity or in the strength of indi-
vidual patents, or in their technological contents in strategically 
building a patent portfolio. Quantity instead of quality is the firm’s over-
riding interest when patents are accumulated to result in a strategic 
patent portfolio. Indeed, owning several patents can enable firms to take 
advantage of patents in other ways than by their implementation.6 Addi-
tionally, the amassing of patents resulting in holding a large portfolio 
can help firms avoid infringement claims: either by showing their ability 
in bringing strong infringement counterclaims7 or by creating patent 
overlap, which makes it difficult to assess patent validity.8 Also, in addi-
tion to defensive purposes, patent portfolios are often built for offensive 
reasons. As such big patent portfolio can be used to increasing firm lev-
erage and power in the market.9  
 
																																																								
5 G Parchomovsky, PR Wagner ‘Patent Porfolios’ (2005). 54 U. PA. L. REv.1, 27 
6 Ibid. 32  
7 CV Chien, ‘From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its 
Implications for the Patent System’ (2010) 62 Hastings L.J. 297, 308-10; T Ewing, ‘In-
direct Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights By Corporations and Investors: IP 
Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque and Reprisal’ (2012) 4 Hastings Sci. &Tech. 
L.J. 1,15-17 
8 JR Orr, ‘Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust.’ 
(2013) 28 Berkeley Tech. LJ 525, 526 
9 BH Hall, RH Ziedonis, ‘The Patent Paradox Revisited : An Empirical Study of Patent-
ing in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979 – 1995’  (2001) 32 RAND Journal of 
Economics, 101, 108-110 
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2.2 Patent portfolio as “super patents”  
As suggested in Parchomovsky and Wagner’s seminal work, building a 
big patent portfolio results in owning a sort of “super patent”.10 The two 
scholars emphasize that patent accumulation offers their owner benefits 
larger than the ones provided by the single patent separately.11 Never-
theless, it is thought that the scale of these advantages depends on the 
particular features of the patent cluster. As such, not only the number 
of patents but also the relationship between them is considered cru-
cial.12 For example, the possibility to rely on more than one patent 
related to the same innovation can be of significant importance.13  In-
deed, ‘patent redundancy’, i.e. the inclusion in the portfolio of several 
patents all referring to the same technology, can ultimately discourage 
competitors from taking legal action or even using the threat of legal ac-
tion to strengthen their position in the market, due to the increased 
costs of challenging multiple patents.14 Furthermore, the reduced value 
of a technology becomes less likely when more patents cover it and pa-
tents are all in the same portfolio. 15  As such, the protection of 
innovative products or processes is provided simultaneously by different 
patents; thus, even if some patents are invalidated, the presence of oth-
er patents covering that same technology (which are not strictly 
necessary to exploit the invention, but to be used in case of invalidity of 
infringement of others) can still allow the exploitation of the innovation 
by the firm that holds all the related bundle of patents. 16   
Moreover, it is more difficult finding unpatented space within a techno-
logical field when several patents cover it. As such, start-up entries can 
be deterred, given the difficulties to detect a piece of technology that is 
																																																								
10 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 7(“ …by combining the "right to exclude" of many closely 
related patents, a patent portfolio greatly increases the effective scale - the total scope 
of protection in the marketplace- beyond that of a collection of differentiated patents.”) 
11 Ibid. 51-52 
12 Ibid. 32  
13 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ (2005) 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 82  
14 Orr(8) 537  
15 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 73 
16 Lemley, Shapiro(13), 85-86 
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not covered by patent protection.17 Similarly, competitors already in the 
market can be discouraged to submit patent applications in those tech-
nological areas where several patents have already been filed by a rival. 
In such a case, competitors that want to continue to operate in that 
market could be forced to reach a licensing agreement that includes all 
the patents in the portfolio in a bid to avoid lengthy litigation.18 Howev-
er, it could be costly, and ultimately firms that do not hold large patent 
portfolios, i.e. do not have patents to offer in return in cross–licensing 
agreements, could find it more convenient to leave the market. Diversity 
inside a patent portfolio can also positively affect the value and the bar-
gaining power of patents.19 Indeed, diversity presents patent portfolio 
holders with the possibility of reaching licensing agreements with a wid-
er range of other patent holders. In particular, the opportunity of 
reaching cross-licensing agreements increases, given the possibility to 
offer patents in return.20 Thus, holding a large amount of patents is 
agreed on having the effect of growing a firm’s market power.21 Moreo-
ver, diversity of patent portfolios tends to bolster a firm’s position in the 
market.22 As such, the presence of patents related to different technolo-
gies can reduce risks and uncertainty, specifically inherent to 
innovative industries. Indeed, strong positions in more than one techno-
logical market can help in consolidating the firm’s grip in new and 
growing markets.23  
2.3 Patent portfolios and competition  
The effect of patent portfolios have been also analysed trying to under-
stand whether the trend to patent accumulations can contribute to the 
stifling of competition. As suggested in the previous subsection, amass-
ing a large amount of patents tends to strengthen patents holders’ 
																																																								
17 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 39-41. 
18 Ibid. 73–74; Orr (8) 538  
19 Ibid. 35  
20 Ibid. 65  
21 Ibid. 34 
22 E Dorsey, ‘Building Patent Portfolios to Facilitate Cross-Licensing Agreements: Im-
plications for Merger Efficiency Analysis’ (2013) 15 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev.125, 
134 
23 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 38 
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economic power. Indeed, patent portfolios can result in providing firms 
with greater bargaining power. As such, the accumulation of patents 
can secure an unassailable position in the market to firms that, owning 
a large amount of patents often related to more than one technology, 
can increase the amount of collected royalties as well as reduce access 
to technologies by other competitors.24 Both hold-up, i.e. threatening le-
gal actions to obtain royalties higher than the value of the patent, and 
tying arrangement i.e. forcing rivals to license also patents that they are 
not interested in, can be strategically adopted using the strong position 
in the market.25 Hence, patent portfolios can result in the asymmetrical 
rising of rival costs since competitors and start-ups can only develop 
their products by incurring high sunk costs to access the patented 
technology.26 Therefore, the accumulation of patents has the potential 
to both deter the entry of new firms in the first place while, at the same 
time, hastening other rivals to exit the market.27  
Notwithstanding, patent portfolios can promote economic growth. In-
deed, patent aggregations have been indicated as a means capable of 
creating efficiencies in the market. As will be fully discussed in Chapter 
VIII, the aggregation of patents in patent pools, i.e. large portfolios in-
cluding all the patents related to the same technology and managed by 
a dedicated entity, can reduce the cost of transactions. Ultimately, firms 
interested in implementing a technology can be facilitated by patent ag-
gregations, given the opportunity of reaching only one licensing 
agreement with the patent pool instead of entering into multiple licens-
ing negotiations.28 Furthermore, patent aggregation resulting in patent 
pools can increase the possibility to access a technology at fair, reason-
able and non- discriminatory terms (FRAND).29 Thus, more room can be 
																																																								
24 Chien (7) 322-324 
25 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 72; Lemley, Shapiro (13) 82. For a definition of hold-up, 
Federal Trade Commission of the United States, ‘The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning 
Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.’ (Federal Trade Commission Report, 
2011), 58 
26 Orr (8) 550 
27 Ibid. 539 
28 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 73 
29 European Commission, ‘Communication from The Commission to The European 
Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee. An Industri-
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found for reducing product prices when a large patent portfolio is built 
around a specific technology and handled by a patent pool.30 Moreover, 
patent accumulation in a big portfolio can result in increasing invest-
ment in new technologies. As already mentioned in the previous section, 
diversification in owned patents can reduce risks and diminish con-
cerns in investing in new fields. 31  Hence, as it will be more fully 
explained in Chapter VIII, patent portfolios, i.e. patent accumulation 
managed by dedicated entities, could facilitate beneficial effects, such 
as fostering innovation and ultimately increasing consumer welfare.32 
2.4 Strategic uses of patent portfolios 
As it will be fully discussed in Chapter IX, the monopolistic prerogative 
resulting from granting patent protection to inventions can affect com-
petition in the market. Admittedly, the issue of reconciling patent 
exclusive rights and free access to the market has been focused over the 
years, and indeed the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has underlined the difference between the existence of an IP right and 
its exercise in order to clarify the possible interface between these two 
pieces of legislation. As such, the Court has pointed out that the exist-
ence of  “rights granted by a Member State to the holder of a patent are 
not affected by the prohibitions”33 established in the Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. However, the “exercise of such rights cannot of itself fall ei-
ther under [ex] Article 85(1), in the absence of any agreement, decision 
or concerted practice prohibited by that provision, or under [ex] Article 
86, in the absence of any abuse of a dominant position.”34 Thus, the ex-
istence of a patent cannot itself confer any market power; however, the 
																																																																																																																																																																		
al Property Rights Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2008) 465/3, 2008), 9 (Referring to 
standard setting, i.e. setting technologies  essential to a standard, the Commission in-
dicates that  “Rules within standard-setting organisations may specify an ex ante (i.e. 
before a standard is set) duty to disclose essential patent applications and/or issued 
patents or a duty to offer commitments to license the essential patents on fair, rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms)”) 
30 Parchomovsky, Wagner (5) 73 
31 P Giuri et al., Report of the Expert Group on Patent Aggregation (European Union, 
2015) 5  
32 Orr (8), 565 
33 Case 24/67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel,Reese,Beintema- Interpharm and Centra-




use of a patent can be caught by competition law, according to the 
Court conclusion. 
All this considered, accumulations of several patents in the hands of 
individual firms or other entities are entirely legal.35 Indeed, building a 
patent portfolio is considered a lawful activity.36 However, the decision 
of a firm to accumulate a large amount of patents can be questioned 
when a large patent portfolio excludes current or future competitors, 
and generally harms competition.37. In the Axalto case,38 for example, 
the European Commission highlighted the ill effect on competition that 
could be produced when a merger agreement resulted in combining pa-
tent portfolios, ultimately creating a big patent portfolio.39 In particular, 
the Commission stressed the suspicion that a firms’ decision to merge 
could be mainly based on the opportunity to aggregate a large amount 
of patents and other IP rights. Indeed, according to the Commission, big 
patent portfolios could prompt tacit coordination among leading players 
in the market. 40 As such, increasing rivals’ costs as well as competitors’ 
difficulties in exploiting the technology involved in the merger was indi-
cated as potential outcomes.41 Therefore, the Commission concluded 
that large patent portfolios could be strategically used to foreclose the 
market, thereby weakening competition.42 However, in the specific case 
of the merger agreement between Axalto and Gemplus, the Commission 
deemed that competition was not weakened. This was due to the Axalto 
and Gemplus’ commitment of disclosing and granting at the same terms 
																																																								
35 EPO, Economic and Scientific Advisory Board, Patent aggregation and its impact on 
competition and innovation policy (EPO, 2015)  
36 Automatic Radio Mfg Co. v. Hazeltine Research  339 U.S. 827 (1950), 834 ( “mere ac-
cumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal.”) 
37 Orr (8) 527 
38European Commission, ‘Case COMP/M.3998 Axalto/ Gemplus, Merger Procedure’ 
(SG-Greffe(2006) D/202682, 19 May 2006)  
39 Ibid. para 60  
40 Ibid. para 65  
41 Ibid. para 66  
42 Ibid. para 64 (“In summary, the new entity will be in a position to marginalise com-
petitors with its combined IP portfolio. The likelihood that it will actually implement 




to any party that was interested in implementing Over-The-Air (“OTA”) 
platforms.43  
Such conclusions on possible strategic uses of big patent portfolio have 
been also supported in recent decisions. In approving Google’s acquisi-
tion of Motorola Mobility,44 the European Commission has focused on 
the acquisition of patents as a lawful conduct that do not itself raise 
competition issues.45 Similarly, the Commission has highlighted that 
the size of patent portfolios could not be considered “anti-competitive” 
in itself, when the effect of merger agreements are assessed ex Article 
102 TFEU.46 However, importance has been given to the fact that patent 
transactions could end up in amassing into the same ownership of pa-
tents that were deemed essential to the practice of industry standards. 
Significantly, the Commission has suggested that antitrust concerns 
needed to be raised towards patent portfolio that could result in impos-
ing anti-competitive licensing rates on downstream competitors, 
compelling downstream competitors to grant cross-licenses on terms 
they otherwise would not have agreed to, and/or excluding competitors’ 
products from the market altogether.47  Nevertheless, the Commission 
has concluded that Google’s acquisition of Motorola ‘would not signifi-
cantly modify the market situation in respect of operating systems and 
patents’48 because the Google patent portfolios has been perceived as 
unlikely to harm competition or to prevent or inhibit innovation.49 Spe-
cifically, the idea of hold-up behaviors, i.e. Google forcing rivals towards 
costly licensing agreements using the threat of an injunction, has been 
																																																								
43 Ibid. para 84  
44 European Commission, ‘Case COMP/M.6381 –Google/Motorola Mobility, Merger Pro-
cedure’ (C(2012) 1068, 13 February 2012)   
45  Ibid. para 181 (“The Commission finds that Google's proposed acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the inter-
nal market on the basis of conglomerate effects.”)  
46 Ibid.para 110  
47Ibid.para 109   
48 European Commission, ‘Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of Motorola Mo-
bility by Google’ (2012) EU Commission Press Release 
 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/129> accessed 
20th June 2017   
49 Google/Motorola Mobility (44) 110  
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dismissed as a possible result of the patent accumulation in that specif-
ic case.50  
Similarly, in the Microsoft case,51 albeit with a different framework, the 
Commission underlined the risk that patent portfolios could be used to 
gain a substantial amount of market power. 52  As already discussed in 
the previous sections, big patent portfolios could create strong bargain-
ing positions to be used to force rivals into costly licensing agreements, 
53 especially those aimed at avoiding legal actions. Hence, big patent 
portfolio has been viewed as a key means of reducing competition. 54  
Nevertheless, with regard to the specific case involving Microsoft and 
Nokia, the Commission concluded that no competition concerns could 
be raised related to the analysed merger. In seeking to provide reassur-
ance by its continued monitoring of the situation, the European 
Commission has stressed the current minimal overlapping in the activi-
ty of Microsoft and Nokia and the present inability of Microsoft to 
effectively restrict competition.55 Nevertheless, the Commission’s deci-
sion in the Microsoft case has further emphasised concerns about the 
strategic use of big patent portfolios. Despite the fact that creating large 
portfolios can not be considered anti-competitive in itself, it cannot be 
ignored that mergers or cross licensing can be used to combine patent 
portfolios resulting in increasing firms’ market power, thereby reducing 
competition and inhibiting innovation. 
2.5 Some conclusions  
The practice of creating big patent portfolios has become fairly common 
over the recent decades. Firms, specifically large ones, seem to be in-
																																																								
50 Ibid. para 134-136 (“The Commission considers that Google's incentives to signifi-
cantly impede effective competition, including by forcing licensees to grant cross-
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51 European Commission, ‘Case COMP/M.7047 - Microsoft/ Nokia Merger Procedure’ 
(C(2013)8873, 4 December 2013) 
52  Ibid. para 198  
53 Ibid. para 201 (“ In their view, this specific transaction structure will allow Nokia to 
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clined to aggregate under their own control large amounts of patents. 
Especially, it appears a tendency toward holding patents related to dif-
ferent technologies. According to Parchomovsky and Wagner, strategic 
reasons could be behind the practice of creating big patent portfolios. 
Indeed, patent accumulation is often more valuable than the simple 
sum of singular patent values. Additionally, big patent portfolios could 
be a key means of gaining a substantial amount of market power. Thus, 
concerns have been expressed also by the European Commission on the 
possible use of patent portfolios in foreclosing the market.  
As will be further analysed in the following sections, quantity is a com-
mon feature also of another phenomenon related to patent 
accumulation: the patent thicket phenomenon. Big patent portfolios 
and patent thickets also share the same concerns on the possible det-
rimental effects on competition as both could be strategically used to 
deter rivals from entering the market as well as investing in the same 
technological area. Nevertheless, some differences could be highlighted 
between big patent portfolios and patent thickets. For example, one of 
the main aspects of the patent portfolio is the concentration of numer-
ous patents under the same ownership, whereas patent thickets can 
also result from dispersed ownership. Moreover, patent portfolios are 
always intentional; by contrast, patent thickets – specifically those of a 
small scale- can result accidentally. Finally, patent thickets occur in 
cumulative innovation areas, whereas big patent portfolio strategy do 
not necessarily implies the accumulation of cumulative patents. This 
feature will be expanded below.  
3. Patent thicket 
3.1 Patent thicket: a definition  
The patent thicket phenomenon was analysed by Carl Shapiro in 
2001.56 According to his seminal work, patent thickets tend to occur 
when more than one patent, often several, cover the same technology. 
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As such, a patent thicket is described as a “dense web” of patents that 
firms need to license in order to commercialize a certain technology.57 In 
particular, Shapiro highlights that patent thickets are a main issue 
when innovations are cumulative, i.e. when inventions are built on pre-
vious ones and singular products are based on a group of patents.58 
Accordingly to the innate nature of this type of innovation, a technology 
usually relates on several patents in cumulative invention area. Never-
theless, this often translates in a great uncertainty about the extent of 
each patent, i.e. about the extent of patent protection granted to each 
piece of invention to be implemented in the final product.59 Indeed, pa-
tents can easily overlap. Additionally, uncertainty can be intentionally 
worsens when both the use of unclear languages and the creation of 
complex patterns of citations is put in place. All this can makes difficult 
for competitors to identify possible infringements. When a patent thick-
et occurs, therefore, firms are ultimately forced to license numerous 
patents (even patents that they are not going to implement) in order to 
avoid the risk of infringements.60 As shown by the “sewing machine 
wars”, which is one of the first examples of incremental innovation stra-
tegically used, the lack of certainty is the most concerning effects of 
patent thickets.61 The “war” happened more than a century ago. At the 
time the needle patented by Howe was the key element around which 
other firms, such as Singer or Wheeler, implemented new type of sewing 
machines. However, too broad patent protection was granted to the 
Howe’s needle; thus, not only the needle but also the process of using 
the needle was covered. This involved a certain degree of uncertainty 
																																																								
57 Ibid. 120 
58 Ibid. 119; J Bessen, E Maskin ‘Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation’ (2009) 
40 The RAND Journal of Economics 611,612 (Referring to software industries, Bessen 
and Maskin provide a definition of sequential and complementary innovations as sub-
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in which innovation is both sequential and complementary. By “sequential,” we mean 
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61 P Moser, ‘Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History’ (2013) 27 Jour-
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about the extent of Howe patent and the contents of other patents cov-
ering sewing machines. As a result, Howe was able to sue his 
competitors for infringement, ultimately receiving millions in licensing 
fees. 
According to Shapiro’s definition of patent thickets, two elements can be 
particularly useful in detecting patent thickets.  The large number of 
patent applications filed referring to the same technology is one of the 
indications of the existence of a patent thicket. Also, the creation of a 
complex pattern of citation among patents could be an indication re-
vealing that patents and patent applications are strategically filed to 
create some degree of uncertainty, thereby positing such a threat to be 
sued for infringements that firms are deterred from implementing new 
inventions. Therefore, according to Shapiro, firms could be discouraged 
from creating new products or services when a patent thicket is create 
around a technology, due to the uncertainty on what is patented and 
what is not, ultimately involving a high risk of litigation.62  
Similarly, the threat of patent infringement drives the European Com-
mission to focus on patent thicket issue in the Axalto case63. As already 
said in section 1.4, the danger of creating large patent portfolios was 
stressed in the decision. Scrutinizing the merger between two of the 
main firms in the market of the secure plastic card, in particular, the 
Commission pointed out the possibility that patents could be used stra-
tegically to create asymmetric bargaining positions. 64  However, the 
European Commission also expressed concerns about the difficulties of 
competitors to detect possible involvement in patent infringement be-
cause of the “fog” generated by the large number of patents covering the 
same technology.65 Further, the decision highlighted that the merger 
would have combined under the same ownership most of the patents 
																																																								
62 Ibid. 24  
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related to the same technology.66 Thus conceived, the Commission un-
derlined the risk that both the uncertainty and the bargaining position 
could have used by the new entity to ‘let these competitors know about 
the alleged patent infringement(s) and urge them to agree on licensing 
the patent families that would spare them a legal challenge’.67  
A different perspective, however, has been provided more recently in a 
study published by the European Commission – Directorate General for 
Competition. In this work, according to Régibeau and Rockett, patent 
dispersed ownership is pivotal in identifying patent thickets, so that 
both the amount and the scattered ownership of patents are key points 
in defining the phenomenon.68 According to the study, the product price 
level tends to increase when several patents are needed for manufactur-
ing a final product. However, they contend that such increasing is 
magnified when more than one firm owns those patents. Dispersed 
ownership tends to cause more uncertainty about the extent of patent 
protection granted to each piece of inventions. Thus, even a firm, which 
holds all the patents it needs to produce the new product, will consider 
it more safer to access rivals’ patents implementing the technology.69  
Indeed, this will significantly reduce the risk of being involved in in-
fringement lawsuits. However, licensing agreements imply that licensing 
fees will be paid. Thus, costs inevitably increase and firms can eventu-
																																																								
66 Text to n. 40  
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ally stop improving new products. Therefore, the economic inefficiencies 
of patent thickets are highlighted, namely growing costs and reducing 
investment in innovation are shown as major concerns regarding exten-
sive patenting in dispersed ownership contexts.70  
In its attempt to define the patent thicket phenomenon, the EPO has, 
also, focused on the increase of transactional costs resulting from this 
strategic use of patents. In particular, in a recent study, the EPO’s Eco-
nomic and Scientific Advisory Board has highlighted how a “large dense 
bush” of patents can affect the firm’s attitude towards cross – licensing. 
71 Indeed, firms are urged to reach several patent licensing agreements 
to avoid the uncertainty create by the existence of a numerous patent 
applications referring to the same cumulative invention.72 As such, the 
EPO’s report has point out that small entrepreneurs could face more 
difficulties in making such type of arrangement and ultimately in pass-
ing through the “dense bush”.73 In the same way, the antitrust issue 
has been highlighted in a recent report commissioned by the UK Patent 
Office.74 The study focuses on the intentionality of patent thickets, given 
much attention to the strategic reason that can be concealed behind the 
choice of filing several patent applications.75 According to Hall et al, the 
significant increase in the number of patent applications filed in some 
technological area, such as pharmaceutical or IT, is due to a certain 
tendency to overlap patent applications, i.e. to seek patent protection 
for a piece of innovation filing several patent applications. Thus, the 
amount of patents or patent applications is not the principal feature in 
defining patent thickets; instead, intentional overlapping between pa-
tents is shown in this study as the most significant aspect of the 
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71 EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board, Workshop on Patent Thickets (EPO 
2013)< 
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phenomenon.76 The analysis conducted in the report specifically stress-
es the significance of the uncertainty that is deliberately created by 
overlapping patents and the possible effects in pushing firms to license 
and cross-license in ordered to tackle the problem. Due to this rise in 
the number of licensing agreements, however, sunk costs increase to 
the extent that new entrepreneurs are discouraged from entering the 
market. 77 Hence, Hall et al conclude that competition concerns can be 
raised, whereby firms already in the market decide to file several patent 
applications with the clear intention of leading to legal uncertainty 
among rivals and new comers.78 Indeed, it cannot be rejected that pa-
tent thickets, i.e. behaviours engaged to put in place patent thickets, 
could result in antitrust violations as will be further discussed in the 
following chapters, namely Chapters VII and IX.  
Notwithstanding the above, patent overlapping is not always the result 
of a strategic patenting. As a recent survey has revealed the increasing 
number of patents can be traced to the nature of the innovation than to 
a strategic purpose.79  In particular, the survey has pointed out that, at 
least at the starting of the “patent flood” phenomenon,80 the rise in the 
amount of applications, and patent overlapping was due to the innate 
nature of digital technologies, mainly based on cumulative and sequen-
tial innovation paths. In particular, as already analysed in Chapter III, 
cumulative technologies depend on several inventions. Additionally, 
cumulative innovations can be sequential i.e. new inventions are direct-
ly induced from already patented inventions. It seems to be case of the 
computer implemented inventions. As such, overlapping could be the 
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79 I Hargreaves, Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth: an in-
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http://bipp.com/Portals/0/public/docs/Hargreaves%20Report.pdf> accessed on the 
20th June 2017, 57 (“The increase in numbers of patents and patent applications is at 
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effect of the innate nature of this type of inventions.81 All this consid-
ered, it should be take into consideration the possibility that patent 
thickets are not (necessarily) created deliberately. They could arise be-
cause numerous economic actors are working in the same field and 
patent innovation can be simultaneously promoted. Therefore, filing 
numerous applications, which ultimately results in patent claim over-
lapping, is commonly allowed. Thus, antitrust issues cannot be always 
associated with that practice as it simply can be the unintended conse-
quence of certain types of innovations.  However, the next chapters will 
thoroughly examine the issue of voluntary basis in patent thicketing. 
Indeed, the possibility that business method patents would be used 
strategically to reduce or eliminate competition in the market is one of 
the main concerns in recognizing patent protection to those type of in-
ventions. Hence, much attention will be given to understand the 
significance of patent ticket strategy in the business method technologi-
cal area.   
3.2 Main features of patent thickets  
The previous review on the definition of patent thickets has pointed out 
some differences in identifying the phenomenon depending on which 
point of view it is analysed, whether it may be legal or economic or anti-
trust one. Nevertheless, some elements seem to be common to each of 
the highlighted definition of patent thickets. In particular, the defini-
tions offered in the previous subsection provided a shared framework 
that identifies the patent thicket phenomenon according to some pecu-
liarities. Indeed, the presence of a large amount of patents and patent 
applications is stressed in each of the given definitions. Also, dispersed 
ownership is a common feature in identifying patent thickets.82 Moreo-
ver, “overlapping”, i.e. the fact that more than one patent application 
could covers the same piece of invention, is pointed out as a significant 
element. However, it is worth to establishing the specificities of this 
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common framework to identify the technological areas that can facilitate 
the incidences of patent thickets. Indeed, as indicated by the EPO, pa-
tent thickets tend to arise where patents are linked to “same, similar, or 
complementary technologies”.83 
High volume of patents  
According to a seminal work in the field,84 technology areas can be di-
vided into “complex” and “discrete” considering the number of 
patentable elements needed to commercialise a new product or pro-
cess.85 Notably, complex are those technologies where new inventions, 
i.e. new products, tend to be built on previous works. Thus, in complex 
technologies products result from assembling complementary compo-
nents, whereas discrete technologies emit a strong link between product 
and patent so that a product often result from the implementation of 
only one patent. Hence, complex industries tend to patent more than 
discrete industries, thus patent categories involved in manufacturing 
complex products result in being the more successful according to the 
significant number of patent applications filed every year. 86 Semicon-
ductors and digital products are indicated as classic examples of the 
complex technology outcome and, in fact, in these areas patenting is of-
ten an extensive activity as well as the strategic use of patents is 
highlighted as a common practice.87  
Dispersed patent ownership  
Empirical research in the field of semiconductors has identified some 
key features of complex technologies that are thought to facilitate pa-
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tent thickets.88 In particular, scholars have highlighted that in semi-
conductors industries the ratio of the number of patents to the number 
of final products pointing towards the fact that several patents are often 
required to produce a single product.89 Moreover, this research has 
shown that the patent complementarity, i.e. several patents implement-
ed into one product, is associated with the “reality” that the same 
technology is often developed by different firms at the same time.90 Thus 
conceived, the significance of dispersed ownership has been stressed in 
facilitating the creation of patent thickets in complex technologies. In-
deed, it is thought there is a relationship between the number of patent 
holders, i.e. the existence of a widely dispersed ownership, and the 
firm’s urge to adopt strategic behaviours.91     
Patent overlapping  
The recent plethora of patents and patent applications related to com-
plex technologies is often associated with a reduction in patent 
quality.92 Notably, the broadness in patent claims is one of the most 
common concerns behind certain antipathy shown toward patenting 
software and other computer – implemented inventions. Indeed, firms 
tend to take advantage of the newness of some inventions as well as of 
the lack of “prior art”, to file claims that are deliberately vague. Hence, 
patent claims related to digital products are likely to show uncertainty 
in their contents; thus, overlapping can easily result as an offshoot of 
patent “vagueness in the boundaries”.93 Indeed, it is a fairly frequent 
occurrence that two or more patents cover the same subject matter 
when claims are written using generic expressions and refer to abstract 
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concepts. 94  Therefore, overlapping due to ‘fuzzy and unpredictable 
boundaries” can strategically create barriers that do not just metaphor-
ically but also concretely hide the core of the innovative technology.95 As 
such, other competitors in the same market are impeded to implement 
similar technologies without avoiding the possibility to be sued for in-
fringement. 96  Nevertheless, as already highlighted in the previous 
sections, overlapping can also result accidentally as a standard out-
come of developing some IT technologies. Notably, software as well as 
business methods inventions consist of claims showing the results of 
the implementation rather than the method to achieve the results.97 
Given this, doubts have been cast about the necessity of including each 
case of patent overlapping under antitrust assessments since, for thick-
ets to emerge, it is thought to be necessary that a large amount of 
‘patents with ill-defined boundaries are granted’.98 
All this considered, patent thickets are likely to be created in several 
technological fields. In particular, semiconductor is unusually indicated 
as an area where patent thickets are common. In particular, digital in-
novations are considered to contain all those features that could 
facilitate the development of patent thicket behaviours. Indeed, a cer-
tain tendency to file several patents related to the same technology as 
well the use of vague and overly-broad language have been highlighted 
with regard to software and other computer implemented inventions, 
such as business methods. Nevertheless, other avenues should be ex-
plored that might account for the rise in the number of patent thickets. 
This, in the context of business method patents, it will be examined in 
later sections.  
 3.3 Measuring patent thickets and strategic patenting 
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As pointed out in the previous subsections, the typical characteristics of 
patent thickets are large volumes of patents, dispersed ownership and 
overlapping. Nevertheless, the significance of the phenomenon is at-
tached to the size, or more accurately the pattern of the links among 
patents and ultimately among patent holders. As already explained, a 
patent thicket consists in a group of patents, usually a considerable 
number of patents, having potential overlaps with multiple other pa-
tents, or potentially requiring the use of multiple other patents. As 
such, the existence of patent thickets is not an issue in itself. Neverthe-
less, patent overlapping as well as blocking effects, i.e. the need to 
licence other patents to implement the innovation, could be resolved on-
ly by reaching several licensing agreements. Thus, patent thickets can 
result in inefficiencies in the market due to the increase in transactional 
costs. Therefore, methodologies that could measure the degree of over-
lapping or the interaction of patents with regard to final products could 
play a major role in analysing not only a patent thicket in itself but also 
the extent of its detrimental effects on the market. Additionally, patent 
thicketing measurement could help in revealing some strategic reasons 
behind the choice of building a patent thicket. Over the years, correla-
tion between thickness, strategic patenting and decrease in competition 
has sought to be quantified.  
In 2004, Ziedonis put forward the “fragmentation index” as a method to 
identify intentionality, i.e. strategic reasons, in firms’ propensity for pa-
tenting. 99 In particular, the hypothesis advanced was that firms were 
more willing to file patent applications when patents related to the same 
technology were widely dispersed among different entities. According to 
the study, the presence of a fragmented patent ownership reinforced the 
firms’ perception of infringement risks.100 As such, firms sought patent 
protection extensively in these contexts. Indeed, holding several patents 
was deemed useful to avoid hold-up effects or high transactional 
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costs.101 Hence, patent thickets were likely to be built for strategic rea-
sons when ownership was fragmented. All this considered, a method 
was developed to measure the degree of distribution of patent owner-
ship among entities in the same technological market. The method was 
based on the backward citations, i.e. citations to previous patents and 
patent applications; especially, backward citations among patents and 
patent applications were counted.102 Given this, the study used the 
number of back citations to establish the degree of distribution of pa-
tent ownership with regard to specific inventions. As such, the pattern 
of the citations was used to identify the number of different entities that 
hold patent related to the same technology, thereby revealing its index 
of fragmentation.103  According to the theoretical considerations dis-
cussed above, the study suggested that this index of fragmentation was 
able to indicate whether some strategies were concealed behind the ten-
dency of firms to file numerous patent applications.104 In point of fact, 
the study tested the methodology referring to previous finding presented 
in relation to semiconductor industries, ultimately proving that the high 
index of fragmentation revealed in this area matched with a certain 
propensity to patent thicketing already demonstrated by the previous 
study. 105According to its critics, the index considered only citations 
from an ownership prospective; specifically the number of patent hold-
ers was quantified, although overlapping between patents, i.e. the 
number of patents related to the same inventions, was not taken into 
account.106  
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A first attempt to take account of patent overlapping was concluded 
done by Siebert and Von Graevenitz. 107  Their study introduced the 
“blocking strength” measurement.108 In particular the two scholars un-
derlined that more than one patent was usually needed to implement 
“complex” products, whereby patents can easily overlap.109 As such, 
theoretically, each patent could fully ward off any exploitation from the 
others. In this light, a method was developed to quantify the extent of 
the interaction among patent in complex technologies. Especially, 
blocking patents, i.e. patents that a firm must license to implement a 
certain technology, were considered.110 Hence, blocking effects among 
patents were emphasised, thereby evaluating the strength of comple-
mentarity between new and existing patents. 111  Indeed, the extent to 
which a new patent is blocked from a previous one was used predict the 
propensity of a firm reaching ex post licensing agreements to deal with 
the patent thicket issue.112 
In a subsequent work, von Graevenitz et al have opted, instead, for an 
approach based on the network analysis113 to provide a measurement of 
patent overlapping in patent thickets. 114 According to the study, patent 
thickets can be imagined as networks of firms. As such, patent thickets 
are drawn as webs where firms are the nodes and the thickness of 
threads represents the degree of overlap between two firms’ patent port-
folios.115 According to the model developed in this study, the overlap 
among patents can be measured using the number of citations. In par-
ticular, the so-called “critical citations”, i.e. citations relating to firms’ 
patent applications that contain a prior art that limits one or more 
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claims in the citing patent application, are taken into account. In par-
ticular, Von Graevenitz et al. demonstrate that overlapping is likely to 
take place when several critical citations are found, showing communal-
ity in prior arts between patents implementing similar technologies.116 
 
Furthermore, the study adapts the overlapping measurement to analyse 
the blocking effect resulting from patent thickets and its consequence 
on competition. On this note, the scholars detected the number of tri-
ples for each technological area triples 117 . Referring to the network 
analysis methodology, the triples have been identified in groups of three 
firms that own patents that cite critical patents of the other two so that 
each firm can easily block the others from implementing their inven-
tions. 118  As such, according von Graevenitz et al., the presence of 
triples can provide an indication about a certain degree of difficulty in 
solving the blocking effect resulting from patent overlapping. Indeed, 
when two firms refer to each other’s patents, both can be equally inter-
ested in cross licensing their inventions. Therefore, firms can easily deal 
with blocking effects, i.e. reaching cross- licensing agreements. Instead, 
the propensity towards cross licensing decreases when three firms or 
more refer to each other’s previous patents or patent applications. Ac-
cording to the scholars, licensing could be more costly when three or 
more firms are involved. 119 Indeed, the blocking effect could be elimi-
nated only when all of the firms decide reciprocally to license their 
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patents, thereby reaching at least three different agreements. Addition-
ally, von Graevenitz et al. suggest that inefficiencies could persist even 
when blocking effects are obviated reaching several cross-licensing 
agreements. In point of fact, it is highly probable that the three or more 
firms involved have differences in bargaining powers. As such, unbal-
anced agreements are likely to be reached, i.e. one firm bear most 
transactional costs compared to the others, thereby harming competi-
tion.120 The network analysis approach proposed by Von Gravenitz et  
al., therefore,  not only proposes a method to measure overlapping, but 
also provides an  opportunity to link this measurement to the possible 
strategic use of patents, according to their blocking effect on other 
firms’ efforts in implementing  similar technologies.121  
3.4 Factors contributing to the growth of patent thickets 
As already discussed, the growth of firm interest in building patent 
thickets has been often linked to a certain propensity in filing patent 
applications. Over the last 20 years, an increase in number of patent 
applications have been consistently observed in software as well as in 
business methods and in other products related to the Digital revolu-
tion.122 Initially, speculation on the cause of such a phenomenon has 
been based on analyses conducted on semiconductor patents.123 More 
recently, surveys have been carried out in other areas where innovation 
is cumulative. 124 According these studies, several reasons might explain 
the rise in patents, and consequently the rise in patent thickets. As will 
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be examined below, some hypotheses have been designed to account for 
the development of the phenomenon referring to digital technological 
areas.  
As highlighted in Chapter III, enhanced computer technology has 
changed the very nature of innovation. On the one hand, the cumulative 
nature of inventions is often indicated as the main features of digital in-
ventions. Thus, IT inventions are often the sum of singular innovative 
components, whereas only one innovation is usually incorporated in the 
other areas’ invention. On the other hand, digital inventions tend to 
have an abstract formulation because of the inherent limitation in 
manufacturing tangible products in the IT industry. As is often the case 
in business method inventions, the innovation is not in the device per 
se, i.e. the tangible element, but in the way in which the device per-
forms according to the brand-new process. However, the increase in 
number of applications related to digital technology is the feature that 
emerges strongly from any analysis in this field. Even the investigation 
conducted in Chapter IV has demonstrated a growing interest in patent-
ing business method at the EPO over the last decades. Nevertheless, not 
the quantity in itself but both the aspects of cumulative innovation and 
abstractness have been put up as the leading factor in creating uncer-
tainty and ultimately in facilitating the developing of patent thickets.125  
Further, the presence of Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) has been given 
as an explanation for the rise of patent thicket phenomenon. 126 In point 
of fact, these entities are not interested in implementing inventions. 
From their point of view, patents are “bargaining chips’’ to be used in 
negotiations, specifically in settlements engaged to resolve infringement 
disputes. 127 In this way patents are typically filed or acquired by NPEs 
to obtain substantial sums of money by aggressively asserting them 
against the firms developing the technology covered in the patent.128 
Therefore, NPEs are not interested in developing new products or in en-
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tering into the market of manufactures. Conversely, a tendency to stra-
tegic and disingenuous practices has been pointed out.129 Hence, the 
development of patent thickets is considered to be highly probable when 
NPEs are numerous in a technological market.130  
Additionally, patent enforcements, or better the increased threat of in-
junctions, have been identified as some of the main reason behind the 
increase in the number of patent applications as well as in creating pa-
tent thickets. 131  In particular, the uncertainty that is generated in 
patent thicket context, as already discussed in Section 2.1, enhances 
the possibilities for firms to sue and to be sued for infringement. In par-
ticular, the seeking of injunctions to put pressure on competitors has 
been highlighted as a common practice in some jurisdictions, especially 
those where when injunctions can be granted easily.132  It could be the 
case when a product is multicomponent in nature, i.e. several patents 
are implemented within and all of them are equally necessary, and a 
firm, which owns the patent of a singular component, threatens to shut 
down the entire production.133 In such a case, the firm can use the 
threat of legal action to force the rival to pay high royalties. However, 
being sued for infringement seems unlikely when the threat of counter-
injunctions can be posed because, for example, the defendant also 
holds some patents related to some of the plaintiff multicomponent 
products. Given the context, firms are more likely to file patent applica-
tions as well as to create uncertainty through patent thickets when they 
are involved in cumulative invention areas.134 Indeed, patents can be 
important weapons of defense, though patent protection is sought only 
for strategic purposes in such cases.135   
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3.5.  Strategic uses of patent thickets  
Analysis of the main features of patent thickets as well of the factors 
that have contributed to the rising of the phenomenon appear to sup-
port the idea of some strategy behind the development of such 
behaviours, i.e. filing of several patent applications related to the same 
piece of technology creating uncertainty on the extent of protection 
granted by each patent. In theory, as already stated in Chapter III, firms 
should seek patent protection to obtain the exclusive right to use their 
invention.136 As such, firms should be interested in granting patent pro-
tection because it secures fully against any exploitation of that 
invention and consequently great rewards for their investment in inno-
vation. However, this does not seem to be the case when innovations 
are cumulative, as is true of business methods. As discussed in Chapter 
III, others means such as to be the first mover in the market has been 
deemed capable of rewarding investment in R&D with regard to inven-
tions that are cumulative.137 Hence, the pursuing of some strategy has 
been considered the probable reasoning behind the growing interest in 
patenting in cumulative innovation context.138 This idea, or rather this 
concern seems to be confirmed by the spread of patent thicket practic-
es.  In particular, either defensive or aggressive strategies have been 
offered to explain the success of patent thickets.   
Defensive use  
Defensive reasons have been suggested to be behind the development of 
patent thicket behaviors. According to Shapiro, the spread of patent 
thickets can be linked to the concern of infringement. 139  The latter is 
frequent in cumulative invention areas. Firms involved in digital tech-
nologies often simultaneously implement the same piece of previous art 
without be aware of that. Due to low standards of non- obviousness, 
firms could find difficult to set their research targets so clearly to avoid 
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any overlapping with competitors.140 Moreover, experiences proved that 
firms are likely to introduce into the market similar products at the 
same time when cumulative inventions are involved.141 All this consid-
ered the chance to be sued for infringement is deemed higher than usu-
usual when cumulative inventions are involved. 142  As such, firms face 
a certain degree of uncertainty about the real extent of the patent pro-
tection granted to their inventions. Nevertheless, surrounding the 
innovative process with uncertainty has been also viewed as a way to 
deal with the threat of infringement itself.143 
Filing patent applications even when inventions are weak or with uncer-
tain commercial value has been considered to be ultimately worthwhile 
when inventions are cumulative. In point of fact, as already discussed 
in the previous section, firms have realized that owning multiple patents 
can be a means of defense. The ownership of several patents can be 
crucial to avoid infringement, irrespective of the strength of each of 
them. Indeed, filing several patent applications is a way to create a “fog” 
that firstly impedes rivals to be sure themselves not to infringe and 
some certainty of not being infringed.144 Second it can be used for coun-
terattacking, whereby firms are sued for infringement. 145  Therefore, 
patent thickets can be created for defensive reasons. Here is the danger 
that can be generated that urges firms not only to file several patent 
applications, but also to issue broad claims in order to prevent or coun-
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teract to future legal actions.146 Therefore, a defensive battle could easi-
ly result in economic inefficiencies, as it will be discussed in Chapter 
VII.     
A different point of view has been offered about a possible defensive rea-
son that lies behind patent thicket behaviors. This is especially in the 
context of pointing out to the role of patents, specifically a large quanti-
ty of them, in strengthening firms’ bargaining positions.147 As already 
stressed in section 1, firms can be facilitated in reaching licensing 
agreements when deploying a huge patent arsenal. According to this 
line of reasoning, quantity is one important feature of patent thicketing 
not least because firms, specifically those involved in the digital tech-
nology, deem that holding a significant number of patents can be useful 
to ward off their rivals. Indeed, a large amount of patents, particularly 
when their claims are broad and vague, can obtain to their holders a 
certain position in negotiation. In particular, both the patents’ volume 
and the difficulties in understanding their actual extent could be used 
to pretend to be playing a certain role in the market, regardless if, in 
fact, most of the patents might be weak or possibly invalid. 148 As such, 
patent thickets can be created to increase the opportunity of reaching 
licensing agreements, especially cross-licensing agreements with rivals, 
agreements to which they might otherwise not be interested in. 
Aggressive use  
The increase in the number of NPEs involved in digital technologies is 
often acknowledged when referring to aggressive reasons behind the 
spread of patent thicket phenomenon.149 Most obviously, firms that are 
not intending to implement patents, focus only on the possibility of 
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gaining financial remuneration by trading patents.150 Thus, it hardly 
comes as a surprise that NPEs negotiate licensing agreements with a 
mind only at obtaining the maximum possible amount of royalties. Un-
like firms that develop their own products, NPEs are not interested in 
acquiring patents to develop new products. Moreover, NPEs do not face 
the threat of being sued for infringement. Therefore, the chances of be-
ing caught in high-cost licensing agreements increase when NPEs are in 
the technology market. What it is more, many NPEs have demonstrated 
a strong tendency for intentionally “asserting” patents against firms, 
with the aimed effect of forcing them to reach costly settlement agree-
ments. 151 
Patent assertion entities (APEs) are, indeed, labelled those entities spe-
cialized in patent assertion152 - they are also known as “patent troll”-153 
and their aggressive behaviour is often stigmatised with the label “pa-
tent mining”, 154 which explicitly underlines the intent to obtain ‘the 
most out of their patents by asserting them more aggressively than ever 
against possible infringing firms’.155 A high profile example of aggressive 
behaviour has been the case of Texas Instruments that in the 1980s 
started to aggressively assert its own patents significantly increasing 
profits coming from the technological licensing program.156  Most re-
cently “patent mining” has increased in complex technology areas. In 
particular, firms have started to create intermediary entities to serve as 
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a “shell firm” that can assert patents against rivals.157 Taking advantage 
of the overlapping nature and the quantity, firms strategically allocate 
their patent rights to non-practicing entities (also called patent priva-
teers) that can sue rivals for infringement without any fear of being 
counterattacked. 158  In particular, the most “assertable” patents are 
transferred to controlled privateers that allege infringements with the 
purpose to reaching unbalanced agreements. 159 These would not be 
otherwise reached with competitors in the same market.160  
Another example of aggressive patent use in creating patent tickets is 
provided by “continuation” practices.161 Continuation in patents has 
been commonly identified as the practice of filing several patent applica-
tions referring to the same priority date. It is usually made possible by 
modifying or adding a new claim to the specification in the original ap-
plication. Thus, continuations could be used, and indeed it is used, to 
file several patents all referring to same piece of invention. Proper con-
tinuation is only allowed in a very few patent systems.162 Nevertheless, 
firms are entitled to divisional continuation in several systems; even at 
the EPO, divisional continuation is possible. As such, at the EPO firms 
are allowed to use the same priority date, i.e. a date which refers the 
same invention, in more than one patent application, when the inven-
tion can be referred to different categories. Thus, it will happen that a 
singular firm can draft several patent applications related to the same 
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invention; however, only one patent will be granted, even if each appli-
cation is assessed by a different divisional office. 163  Indeed, 
continuation is often strategically put in place to delay patent issuance 
164 or to create tactical flexibility during the examination processes.165 
Nevertheless, continuation, i.e. the opportunity of filing several patent 
applications referring to the same priority date, can also be used to cre-
ate uncertainty around claims and patent boundaries in the timeframe 
between the filling of patent applications and the granting of the pa-
tent.166  Hence, patent continuation can facilitate the building of patent 
thickets, ultimately generating enough confusion to discourage rivals 
from filing applications in the same technological area. 167  
3.6 Why patent thickets are a problem for firms? 
Based on the analysis conducted in the previous subsection, some con-
clusions can be drawn concerning the effect about effects of patent 
thicketing. Most obviously, the existence of patent tickets works as a 
disadvantage to most firms, while serving only very few beneficially. No-
tably, some significant consequences can arise from patent thicketing.  
Increasing in uncertainty.  
The previous analysis has clearly pointed up the connection between 
patent thicketing and uncertainty both on the claims and ownership of 
patents. Large amount of applications, vague language and overlapping 
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of claims are some of the most common features of the phenomenon: 
with all of them intentionally combined to create a dense web, which ul-
timately impede to see through the reality of the invention.168 There are 
a variety of practices that are driven by their potential effects on com-
petitors and market. These range from the intent to hide the core of an 
innovative technology, to the desire of concealing the obviousness of 
some product or processes.169 In particular, patent thickets are com-
mon in those areas where the implementation of inventions does not 
need much time and products have a short life spam; thus, a temporary 
confusion about the range of the invention can be crucial to gain a sig-
nificant position in the market.170 Thus conceived, uncertainty is often 
the desired outcome of patent thicketing.  Nevertheless, firms, even the 
very ones that have resorted to patent thicketing, can themselves suffer 
ill effects from such practice. For example, uncertainty affects a firm’s 
sureness about acquiring a patent that cannot be challenged by oth-
ers. 171 Moreover, the number of infringement proceedings steadily 
increases in patent thicket contexts given to such an intentional vague-
ness in the claims that easily results in “fuzzy boundaries”. 172 
Consequently, firms constantly face the risk of inadvertent infringement 
so that often firms express a fear of infringing others’ patents, even if 
they have been granted all the patents related to the invention imple-
mented in a new product. 173 Additionally, uncertainty created by 
strategic overlapping ultimately conceals the identity of the potential 
plaintiffs, thus ex ante licensing is problematic and complicated, there-
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by reducing the ease and chances of reaching agreements. 174 Converse-
ly, costly settlements are often the outcome of patent thicketing, 
because firms are frequently held up after inventions are implement-
ed.175 As such, agreeing on high licensing royalties can be the only way 
to avoid major costs coming from switching technology.176   
Increasing in negotiation costs  
Patent thickets routinely create a bundle of patents that are all related 
to the same invention, or at least, to the same technology. As already 
discussed, patent thickets are likely to happen in cumulative technolo-
gies due to the fact that these technologies rely on several patents.177 
Nevertheless, patent thickets can be built intentionally. As such, the 
number of patents related to the same technology is tactically increased 
to a rate that is unsustainable, especially for small firms. Most 
pressingly, the increasing number of patents ensures that several 
agreements need to be reached, most of the times with more than one 
licensee. 178 Thus, both monetary and social costs can emerge since 
more time and expertise are required to deal with such complicated ne-
gotiations. Hence, only very few firms can bear costs to implement those 
technologies that are wrapped up by thickets. Accordingly, rising in 
transaction costs has been pointed up as one of the major drawbacks of 
patent thickets, especially from the point of view of small firms.179  
Additionally, rising costs has been associated with difficulties in gaining 
a fully knowledge of those technologies related to patent thickets. In 
particular, the fact that several patents cover a technology can affect 
the ability of a purchaser to understand the real value and quality of 
it.180 Frequently, claims are deliberately vague and important knowledge 
																																																								
174 Hall, Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 33 
175 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Patent holdup and royalty stacking’  (2006) 85 Tex. L. 
Rev.  1991, 2009 
176 Bessen, Meurer(1) 135; Allison,Lemley,Walker (151)  
177 Text to n. 58 
178 Text  to n. 72 
179 ex multis Bessen, Meurer(1) 165; Hall, Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1); Ré-
gibeau, Rockett (68) 
180 Bessen, Meurer(1) 182  
	
	 184	
is intentionally not patented.181 Hence, patents are eventually unreliable 
in patent thicket context because they do not offer enough information 
to predict, even approximately, the profits that could be realized once 
that technology is implemented.182 Therefore, transactions are not only 
more complicated but also more risky in patent thicket contexts with 
the effect that firms face an increase of costs, alongside the indetermi-
nacy in economic benefits, ultimately received by investing in a technol-
technology.  
Increasing in litigations  
As earlier stated, broad patents are one of the most common character-
istic within patent thicket phenomenon. Due to the vagueness in claim 
descriptions and the abundance of patent applications, precise patent 
boundaries are often extremely difficult to identify in technological areas 
where patent thicketing is practised.183 Therefore, in those areas pa-
tents routinely deploy broad terms generating wide interpretation with 
the effect that litigation has become increasingly common.184 In particu-
lar, doubts on the obviousness can easily be cast when inventions are 
broadly described, or innovations regard practices already adopted or 
are based on mathematical formula that are already in use. 185 Moreo-
ver, the large amount of patents and applications connected to the same 
technologies can make it difficult to search for prior art so that inad-
vertent infringements can easily occur.186 It also creates difficulty in 
assessing the validity of the patent itself. Therefore, patent “weakness”, 
i.e. broadly-defined patents that can be interpreted widely, has been put 
forward to explain increasing litigation and, in actual fact, more than 
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one study has provided evidence of the escalation of patent disputes in 
those areas where patent thickets have arisen.187 
As already explained in chapter III, “abusive” litigation has been 
stressed with regard to patent trolls, which also has been pointed up to 
explain increasing in litigation and litigation costs. 188 Indeed, patent 
trolls purposely wait for other firms to implement inventions and even-
tually sue them for infringements based on later-developed 
technologies. Hence, patent trolls exploit their patents for no other pur-
pose than obtain great damage rewards and patent vagueness is a 
useful tool. 189 Moreover, a general tendency to use patens for oppor-
tunistic behaviours has been identified as a tactic of not only “patent 
troll” but of all kind of entities that are not interested in manufacturing 
and commercializing products.190 In particular, a propensity to assert 
patents against numerous firms has been shown by non-practice enti-
ties in the USA and Europe.191 Therefore, costs for defending patents 
are steadily increasing over the last few years, specifically in the US. 192 
Costs far exceed profits in a patent-thicket context such as software 
technological area so that they are thought to be “an important disin-
centive to innovation”.193  
3.7 Some conclusions  
As reveled by the analysis carried out in this section, patent thickets are 
identifiable by the amount of patents and patent applications involved, 
as well as their vague language and the risk of overlapping revealed by 
the high rate of mutual citations. In particular, patent thickets are a 
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specific occurrence of cumulative technology, i.e. technology resulted by 
combining singular innovative components. In such a context, it can 
happen that patent applications covering each of the innovation’s com-
ponents are intentionally broadly defined. As such, several patents are 
involved, usually citing each other. Using citations and vague language, 
confusion is ultimately created on the extent of each of the patent. 
When it happens, when uncertainty on the extent of patent protection is 
created, a strategic patent thicket is built.  
Most obviously, when uncertainty is intentionally created, some strate-
gic tactic reasons are involved. Due to the uncertainty, rivals find 
practically impossible to invent round the patents. Moreover, securing 
the set of licenses necessary to exploit the technology implies prohibi-
tive costs according to the numerous agreements that have to be 
reached. Thus, patent thickets can be used to generate inefficiencies, 
ultimately deterring competitors to enter the market. Hence, patents 
and patent applications in a patent thickets can be used as a part of a 
wider collection of patents covering a particular area of economic activi-
ty, rather than individually. In particular, entities owning entire 
collections of patents can use them to negotiate agreements among 
themselves, revealing either defensive or aggressive purposes. Therefore, 
building patent thickets can be an effective strategy for partitioning or 
even closing off the market. 
In the following chapter, the database including all patent applications 
filed in the category G06Q will be analyzed to understand whether some 
patent-thicket strategy has been developed in Europe with regard to 
business method patents. As already indicated, citations between pa-
tents can provide useful information about patent thicket strategy. As 
such, a network analysis of the citations among business method pa-
tents at EPO will be conducted. This will give the opportunity to identify 
the more involved firms in the business method patent phenomenon. 
Furthermore, evidence will be provided of the possibility that some stra-





What evidence of patent thicketing in business method 





As discussed in previous chapters, granting exclusive rights on an in-
vention seems not to be enough to explain the observed large numbers 
of patent applications in the category G06Q at the EPO. In particular, 
the theoretical framework provided in Chapter V has emphasized how 
digital revolution, i.e. innovation due to IT technologies, has brought to 
the fore new ideas and concepts around patents and patent protections. 
Above all, the use of patents to create monopolistic positions in the 
market has been pointed out, in connection with practices of patent 
claim overlapping and patent application crowding, ultimately to impede 
rivals to enter the market and to implement similar technologies. Thus 
conceived, patents and patent applications are more and more often a 
tool not only to secure the exclusive use of singular inventions, but also 
a way to ensure the exclusivity in the implementation of a whole tech-
nology. Therefore, not only inventions, but also innovation and 
knowledge are conceived as issues of property rights. 
 
Referring to strategic behaviors, namely patent thicketing, this chapter 
is aimed to investigate if some of these tactical approaches have indeed 
been adopted in the European context of business method patenting. In 
order to do that, the leading players in the category G06Q at the EPO 
will be identified. Thus, the names of the most active firms will be re-
vealed and discussed in the first section of this chapter. Then, the 
attitude towards patents and patent applications of the top ten firms for 
number of applications in the category G06Q will be analyzed, and the 
relationships among these firms will be scrutinized. On this purpose, 
patent citations data will be used to construct a network of citations 
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among firms and to disclose the possible presence of strategic links, 
through the use of network theory.  
 
2.The key players in the world of business methods at the EPO  
 
As indicated in Chapter IV, firms file the majority of applications in the 
category G06Q at the EPO. Thus, firms are the main protagonists and 
at the same time the architects of the success of business methods as 
patent subject matter in Europe. But, are all the firms contributing 
equally to the phenomenon? Or only few of them are driving the entire 
market? And in the latter case, which are then the firms playing the key 
role? Satisfactory answers to these questions can be obtained making 
use of the data set introduced in Chapter IV. As discussed in Section 4 
of Chapter IV, the file SUM_UP_FILE maintains information on all pa-
tent applications filed in the category G06Q at the EPO. 776  In 
particular, patent applications can be listed according to the name of 
the applicants, and from a visual inspection of SUM_UP_FILE, it clearly 
emerges that big firms tend to submit patent applications using also 
their subsidiaries or parent companies so that, for example, Visa files 
applications as Visa International Service Association (Visa Int. in the 
following) but also as Visa USA Inc. (Visa USA). Thereby, all the applica-
tions referring to the same organization have been summed up to 
provide a more complete overview. Names of applicants and numbers of 
patent applications have been reported in Figure 1. 
																																																								







In particular, the figure shows the top 20 firms sorted by the number of 
applications that each of them has filed in the category G06Q at the 
EPO. The graph indicates that Microsoft is the applicant with the high-
est number of filed applications, about 950, followed by Google with 
nearly 800 patent applications, and then all the remaining others firm, 
each with a number of filed patent applications ranging from 300 to 
about 500. Thereby, a significant gap emerges clearly in Figure 1 be-
tween the number of applications filed by the first two firms in the list 
and the number of applications filed by the remaining firms. Whereas 
Microsoft’s and Google’s applications in the category G06Q far exceed 
the number of 500, all the other firms in the chart have filed less than 
500 applications, with nine of them having less than 300 applications. 
Therefore, Figure 1 reveals Microsoft and Google as indubitably the two 
leading characters in the race to grant patent protection for business 
methods in Europe.  
 
The results obtained are not totally surprising.  Indeed, the firms found 












































are entities well know for being internationally involved in the market of 
digital technologies.777 If proof was needed, Figure 1 is in support of the 
view that IT firms have played an important role in the growth of popu-
larity and interest in business method patents. 778  Nevertheless, a 
certain degree of heterogeneity also emerges from the graph. In particu-
lar, some big manufacturing firms, such as Samsung or Sony, are in 
the list, as well as financial firms as Visa, or Internet based entities like 
Ebay. Based on this result, business methods seem to be conceived as a 
crosscutting patentable subject matter, attracting the attention of dif-
ferent entities.779  
 
Further information can be extracted from Figure 1. First of all, Euro-
pean firms seems to be less interested in obtaining patent protection for 
their business methods than American firms.780 In particular, the first 
European firm in the list is Nokia, which is only in the 10th position. 
This finding is consistent with the EPO annual statistics. According to 
the EPO reports published in the last decade, American applicants ac-
count for about the 25% of all the applicants at the EPO in all 
categories.781 Moreover, the EPO statistics reveal that large enterprises 
represent in average as much as the 65% of the applicants in the last 
decade.782 Thereby, the presence of several large American firms in the 
list of the top applicants in category G06Q must not seem surprising.  
 
There are however some surprising results that can be derived from the 
plot in Figure 1. For example, the reader can wonder why Apple or Am-
azon does not show up in the list. Regarding Apple, it is important to 
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realise that Apple is not a top applicant in general. According to the 
EPO statistics, Apple has never been in the list of top 50 applicants 
during the last decade. Moreover, recent studies indicate that Apple has 
become a player in the context of patent protection only in the last few 
years, and has tended to file patent applications in categories different 
from G06Q, such as for instance in category G06F. 783 With regard to 
Amazon, the absence of its name in the list of the top 20 applicants 
marks a significant difference with respect to the US framework. 784  
Amazon is indeed ranked as one of the main applicants in the class 705 
at the USPTO, whereas in Europe the total number of applications filed 
by Amazon Technologies is about 70.  
 
A look at the Amazon “one-click” patent affaire can probably provide 
useful clues to understand the different behaviours of Amazon in Eu-
rope and in the US. As it is well known, Amazon sought patent 
protection for its innovative “one-click” method, applying both to the 
USPTO and to the EPO. While the USPTO issued a patent to cover the 
method,785 the application was rejected at the EPO.786 According to the 
conclusions of the EPO technical board, the “one-click” method lacked 
of enough novelty.787  Ultimately, Amazon “one-click” affaire is the epit-
ome of the different attitude of the EPO and the USPTO toward business 
method patens. Such as, the European approach seems to penalize 
those business methods that are not innovative per se but, as support-
ed by Amazon arguments, are new according to their application to a 
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new context, as the e-market in this particular case.788 Indeed, the 
more strict European approach could explain why Amazon, which is 
one of the most popular applicants at the USPTO, is not listed among 
the twenty applicants with the highest number of patent applications in 
the category G06Q at the EPO.  
 
3. How the leading players behave   
 
Once the names of the firms who have played, overall, the leading role 
in the business method arena have been identified, it is also possible to 
investigate the behaviour over time of these leading players. Noticeably, 
the results show slightly different attitudes in the way the firms have 
submitted applications in the category of business methods. Some of 
the heterogeneities, in relations to the number of applications filed in 
the category G06Q over the years, are already revealed by the curves in 
Figure 2.  
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In particular, the graph reports, as a function of the year and in a line-
ar-logarithmic plot, the cumulative number of applications filed by the 
top-ten firms, namely those in the list shown in Figure 1. Namely, it in-
dicates, for each year, the total number of applications with a filing date 
in that year, or in one of the previous years. First of all, Figure 2 pro-
vides a general overview of the behaviour of the leading firms in the area 
of business method patents at the EPO. It shows that the number of 
applications filed in the category G06Q has increased, for each of the 
top-ten firms, in almost all the years in the period from 1990 to 2014. 
Ultimately, the figure indicates that the major players in the category 
G06Q have maintained their interest for business method patents over 
the years. Since a straight line in a linear-logarithm scale is the indica-
tion of an exponential increase, then all curves show in general an 
initial stage in which the cumulative number of patents has grown ex-
ponentially in time, and then a slowing down in more recent periods. 
Each line is specifically displayed in a different colour, so that it is pos-
sible to distinguish one firm from another. For instance, Microsoft, the 
firm with the largest total number of applications in our data set, is re-
ported in red. Markedly, firms in the top-ten list started filing 
applications in the category G06Q in the 1995 to 2000 five-year period; 
although, the number of patent applications became significant – i.e. 
more than 10 for each firm – only around 2005. After 2005, the con-
sistent growth in the number of patent applications is highlighted by 
the largest slopes of the curves, which are indeed found in the period 
2005-2010, for most of the firms. Differences are present from one 
company to the other. There are cases in which the curves are crossing 
each other, meaning that one firm is overtaking another firm in terms of 
total number of applications. Emblematic is for instance the case of 
Google, which starts to file applications for patents in the category 
G06Q only in year 2003, but already at year 2010 has become the se-
cond largest player after Microsoft.  Summing up, Figure 2 supports the 
idea that the most important multinational corporations in the ICT sec-
tor have paid a continuous attention paid to business methods. It is in 
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indeed possible to show that almost one third of the applications in the 
constructed data set have been filed by the top-20 firms shown in Fig-
ure 1.  
 
More detailed information on the temporal distribution of the applica-
tions of each firm can be obtained if the numbers in Figure 2 are 





This is done in Figure 3, which reports the histogram of the number of 
applications filed by each of the top ten list firms year by year (in con-
trast to the cumulative numbers shown instead in Figure 2). Also here 
we have adopted a double-linear scale, and the values on the y-axis 
range from 0 to 300, with large ticks of values equal to 50 units. Due to 
the linear scale of the vertical axis large amounts are better detected 
than small, thus significant changes in number of patent applications 
in the category G06Q are immediately understandable. This figure 
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clearly highlights the different attitudes of the leading players towards 
business method patents. For instance, the data indicate that Microsoft 
expressed its largest interest in business method patents in terms of 
patent applications in the years 2007 and 2008. Then, the number of 
patent applications filed by Microsoft in the category G06Q dropped in 
2010 and has never reached the previous peaks again, in the following 
years. In point of fact, a certain decrease in the amount of G06Q appli-
cations can be observed for most of the firms in the chart referring to 
2010. This trend, either temporary and of minor importance in most of 
the cases, reflects the uncertainty that surrounded   business method 
patents at that time; specifically, as already pointed out in chapter II, 
doubts were casted about the patentability of business methods in 2009 
and 2010, as the Bilski affair in the US, and the Referral to the En-
larged Board of Appeal in Europe, took place.  
 
Nevertheless, a certain positive trend for business method patents has 
emerged again after 2010, as shown by the general increase in the 
number of applications filed by most of the top-ten firms in the category 
G06Q. However, doubts casted by the Alice affair789 in the US seem to 
have affected the previous inclination to seeking patent protection for 
business methods. But not all the firms in the top–ten have engaged in 
this type of behaviour, namely cutting or stopping to file patent applica-
tions in the category G06Q. In particular, Google as well as Samsung 
and NEC maintain a positive attitude towards business method patent-
ing. Notably, the number of patent applications filed by Google has 
increased significantly after 2010, especially in each of the years be-
tween 2011 and 2013. Such numbers are higher than the numbers of 
applications submitted in the three-year period before 2010. Therefore, 
according to the histogram, if Microsoft has played the leading role in 
category G06Q before 2010, Google is clearly the protagonist of the 
phenomenon nowadays.  
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4. Are the leading players really interested in business method pa-
tents? 
  
According to the data analysis carried out until now, business methods 
emerge as a popular subject matter at the EPO. In particular, the data 
set has provided evidence of almost 35.000 different applications sub-
mitted in the category G06Q at the EPO. Moreover, our further 
investigation into the contents and details of the submitted applications 
has revealed that various types of entities are involved in the phenome-
non, and with a very heterogeneous behaviour. Nevertheless, the reason 
of such popularity is not completely clear. As already discussed in 
Chapter III, large numbers of patent applications seems to be a common 
feature when inventions are implemented by computer or are related to 
Internet technologies. Referring to this type of inventions, indeed, more 
than one study has highlighted strategic purposes hidden behind the 
choice of firms to file numerous patent applications. Therefore, it could 
be possible that strategic reasons also drive the behaviour of firms in 
planning and applying for business method patents. 
 
Indications in support of the possible existence of strategic behaviours 
in the category G06Q is provided by one of the plots that have been al-
ready presented in chapter IV. Such a plot, showing the number of 
granted patents versus the number of patent applications filed in the 
category G06Q in a double logarithmic scale, is reported here again in 
Figure 4. As already discussed, the plot provides a graphic representa-
tion of the considerable difference between the volume of patent 
applications submitted at the EPO and the number of patents eventual-
ly granted. Hence, the figure supports the idea that firms are in reality 
interested in filing applications more than in having patents granted.  
As a matter of fact, just a few of the applications filed in the category 
G06Q seem to satisfy all the requirements imposed by Article 52 EPC. 
Indeed only a small percentage of the applications successfully pass the 




Additionally Figure 4 offers valuable insights now that the names of the 








As the values reported in this graph already reveal (and will be clear 
from the following two tables), even if as expected the number of grant-
ed patents shows an overall increases with the number of filed 
applications, the most active firms in the category G06Q, i.e. the leading 
characters in terms of number of filed applications, are in general not 
the most successful ones in terms of granting patent protection for their 
business methods. In particular, the number of granted patented with 
respect to the number of filed applications can be significantly low for 
the top-ten firms, with three of them with less than 10 granted patents. 
In some of the cases, for instance for Google, this can be explained by 
the extremely long time, on average six years, spent by the EPO in ex-
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amining patent applications.790 Indeed, as observed in Figure 3, the 
bulk of Google patent applications have been submitted after 2010, 
thus most of them might even not have been examined yet. However, 
the disproportion between the efforts of large firms to address business 
method patentability and the protection ultimately granted remains 
large even when one takes into consideration the effects of the delays in 
the examinations process. The extent of this inconsistency is evident 
from the computation of the so-called success percentage, namely the 
rate of success per company, defined as the percentage of successful 
applications with the respect to the total number of filed applications. 
This allows a quantitative comparison of the rate of success of the most 
active companies to the rate of success of the most successful ones. The 
results are reported in the following two tables. In particular, Table 1 
shows the name of the firms with the highest ratio of granted patents 
per number of filed applications in the category G06Q. The last column 
of the table is the one reporting the values of the success percentage of 











Silver brokers 33 28  85 % 
Swisscom  13 5  42 % 
NCR  13 5  42 % 
Diebold 13 5  42 % 
Alcatel  16 6  37 % 
Vodafone  16 5  31 % 
 
Table	1.	The	top	entities	in	terms	of	percentage	of	granted	patent	per	filed	applications	in	the	category	G06Q	




790 A Calculu, EPO Performance 1 – application pendency times ( IPKAT, March 2016) 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/epo-performance-1-application-
pendency.html accessed on 7th August 2017.     
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A success percentage equal to 85 % indicates that the company with 
the highest rate of successful application in Table 1, namely Silver Bro-
ker, has been granted 85 % of its patents. In this particular case in fact 
the firm has been granted 28 patents out of a total of 33 filed applica-
tions. Table 1 shows that, in the case of the most successful companies, 
the percentage of success can be quite high, as there are other firms 
with success percentages ranging from 30% to 50%. However, none of 
the most active firms in terms of number of applications, i.e. none of the 
key players in the category G06Q appears in this table. Table 2 lists in-
stead the success percentages of the top–ten firms in terms of number 
of filed applications in the category G06Q. Apart from Research in Mo-
tion, which is in the first position with a success rate of almost 20%, all 
the other firms have been granted between 0.2 and 6.4 % of their appli-
cations. Indeed, Sony is the only other company in the table with a 
success ratio larger than 6%. The following two firms, the only two with 
a success percentage larger than 5%, are two European firms, namely 
Nokia and SAP. Also Siemens, which has not been included in Table 2 
because it is not in the top ten by volume of applications (with the 11th 
largest number of applications, it is indeed the first excluded firm) has a 
success ratio larger than 5% (namely 6.36% with its 21 granted patents 
out of 330 filed applications). This suggests that, European based firms 
seem to know more about EPO procedures than other firms. Moreover, 
the table reveals that manufacturing firms, such as Research in Motion 
or Nokia, namely those involved in smartphones, are better than others 
in granting patent protections. Probably, it is far easier for this type of 
firms to provide enough evidence of technicality since the method is ul-












Motion 379 74 19.52 % 












Nokia  340 19 5.58 % 
SAP 377 21 5.57 % 
Microsoft  922 29 3.14 % 
Hitachi  351 10 2.85 % 
Nec  383 8 2.09 % 
Samsung  407 8 1.97 % 
Google  743 5 0.67 % 
Visa  490 1  0.20 % 
	
Table	2.	The	top	ten	 firms	for	total	number	of	patent	applications	 filed	 in	the	category	G06Q	are	shown	to-
gether	 with	 the	 number	 of	 applications,	 the	 number	 of	 granted	 patents,	 and	 their	 success	 ratio.	 Firms	 are	
sorted	in	decreasing	order	of	success	percentage.	
Therefore, the comparison between Table 2 and Table 1, together with 
the results of Figure 4, highlights the inability of the big multinational 
firms to obtain patent protection for their business methods in Europe, 
even if they pour a considerable amount of money and time into filing 
large numbers of patent applications. At the same time, the results in-
dicate that significant failure rate has not affected the determination of 
firms in obtaining patent protection, as patent applications have been 
filed consistently in the category G06Q over the years. Indeed, the low 
success rate does not seem to have had any impact on firms’ interest in 
granting patent protection for business methods patent applications, as 
well as the strict EPO viewpoint into the business methods patents 
seems not to have been a deterrent for firms to filing patent applications 
in the category G06Q.  
 
Certainly, the low rate of patent issuance in the category G06Q cannot 
go unnoticed. Such a low rate, indeed, seems to suggest that big com-
panies are more interested in filing patent applications than in 
obtaining patent protection, when dealing with business methods. 
Thus, accumulating patent applications, rather than patents, might be 
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the real reason behind business methods. This ultimately supports the 
hypothesis that those firms that have filed numerous patent applica-
tions in the category G06Q at the EPO consistently over the years 
should have followed strategic purposes. Truly, some of the features of 
the patent thicketing phenomenon seem to emerge in the backdrop of 
business method patents at the EPO.   
 
According to the conclusions of the previous chapter, a high volume of 
patent applications can be an indicative factor of the firm’s patent 
thicketing attitude. Additionally, flooding patent offices with numerous 
patent applications has been described as a usual strategy to create 
such an uncertainty than competitors would avoid entering in the same 
market. Admittedly, the table discussed above shows that big firms take 
a great interest in filing numerous patent applications in the category 
G06Q at the EPO. Not only the total number of patent applications in 
this category is significant, but also the number of patent applications 
filed by each of the top-ten firms is surprising. On the other hand, firms 
appear uninterested to the quality of their applications as the collected 
data indicates that far less than 1% of applications are eventually 
granted. Thereby, a certain strategic approach could be involved in the 
firm choice for high volume application in the category G06Q.  
 
Referring now to the uncertainty, a considerable ambiguity about the 
extent of patent protection can be thought to be due to the large 
amount of applications filed in the category G06Q. Especially, patent 
applications in this technological area are said to use broader language 
compared to other technical fields. Also their complexity has been high-
lighted according to the numbers of claims for each patent application. 
Moreover, the examination of patent applications at the EPO usually 
takes years, as already said. All this to confirm that the identification of 
the aspect of an innovative method covered by patent protection can re-
sult difficult, specifically when more than one patent application can 
potentially cover it and none of them has been examined yet. Uncertain-
ty is ultimately created, so that in the meantime competitors would 
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rather prefer not to implement similar inventions and develop similar 
technologies, too. Conclusively, the analysed data seems to reveal a cer-
tain patent thicketing attitude in the EPO context when referring to 
business method innovations. Thereby, significant evidences appear to 
exist that patent applications in category G06Q could be used not only 
to provide exclusive rights on the singular inventions, but also to stra-
tegically exclude rivals from using similar technologies, so that a wider 
protection is ultimately de facto received.  
 
5. Patent citations and network analysis  
 
Further evidences on patent thicketing in business method patents can 
be provided by the analysis of the EPO network of patent citations in 
the category G06Q. As already discussed in Chapter V, citations have 
been analysed to evaluate some features of patents and patent applica-
tions performance.791 In particular, according to the EPO Guidelines for 
Examination, in a patent application (but also later within subsequent 
submissions) applicants are asked to specify about pieces of previously 
existing knowledge upon which the invention is built.792 These pieces 
can be scientific works, granted patents or published patent applica-
tions. Additionally, while investigating newness of claimed invention, 
patent officers can identify links between the new product or method 
and previous patents and patent applications.  All these are labelled as 
citations and are recorded in the patent register at the EPO. Citations 
																																																								
791 Text to para 3.3 Chapter V; see also on the link between number of citations and 
uncertainty of patent originality JR Allison, MA Lemley, ‘The growing complexity of the 
United States patent system’ (2002) 77 BUL rev.  77, JR Allison, EH Tiller. ‘The busi-
ness method patent myth’ (2003) Berkeley Tech. LJ987, M Grimaldi, ‘The patent 
portfolio value analysis: A new framework to leverage patent information for strategic 
technology planning’ (2015) 94 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 286  
792 EPO Guidelines for Examination at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/index.htm; C Webb et al., ‘Analysing European and Interna-
tional Patent Citations: A Set of EPO Patent Database Building Blocks’ (2005)  OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers  8 (“EPO search codes and their 
meaning: D Documents cited in the application i.e. already mentioned in the descrip-
tion of the patent application; L Documents cited for other reasons (e.g. a document 
that may throw doubt on a priority claim)”) 
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are indeed a significant source of information.793  In particular, the 
number of citations per patent applications, or the type of citations (i.e. 
to scientific papers, to other patents, etc.), has been investigated to un-
derstand the quality of innovation in IT technological areas.794 Also 
citations have been studied referring to their relations and interactions, 
as already discussed in Chapter V.795 
 
The best way to represent the entire patterns of relations among patents 
is to construct the corresponding network of patent citations, i.e. a net-
work showing all patents and their relations in terms of citations. An 
example of how citations among patents can be transformed into, and 





In the left hand side of the figure, five patents are shown together with 
their citations lists. The five patents, respectively indicated as P1, P2, 
																																																								
793 BH Hall, AB Jaffe, M Trajtenberg, ‘Market value and patent citations’ (2005) 36 
RAND Journal of Economics16, 18 (“These citations serve an important legal function, 
since they delimit the scope of the property rights awarded by the patent. Thus, if pa-
tent B cites patent A, it implies that patent A represents a piece of previously existing 
knowledge upon which patent B builds, and over which B cannot have a claim.”) 
794 P Almeida, ‘Knowledge sourcing by foreign multinationals: Patent citation analysis 
in the US semiconductor industry.’ (1996) 17 Strategic management journal 155; BH 
Hall, AB Jaffe, M Trajtenberg, ‘The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, insights 
and methodological tools’ (2001) NBER  Working paper n. w8498 
795 Text to subsection 3.3 Chapter V 
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P3, P4 and P5, were numbered in temporal order of their submission. 
This means that P1 is the oldest patent, P2 is the second oldest one, 
and so on until the last patent P5. Only citations from a given patent to 
older ones are possible. For instance in the example reported, patent P2 
cites patent P1, patent P3 cites P1, patent P4 cites patents P1 and P2, 
and lastly patent P5 cites P1, P3 and P4. Notice that citations of a pa-
tent are commonly divided into two classes, known as backward and 
forward citations. Backward citations are citations made from the patent 
to previous patents. Forward citations are instead all those citations that 
the patent has received by other patents. 796 For instance, patent P4 in 
the example considered has two backward citations, namely to previous 
patents P2 and P1, and one forward citation, coming from patent P5.  
The whole information contained in the left hand side panel can be 
schematically represented in a so-called graph (mathematical graph) re-
ported in the right hand side panel. Graphs are the objects used in 
mathematics to describe networks. 797 A graph, usually indicated by the 
symbol G consists of two sets, a set of N nodes or vertices representing 
the basic elements of the graph, and a set of K edges, where each edge 
consists of a unordered or of an ordered couple of nodes, according to 
whether the graph describes a network in which the directionality of 
links is relevant or not. Thus, graphs can be of two different types, re-
spectively referred to as undirected graphs or as directed graphs. In the 
case of the graph G shown in the right hand side of Figure 5, patents 
are associated to nodes, and a directed link from node A to node B in G 
indicates that patent B is cited by patent A. The graph G has in this 
case N=5 nodes and K=7 directed links.  
 
Drawing a graph, as done in the right hand side of the figure, is certain-
ly the best way to highlight the basic features of the corresponding 
network: to show for instance the relations among its nodes, or the ar-
																																																								
796 As it will be clear in the following, forward citations have an essential role in the 
analysis of the quality of a patent, as they quantify the extent of its impact.  
797 Boccaletti et al, ‘Complex networks: Structure and dynamics’  (2006) 424 Physics 
Reports 175;  V Latora, V Nicosia, G Russo Complex Networks: Principles Methods and 
Applications (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
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chitecture of the system as a whole. Visualizations, however, are impos-
sible when number of nodes and links in the graph are large, because 
the drawing that would be obtained in such a case would look too intri-
cate to be useful, with too many packed nodes and crossing links. An 
alternative mathematical representation of graphs, which is also useful 
when a graph needs to be inputted into a computer software, for in-
stance in order to evaluate numerically some of its properties, can be 
obtained by using a matrix, which in practice is a table of numbers. In 
particular, any graph G can be completely described by giving its so-
called adjacency matrix A, which is a square table containing only 1 or 
0, and telling whether for each pair of nodes in graph G there is a link 
connecting them or not.  
 
The adjacency matrix of a graph is always a square matrix, i.e. is a ta-
ble with the same number of rows and columns. Such a number is 
equal to the number of nodes in G. For instance, the adjacency matrix A 
of the graph in the right-hand side of the figure has N=5 rows and N=5 
columns and reads:  
𝐴 =
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
 
 
There are seven values of the matrix equal to 1, because the graph has 
K=7 directed links. All the remaining values are set to 0. E.g. the value 
1 in the fourth row and second column indicates that there is link from 
node 4 to node 2 in the graph, while in the fourth row and third column 
there is a 0 because there is no link from node 4 to node 3. This corre-
sponds to saying that the entry, or element, a42 of matrix A is equal to 
1, while a43 is equal to 0. Consequently one sets: a42=1and a43=0. More 
formally, for any graph G with N nodes, the adjacency matrix of G is a N 
× N square matrix, i.e. a square table of N × N numbers, such that the 
element aij , i.e. the number in the i-th row and j-th column position (i, j 
= 1, … , N ) is equal to 1 when there is a link from node i to node j, and 
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zero otherwise. Notice that each of the two labels i and j can take values 
from 1 to N. We indicate this as: i, j = 1, … , N. The diagonal of the adja-
cency matrix usually contains zeros if, as in the case shown in figure, it 
is not possible to have links from a node to itself. Otherwise, we can al-
so have values equal to 1 in the diagonal positions. The adjacency 
matrix A of a generic graph G can then be written as: 
  
𝐴 =
𝑎!! 𝑎!" 𝑎!" … 𝑎!!
𝑎!" 𝑎!! 𝑎!" … 𝑎!!
𝑎!" 𝑎!" 𝑎!! … 𝑎!!
… … … … …
𝑎!! 𝑎!! 𝑎!! … 𝑎!!
 
 
Following, some basic graph definitions and quantities will be intro-
duced. First, the focus will be on the graph nodes. The simplest way to 
characterize a node of a graph G is to count the number of its connec-
tions. Thus, a vey important property of a node, known as the node 
degree, is its number of links. In the case of a directed graph, we can 
define two types of degrees for each node, namely the out-degree, equal 
to the number of links going out from the node, and the in-degree, equal 
to the number of links going into the node. The degrees of node i can be 
written in terms of the adjacency matrix of the graph. In fact, the out-
degree of i, usually indicated as 𝑘!!"#, is equal to the sum of the elements 
in row i, while the in-degree of i, usually indicated as 𝑘!!", is equal to the 








The total degree ki of node i is then the sum of its out-degree and its in-
degree: 𝑘! = 𝑘!!"# + 𝑘!!". 
  
As an example, we can easily calculate the degrees of the nodes in the 
graph G in Figure 5 by summing respectively the values in the rows and 
in the columns of the corresponding adjacency matrix A, written above. 
We get: 
 𝑘!!"#=0, 𝑘!!"#=1, 𝑘!!"#=1, 𝑘!!"#=2, 𝑘!!"#=3, and  
	
	 207	
 𝑘!!"=4, 𝑘!!"=1, 𝑘!!"=1, 𝑘!!"=1, 𝑘!!"=0. 
Finally the total degrees of the five nodes are:  
  𝑘! = 4, 𝑘! = 2, 𝑘! = 2, 𝑘! = 3, 𝑘! = 3,  
which have been obtained by summing their in- and out-degrees. 
 
Up to now, only networks where, for each pair of nodes, either there can 
be a link or not, have been considered. Such black or white, 0 (absence 
of link) or 1 (presence of link) situation, is an extreme case. Along with a 
complex connectivity structure, many real networks also display a large 
heterogeneity in the capacity and the intensity of their links. Examples 
are the existence of strong and weak ties among the individuals of a so-
cial network, unequal traffic in the Internet or in various transportation 
networks 798 or, as will be shown in the following sections of this chap-
ter, also network of citations among firms.  
 
Weighted networks can be represented in terms of so-called weighted 
graphs. A weighted graph is a graph such that a numerical value, 
namely a positive integer or a positive real number, is attached to each 
of its link. A weighted graph can be described by giving its weighted ad-
jacency matrix W:  
 
𝑊 =
𝑤!! 𝑤!" 𝑤!" … 𝑤!!
𝑤!" 𝑤!! 𝑤!" … 𝑤!!
𝑤!" 𝑤!" 𝑤!! … 𝑤!!
… … … … …
𝑤!! 𝑤!! 𝑤!! … 𝑤!!
 
  
This is again a N × N matrix, where N is the number of nodes in the 
graph. The element wij , i.e. the number in the i-th row and j-th column 
position (i, j = 1, … , N ) is different from 0 when there is a link from 
node i to node j, and zero otherwise. However, this time, the value of wij 
can be any positive number and denotes the intensity of the link, e.g. 
the number of contacts between two individuals in a social network or, 
																																																								
798 Boccaletti et al (797); Latora, Nicosia, Russo (797) 
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as in the case of interest for this research, the number of patents of a 
firm citing patents of another firm, in the network of firm citations.  
The generalization of the concept of node degree is the so-called node 
strength. In the case of a directed graph, for a node we can define two 
types of strength, the out-strength, equal to the sum of the weights of 
the links going out from the node, and the in-strength, equal to the sum 
of the weights of the links going into the node. The strengths of node i 
can be written in terms of the weighted adjacency matrix of a graph. In 
fact, the out-strength of i, usually indicated as 𝑠!!"#, is equal to the sum 
of the elements in row i, while the in-strength of i, usually indicated as 









The total strength si of node i is then the sum of its out-strength and its 
in-strength: 𝑠! = 𝑠!!"# + 𝑠!!". 
 
To conclude this section is useful to mention that the network approach 
to study citations has a long tradition, initially started with the pioneer-
ing works by Lotka in 1926 on the statistics of scientific citations.799 In 
1965 Derek de Solla Price studied the first network of scientific articles 
at a world wide scale, obtained by linking each published article to the 
other articles mentioned in its footnotes or bibliography. It was in this 
work that a non-trivial power law was for the first time observed (and 
subsequently modelled) in both the in- and out-degree distributions of 
the citation network 800. Since then, the statistical properties of the dis-
tribution of citations have been discussed in various works 801, and 
bibliographic references have been an object of great interest to identify 
influential publications and measure the impact of a work on the re-
search community, but also to rank authors and scientific journals. 
																																																								
799 AJ Lotka, ‘The frequency distribution of scientific productivity’ (1926) 16 J Wash-
ington Academy of Science, 12  
800 DJ de Solla Price, ‘Networks of Scientific Papers’ (1965) 149 Science 510 
801 S Redner, ‘Citations Statistics from 110 years of Physical Review’ (1998) 4 Eur. J. 
Phys. B 131. 
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Recently the power law behaviour of the in-degree distribution suggest-
ed the introduction of a novel indicator, the so-called h-index to quantify 
the impact of a scientist in the scientific community 802. Today compre-
hensive citations for papers published in academic journals, such as 
the Science Citation Index, can be searched through subscriptions, 
based on online platforms such as the Web of Science maintained by 
Thomson Reuters, while similar bibliographic databases, such as 
Google Scholar are freely available. 
 
6. The network of firm citations 
 
Networks of citations among patents have also been thoroughly studied, 
especially in the context of innovation and knowledge transfer, and pa-
tent analysis has become a vital tool for identifying technological 
trends.803  Patent citation networks, when studied at the most basic 
level, namely at the level of citations among patents, have been shown to 
exhibit statistical properties similar to those observed in networks of ci-
tations among scientific papers. This indicates that article citation 
networks and patent citation networks can share a common type of 
mechanisms.804 However, also features peculiar to patent citation net-
works have been discovered. As already discussed in chapter V, patent 
citation networks have been employed, at the level of citations among 
firms, to detect possible strategic use of patents.  
 
Recent studies have adopted network methodology to investigate the 
strategic use of patents to build patent thickets. For instance, von 
																																																								
802 JE Hirsch, ‘An index to quantify an individual’s scientific research output’  (2005) 
102 P. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 16569  
803 Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (793); Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (794); AB Jaffe, M Trajten-
berg, Patents, citations, and innovations: A window on the knowledge economy (MIT 
press, 2002); BH Hall, D Harhoff, ‘Recent Research on the Economics of Patents’ 
(2012) NBER Working paper n. 17773< http://www.nber.org/papers/w17773 > ac-
cessed on the 20th June 2017, 541; D Harhoff et al. ‘Citation frequency and the value 
of patented inventions’ (1999) 81 Review of Economics and statistics 511; JO Lan-
jouw, M Schankerman ‘Patent quality and research productivity: Measuring 
innovation with multiple indicators’  (2004) 114 The Economic Journal  (2004) 441 
804  S Valverde et al, ‘Topology and evolution of technology innovation networks’ (2007) 
76 Physical Review E, 056118.1. 
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Graevenitz et al. have analysed patent citations among firms to assess 
the degree of patent thicketing.805 The basic idea is that important in-
formation on strategic use of patents can be extracted by looking at 
cases in which firm A cites a patent of a firm B, while firm B cites a pa-
tent of firm A. Such mutual citation links are deemed to be signals of 
firms that can block each other. Following this argument, when cita-
tions result in a bilateral relationship between firms, cross licensing is 
assumed as highly possible because it is the best way to avoid in-
fringements and cost raising, allowing both firms to fully exploit all the 
patents related to the same technology. Thus, finding reciprocal cita-
tions in the network among firms can reveal, on one hand, possible 
market inefficiencies, but, on the other hand, the firms’ propensity to 
reduce or eliminate those inefficiencies by reaching cross-licensing 
agreements.806  
 
Even more complicate and worth of attention is the case of the so-called 
triples i.e. three firms, each owning patents that block patent applica-
tions of the other two firms. Reaching an agreement among three firms 
is more difficult, since the bargaining problem cannot be resolved 
through independent bilateral bargaining by each firm pair in the triple. 
Hence, hold-up and cost rising, i.e. market inefficiencies can occur 
more frequently in the cases of triples,807 unless a patent pool is creat-
ed.808  All this considered, Georg von Graevenitz et al. have proposed to 
use the number of triples in the network of citations among patent ap-
plications at the EPO as way to identify inefficiencies in the market, 
thereby measuring the density of patent thickets.809 In this way, they 
																																																								
805 G von Graevenitz, S Wagner, D Harhoff  ‘How to measure patent thickets: A novel 
approach’ (2011) 111 Economics Letters 6; BH Hall, G von Graevenitz, C Rosazza- 
Bondibene, ‘A Study of Patent Thickets’ (The Intellectual Property Office, 2013) 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf > accessed at 20th  June 2017 
806 M Grimaldi et al,  ‘The patent portfolio value analysis: A new framework to leverage 
patent information for strategic technology planning’ (2015) 94 Technological Fore-
casting and Social Change 286, 289  
807 Hall, Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (805) 39 
808  Ibid (“Where multiple triples arise within the same network of firms it is highly 
likely that these will overlap creating ever more complex bargaining problems that re-
quire recourse to patent pools or standards for their resolution.”) 
809 G von Graevenitz, S Wagner, D Harhoff (805) 7 
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have identified that patent thickets particularly affect complex technol-
ogy areas.810 
 
In this work, a network analysis of the citation relations among firms in 
the context of business methods patents will be performed. In order to 
study the patterns of patent citations, the same data set described in 
Section 4 of Chapter 4 will be used. In particular, all patent applications 
published until the date of 2nd June 2014 under the category G06Q 
have been considered to construct a complex network. Notice that in 
this network, nodes would not represent patents, but firms, as in the 
studies by von Graevenitz et al. mentioned above. Namely, in the con-
structed network, nodes represent entities having filed at least one 
patent application in the considered category, and where there is a di-
rectional link from entity A to entity B if at least one patent application 
filed from A cites an application filed from B. To better clarify, since only 
patents and patent applications that have been quoted at the EPO reg-
ister with an EP number have been taken into consideration, then the 
links between firms only map relationships in an European context. No-
tice also that the work by von Graevenitz et al. considered citations 
according to their blocking potential, i.e. to the probability that the user 
of one patent could infringe the cited one. For such a reason, only criti-
cal citations between patent applications were taken into account 
(namely citations of type X and Y)811, while in this work all citations, not 
only the critical ones will be considered.  
 
																																																								
810 Ibid 8 
811 Webb et al (792) (“EPO search codes and their meaning: X Particularly relevant 
documents when taken alone (a claimed invention cannot be considered novel or can-
not be considered to involve an inventive step); Y Particularly relevant documents if 
combined with one or more other documents of the same category, - such a combina-
tion being obvious to a person skilled in the art; A Documents defining the general 
state of the art (but not belonging to X or Y); O Documents which refer to non-written 
disclosure ; P Intermediate documents - documents published between the date of fil-
ing of the application being examined and the date of priority claimed; T Documents 
relating to the theory or principle underlying the invention (documents which were  
published after the filing date and are not in conflict with the application, but were 
cited for a better understanding of the invention) E Potentially conflicting documents – 
Any patent document bearing a filing or priority date earlier than the filing date of the 
application searched but published later than that date, and the content of which 
would constitute prior art”) 
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The network produced in this way has N=1,501 nodes and K=1,397 
links, and from now on will be referred to as the firm citation network of 
category G06Q at the EPO, notwithstanding the fact its nodes can be 
firms but also banks, universities and other entities, to stress its differ-
ence from a network where the nodes are patents. Notice that the 
number of nodes in the network is much smaller than the total number 
of entities in our data set, namely 14,230. This is due to the fact that 
the network contains only entities that have filed at EPO a patent appli-
cation in the category G06Q in the period examined, but also have cited 
or received citations from other patent applications. Specifically, the 
network contains only those entities that have cited at least one of the 
previous patent applications in the same category, thus they have at 
least one backward citation, i.e. 𝑘!"# ≥ 1, or have been at least cited 
once, thus they have at least one forward citation, i.e. 𝑘!" ≥ 1. This dras-
tically reduces the number of entities, producing a network with 1,501 
nodes, all of them active, i.e. with at least one in-going or out-going 
link, plus a set of other 14,230-1,501=12,729 non-active entities which 
can be considered as the isolated nodes of the network, but will not be 
taken into account in the following analysis and, for simplicity, will not 
be shown in the following figures. Of the 1,501 active nodes in the net-
work, we have 636 nodes with 𝑘!"#=0 (no backward citations) and 
𝑘!" ≠0, 674 nodes with 𝑘!"=0 (no forward citations) and 𝑘!"# ≠0, and 
191 nodes with both 𝑘!" ≠0 and 𝑘!"# ≠0.  







with	exponents	𝜸𝒐𝒖𝒕 = 𝟏.𝟖	and	𝜸𝒊𝒏 = 𝟏.𝟗.		
The out-degree distribution has been constructed by computing the 
number 𝑁(𝑘!"#) of nodes in the network with out degree 𝑘!"#, and then 
by evaluating the probability distribution as the ratio 𝑃(𝑘!"#) = 𝑁(𝑘!"#)/
𝑁, where N=1,501 is the total number of nodes in the network. The in-
degree distribution 𝑃(𝑘!") has been constructed analogously, from the 
number of nodes 𝑁(𝑘!") with a number of in-going links equal to 𝑘!". 
The figure then shows on the y-axis the quantities 𝑃(𝑘!"#) and 𝑃(𝑘!"), as 
a function respectively of 𝑘!"# and 𝑘!" on the x-axis, and tells what is 
the probability of a finding a node of a given degree. For instance, the 
panel on the left hand side indicates that more than 40% of the nodes 
have out degree 𝑘!"# = 1, while 7% of the nodes have 𝑘!"# = 2, and only 
2% have 𝑘!"# = 3. Although such a distribution is decreasing, it is pos-
sible to find nodes with a large out degree, e.g. there is one company 
with 𝑘!"# = 27, and two companies with 𝑘!"# = 24. Analogously it is pos-
sible to find nodes with large in degree. In particular, there is one 















The degree distributions are both scale-free. It is indeed possible to fit 
the long tails of the distributions with a power-law, i.e. a function of the 
form 𝑃 𝑘 ~𝑘!!. The two exponents extracted are respectively 𝛾!"# = 1.8 
and 𝛾!" = 1.9, and are in agreement with other exponents found in the 
literature 812.  
 
In this sense, the results confirm that, the same scale-free properties 
found in networks of citations among scientific papers, and in other 
complex networks (such as social networks, and the network of hyper-
links among Web pages in the Internet), also emerge in networks of 
citations among firms. Moreover, exponents close to a value equal to 2 
denote that citation of patent application are very heterogeneously dis-
tributed among the various firms, so that only a few of them get the 
largest majority of citations. It can then be interesting to focus on the 
names of the firms in the tails of the degree distributions reported in 
Figure 6. This can be done by ranking the network nodes by their out- 
or in-degree, i.e. we can rank the corresponding companies by their 
number of citations to other patent applications in the same category 
(backward citations), or by the number of received citations (forward ci-
tations). The results, reported in the two lists in Table 3, indeed, 
confirm the significant role played by some well know companies in the 
IT sector. Consistently with other indications emerged in the analysis 
performed in Chapter IV, the large and almost equal numbers of back-
ward and forward citations demonstrate the central role played by 
Google in the business method patent phenomenon in Europe. The 
same can be said for Research in Motion (Blackberry). In point of fact, 
Blackberry has developed a favourable approach to patents, as indicat-
ed recently.813 And that could account for the key role played also in the 
																																																								
812 Boccaletti et al (797); Latora, Nicosia, Russo (797) 
813 J Mullin ‘Blackberry enters a new era, files 105-page patent lawsuit against Avaya’ 
(ARS Technica Uk 2016) <https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-
policy/2016/08/blackberry-avaya-patent-lawsuit/> accessed 7th August 2017 
(“BlackBerry revolutionized the mobile industry," the company's lawyers wrote in their 
complaint. "BlackBerry... has invented a broad array of new technologies that cover 
everything from enhanced security and cryptographic techniques, to mobile device us-
er interfaces, to communication servers, and many other areas.") 
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field of business methods. Regarding other firms, the two lists indicate 
less balanced approaches. For examples, Nokia is more interested in 
technologies that have been developed by other firms. In contrast, Visa 








27  1 Visa Int. 29 
2 Google 24  2 Research 
in Motion 
24 
3 Nokia 24  3 Microsoft 23 
4 Samsung 21  4 Accenture 22 
5 Microsoft 13  5 Google 22 
6 Alcatel 13  6 Nec 18 
7 Siemens 13  7 Fujitsu 14 
8 LG Elec-
tronics 
12  8 Sap 14 
9 Visa Int. 12  9 Alcatel 14 
 






When looking more specifically at the structure of firm citation net-
works, it is important to notice that such networks can have properties 
very different from those of the networks of citations among patents. In 
fact, a patent citation network, i.e. a network whose nodes are patents, 
corresponds to what in mathematics is known as a directed acyclic 
graph (a network without directed cycles). In fact, patents have a tem-
poral order associated and, because of temporal constraints, 
substructures in which a node A has a link to node B, node B has a link 
to node C, and also node C has a link to node A, cannot exist in patent 
networks. Conversely, directed cycles are well possible in networks of ci-
tations among firms, because it is possible that, at the same time, firm 
A cites a patent of firm B, firm B cites a patent of firm C, and firm C 
cites a patent of firm A. Also, in networks of citations among firms it is 
possible that firm A cites a patent of firm B, while firm B cites a patent 
of firm A. Differently from the networks previously constructed, the pro-
duced firm network can also be seen as a weighted network, meaning 
that a numerical value, the so-called link weight, can be associated to 
each link. Such a value has been obtained by counting the number of 
different patent applications of a firm citing patent applications of an-
other firm (or of the same firm as well). This is because the number of 
citations is taken as a measure of how closely two firms operate in the 
same technological field and are interested in similar inventions.  So 
that, if the link from firm A to firm B has a weight wAB=5, this means 
that firm A holds 5 applications citing applications of firm B. If the self-
link from firm A, i.e. the link connecting node A to itself has a weight 
wAA=3, this means that firm A holds 5 applications citing applications of 
the same firm. Notice that, as it is possible that there is a link from 
node A to node B but vice versa the link from B to A does not exist, for 
most of couples of nodes A and B, the weight wAB of the link from A to B 
is different from the weight wBA of the link from B to A.  Figure 7 shows 
the distribution of link weights observed. The plot reports the number of 
links of a given weight w, and indicates that most of the links, precisely 
1,232 out of the total number K=1,397 have a weight w=1. This means 
that, most couples of connected companies A and B, represent cases in 
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which only one patent application of company A cites one patent appli-
cation of company B.  Then, there are 119 links with a weight equal to 
2, and very few links with large values of their weights, for instance only 
three links with a weight larger than 10, respectively with exactly w=12, 




Interestingly, all the three largest weights correspond to self-links. More 
precisely, the link with w=39 is the self-link (loop) of the node represent-
ing Research in Motion, the link with w=22 is the self-link of the node 
representing Amadeus sas, while the link with w=12 is the self-link of 
the node Sap ag. This means, for instance, that Research in Motion has 
39 citations going from some of its patent applications to some others of 
its patent applications. Self-citations are quite common in the con-
structed network. We have in fact found that 68 links correspond to 
self-citations. The number of reciprocated links is instead smaller. The 

















the link from A to B is accompanied by the presence of the link from B 
to A. The 11 reciprocated couples are reported in Table 4. 
 
Research in motion  Nokia 
Research in motion Samsung 
Hitachi  Toshiba 
Nokia Microsoft 
Research in Motion  Google 
Siemens Sap 
Visa Int Visa USA 
Salamander Mood_internat 
Alcatel Lucent IBM 
Nec Hitachi 
Research in Motion Vodafone 
	




In a weighted network another interesting node property analogous to 
the node degree is the so-called node strength. While the degree is equal 
to the number of links of a node, the node strength is the sum of all the 
weights of the links of the node. In a directed weighted network as the 
one we are dealing with, each node is characterized by its out- and in-
strength. Figure 8 reports respectively the out- and the in-strength dis-
tribution. The first distribution has been constructed by computing the 
number 𝑁(𝑠!"#) of nodes in the network with out strength 𝑠!"#, and then 
by evaluating the probability distribution as the ratio 𝑃(𝑠!"#) = 𝑁(𝑠!"!)/
𝑁, where N=1,501 is the total number of nodes in the network. The in-
strength distribution 𝑃(𝑠!") has been constructed analogously, from the 
number of nodes 𝑁(𝑠!") with an in-strength equal to 𝑠!". The figure then 
shows on the y-axis the quantities 𝑃(𝑠!"#) and 𝑃(𝑠!"), as a function re-
spectively of 𝑠!"# and 𝑠!" on the x-axis, and tells what is the probability 
of a finding a node of given strength. For instance, the panel on the left 
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hand side indicates that about 40% of the nodes have out strength 
𝑠!"# = 1, while 9% of the nodes have 𝑠!"# = 2, and only 2% have 𝑠!"# = 3. 
It is however possible to find nodes with a large out strength, e.g. there 
is one firm with 𝑠!"# = 82, and another one with 𝑠!"# = 36. Analogously, 
it is possible to find nodes with large in degree. In particular, there is 
one firm with 𝑠!" = 72 in-going citations, one with 𝑠!" = 42, and another 




dashed	 lines	 are	 power-law	 fits	 to	 the	 tails	 of	 the	 distributions,	 of	 the	 form	𝑷(𝒔)~𝒔!𝜸 	with	 exponents	
𝜸𝒐𝒖𝒕 = 𝟐.𝟎	and	𝛄𝐢𝐧 = 𝟐.𝟐.	
 
As for the case of the degree distributions, also the strength distribu-
tions are scale-free. It is indeed possible to fit the distributions with a 
power-law, 𝑃 𝑠 ~𝑠!! , with the two exponents 𝛾!"# = 2.0  and 𝛾!" = 2.2 . 
Again this confirms the high heterogeneity of the nodes of the network.  
We can rank the firms in the network by their out- or in-strength. Firms 






















82  1 Research 
in Motion 
72 
2 Amadeus 36  2 Microsoft 42 
3 Samsung 29  3 Visa Int 31 
4 Google 29  4 Accenture 30 
5 Nokia 26  5 Google 29 
6 Sap 21  6 Sap 25 
7 Siemens 21  7 Amadeus 25 
8 Microsoft 19  8 Siemens 20 





To have a more precise idea of the global structure of the firm citation 
network, it is possible to perform a component analysis of the corre-
sponding graph, and to show graphically the resulting largest connected 
components. In a directed graph there are two possible types of compo-
nents that can be extracted, namely the so-called weakly-connected 
components and the strongly-connected components. A weakly-connected 
component consists of all those nodes, such that from each node is pos-
sible to go to any other node, using links, but not taking into account 
the directionality of the links. The firm citation graph has 377 weakly-
connected components. The largest weakly-connected component of the 
graph has N=699 nodes and K=910 directed links, and is much larger 
than all the others: for instance the second-largest weakly-connected 
component has only N=8 nodes. Also, the largest weakly-connected 
component has 67 triangles, i.e. triples of connected nodes, and the av-
erage distance between any couple of nodes is equal to 4.79. But 
unfortunately, the largest weakly-connected component of the graph is 
way too big to be drawn.  
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 A strongly-connected component of a directed graph is instead a compo-
nent made by those nodes such that, for each couple of node, let us say 
A and B, it is possible to go from A to B, but also from B to A, by follow-
ing the graph links with their directionality. The firm citation network 
has 1463 strongly-connected components, the largest one with N=38 
nodes and K=111 directed links, the second one with only N=2 nodes. 
Therefore, apart from the largest one, all the other strongly-connected 
components are very small, namely are made by two nodes or by single 
nodes. The graph corresponding to the largest strongly-connected com-
ponent, having only N=38 nodes can be graphically shown and is 












The graphs contains many relevant companies in the sector, and K=111 
directed links among them, showing the activity of the companies in cit-
ing patents of other companies. The maximum distance between two 
nodes of the graph is equal to 8, while the average distance is 3.6. If we 
neglect the directionality of the links, the graph contains 31 triangles. 
The size of each node and its color in figure indicate the total degree of 
the node, i.e. the sum of the node out- and in-degree. The color code 
adopted is reported in the bottom right corner of the figure. In particu-
lar, blue coloured nodes are those with large total degree, while nodes 
with small degree are coloured in red. Links are directed, so that there 
can be up to two links connecting the same couple of nodes. To graph-
ically distinguish the two links, the out-going link of a node is coloured 
with the same colour as the node.  The link widths represent the weight 
of the links. For simplicity self-loops, i.e. links from a node to itself, 
have not been shown. We can further reduce the complexity of the plot 
by keeping of the 38 nodes of the largest strongly-connected component 
of the graph, only those nodes with a total degree larger or equal to 5. 
We get in this way the graph with N=18 nodes shown in Figure 10. 
Such a graph, although being only a portion of the entire network, can 
give interesting insights on the global relations between firms in the 








According to Figure 9 and Figure 10, Blackberry represents the core of 
the network. Such a firm is directly linked to most of the other players 
in the business method context. In particular, Blackberry is connected 
with two of the other major players, namely Google and Microsoft, 
whose patents and patent applications seem to be mostly cited in the 
applications filed by Blackberry at the EPO. 
 
Research in Motion Nokia Google 
Research in Motion Nokia Vodafone 
Research in Motion Nokia Samsung 
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Research in Motion Nokia Microsoft 
Research in Motion Google Samsung 
Research in Motion Google Vodafone 
Research in Motion Samsung Vodafone 




Instead, Samsung often cites patents and patent applications filed by 
Blackberry, which is quite understandable as both firms are involved in 
the mobile business.  
 
The key role played by Blackberry is also confirmed by the results on 
the number of triples reported in Table 6. Since the network does not 
contain mutually locked triples of firms, i.e. triples of nodes connected 
by all the six possible links among them,1 triples of nodes connected by 
five links have been investigated. Blackberry, indeed appears in seven of 
the eight triples with five links found in the network and reported in 
Table 6. Hence, it seems to occupy a blocking position in the market to-
gether with other well-know firm in the market of smartphones, such as 
Samsung or Hitachi. These firms are therefore at high risk of developing 
patent thicket behaviours.  
 
Similar conclusions can also be reached with respect to strongly mutu-
ally connected couples of firms, such as Sap and Siemens or LG and 
Samsung, according to the quantitative analysis synthetized in the net-
works in Figure 9 and Figure 10. Indeed Sap and Siemens show to be 
bi-directionally coupled (blocked) with links of high weights. The same 
happens for the couple made by LG and Samsung.  
 
Another significant result emerging from Figure 9 and Figure 10 is the 
lack of strong relationships between Google and Microsoft, which are 
the two firms with the highest number of patent applications in the cat-
																																																								
1 G von Graevenitz, S Wagner, D Harhoff (805) 39 
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egory G06Q. At least in theory, the possibility of having citations be-
tween patent applications filed by Google and those filed by Microsoft 
should be high. And, indeed, the two firms cite and are cited by most of 
the firms in the citation network. However, Microsoft and Google have 
no strong link between them. This can be quite reasonable when one 
considers that Microsoft is a technological firm involved in development 
of software, whereas Google is probably, mainly, a media company.2 All 
this seems to corroborate the idea that business methods are a cross-
cutting topic; as such, business method patents can cover a wide array 
of topics. Indeed, the lack of links between Google and Microsoft indi-
cates that such two big firms develop their inventions in so diverse 
areas that innovations are developed independently from each other, 
even if patent applications are filed in the same category, the category 
G06Q. On the other hand, the absence of links between these two firms 
in the citation network seems to suggest a low risk of patent thickets 
between Microsoft and Google in the category G06Q at the EPO.  
 
7. Some conclusions  
 
The quantitative analysis provided in this chapter reinforces some of the 
conclusions reached in Chapter IV. The network of citations among 
firms that has been constructed and analyzed has given indication that 
a large variety of diverse types of inventions can be involved in the cate-
gory G06Q at the EPO. As such, the category proves to be a cross 
cutting one. The category G06Q, therefore, seems not only to involve dif-
ferent type of entities, but also diverse kinds of inventions. Additionally, 
and more crucially, the quantitative analysis performed in this chapter 
seems to support the hypothesis that strategic reasons can explain the 
incredible interest to seek patent protection for business methods in 
Europe. In particular, the low rate of granted patents, the compelling in-
terest in filing patent applications, as well as some interesting links 
among the firms involved in this technological area, are all arguments 
																																																								
2 M Helft ‘Is Google a Media Company?’ NYTimes (New York, 10 August 2008) 
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that support this idea. In the following chapters, some ill effects of 
thicketing in business method patents will be described, whereas possi-









1. Introduction  
 
The quantitative analysis of Chapter VI has revealed the possible exist-
ence of strategic purposes hidden behind the popularity of business 
method patent applications at the EPO. Further, the investigation car-
ried out in Chapter VI has confirmed that patent thicket behaviours 
have to some extent developed in the category G06Q at the EPO. Both 
the impressive number of patent applications filed in the category G06Q 
and the dense network of citations among patent applications of the 
major players in the field, have ultimately corroborated the hypothesis 
suggested in Chapter III that applications related to business methods 
category are filed not to grant patent protection to inventions, but to 
generate uncertainty, thereby strengthening the position of firms, espe-
cially the big ones, in the market.  
 
As was briefly explained in Chapter V, strategic use of patents, specifi-
cally patent thickets, can result in some detrimental effects for firms 
that are forced to license several patents with a significant increase in 
their costs. But there is more: the practice of filing several patent appli-
cations and overlapping them can adversely affect also society. Indeed, 
innovation can be stifled and competition can be ultimately reduced or 
nearly eliminated in the market for technologies to which the patent 
thickets relate.1 According to the indications provided in Chapter V, this 
chapter aims to focus on detrimental effects occurring specifically when 
patent thickets are developed in computer-implemented invention (CII) 
																																																								
1 BH Hall, G von Graevenitz, C Rosazza-Bondibene, ‘A Study of Patent Thickets’ (The 
Intellectual Property Office, 2013) <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf > 




areas, as it is the case of business methods. The chapter is organised 
into two parts. The first section will provide a general overview on the 
inefficiencies that are usually related to patent thickets developed in 
computer-implemented invention area. The second section, instead, will 
focus on some of those detrimental effects. In particular, effects such as 
hold-up,2 double mark-up3 or tacit collusion, which are often castigated 
for creating market inefficiencies, will be examined.  
 
2. Strategic patenting, inefficiencies and competition in computer 
implemented inventions  
 
In the 1990s, the development of complex technologies, including soft-
ware and computer technologies, resulted in filing of an ever-
increasingly number of patent applications. In the US, the phenomenon 
was examined from the outset by the Carnegie Mellon survey, which 
was concluded in the early 1990s.4 The survey, in particular, put for-
ward that the firm’s resolution to patent was just not to do with 
profiting from their inventions.5 Among such other considerations were 
the blocking of rivals to patent related inventions, the preventing of in-
fringement suits and the strengthening of position in negotiations.6In 
particular, the so-called patent intensive firms, such as computer or 
electronics industries, were identified as a clear exponent of strategic 
patenting. Admittedly, new technology entrepreneurs used mostly pa-
tents “either to extract licensing revenue or to force inclusion in cross 
licensing negotiations”.7 Moreover, antitrust worries started to be ex-
pressed, as the survey indicated that patents were often tools for 
maintaining an oligopolistic position in the market since “firms patent 
not only to protect their own technology, but to hold their rivals hostage 
																																																								
2 Text to n.25 Chapter V  
3 Text to n. 106 
4 Text to n. 7 Chapter IV; W Cohen, J Walsh, R Nelson ‘Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)’ 
(2000) NBER working paper w7552 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552> accessed 
on the 20th June 2015  
5 Ibid. 3  
6 Ibid. 17  
7 Ibid. 22 
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by controlling technology that they need.”8 In particular, small firm dif-
ficulties encountered when entering or remaining in the market were 
highlighted as possible drawbacks of intensive patenting. 9  
 
Similar concerns were voiced in an analysis regarding cumulative inno-
vations performed in the same years.10 According to Gallini, firms were 
driven to file more than a single application for the same invention 
when innovative products or processes were based on previous inven-
tions, as happened in software or business methods. 11  As already 
explained in Chapter V, filing several application related to the same in-
vention can result in create difficulties in defining clear boundaries 
between patents, thereby causing uncertainty on what is ultimately 
covered by each application. 12 The study proved that this behaviour 
was seen as appropriate to avoid the infringement threat, according to 
the fact that large patent portfolios could efficiently serve defensive pur-
poses.13 However, Gallini suggested that such a growth in number of 
patent applications had the effect to discourage firms from entering the 
market.14 Most obviously, small firms were deterred, as they could not 
afford to file several applications. 15Indeed, small firms were generally 
not strong enough to avoid infringement by others or to settle on the 
best terms due to the lack of large patent portfolio.16 Therefore, new en-
trepreneurs unable to reduce the threat of patent litigation ultimately 
decided not to implement their invention. Competition in the market 
was, thus, negatively affected.17  
  
 In the same way, an empirical analysis of the semiconductor industries 
revealed the tendency by those firms to accumulate large numbers of 
																																																								
8 Ibid. 26  
9 Ibid. 27 
10 NT Gallini, ‘The economics of patents: Lessons from recent US patent reform’ (2002) 
16 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 131 
11 Ibid. 146  
12 Text to Chapter V 
13 Gallini (10) 140  
14 Ibid. 145  
15 Ibid. 143  
16 Ibid. 136 
17 Ibid. 144 
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patents.18 Indeed, according to Hall and Ziedonis, big semiconductor 
firms were likely to amass patent portfolios for offensive and defensive 
reasons since, depending on their size, the benefits of accumulating a 
large number of patents outweighed costs.19  Nevertheless, concerns 
were raised as “a firm lacking a strong patent portfolio of its own with 
which to negotiate licensing or cross-licensing agreements could face a 
more rapid erosion of profits in an era when the costs and risks associ-
ated with infringement had increased”.20 Consistent with this, a certain 
tendency to collusive practices was concluded by a study focusing on 
patent complementarity in complex technologies.21 In particular, firms 
involved in complex technologies were shown to be inclined to strategic 
interactions, often resulting in cartel behaviour. Specifically, evidence 
was provided that firms already in the market were more inclined to 
price fixing so that rival firms’ production efforts decreased and access 
of small firm in the market was hindered in the end.22 Maurer, also, 
reached consistent conclusions in his analysis of the patent thicket 
phenomenon in the US.23 Significantly, the relation between “patent 
flood”24 and rise of predatory behaviours, i.e. actions only done to ex-
clude rivals, was the centrepiece of the study. 25  Further studies 
confirmed the suspicion of the some strategy behind patent thicketing.26 
In particular, suggestion was made that broad claims in patent applica-
tions as well as the use of continuation27 - resulting in the overlapping 
of several patents related to the same invention - were strategically 
																																																								
18 BH Hall, RH Ziedonis, ‘The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting 
in the US semiconductor industry, 1979-1995’ (2001) 32 The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 101  
19 Ibid. 110  
20 Ibid. 109 – 110  
21 Harhoff et al, The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and com-
petition policies - Tender for No ENTR/05/82 (European Commission, 2007) < 
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/37550/1/study- 202852-2008_en_2475.pdf> accessed 
on the 20th June 2017, 109  
22 Ibid. 112  
23 MJ Meurer, ‘Business Method Patents and Patent Floods’ (2002) 8 Wash. UJL & 
Pol’y 309  
24 Text to n. 132 Chapter III  
25 Meurer (23) 325  
26 N van Zeebroeck, B van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, ‘Filing strategies and patent 
value’  (2011) 20 Economics of innovation and new technology 539 
27 Text to n. 161 Chapter V 
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placed to sue rivals for infringement, to settle extracting high royalties, 
to ultimately increase the market value of patents.28  
 
The fact that patent thickets are created with the aim of raising costs of 
rivals emerges as a well-know feature of the phenomenon according to 
the finding of the already discussed studies. In this respect, it should be 
noted that the possibility has been indicated that a dominant firm can 
strategically affect costs of competitors.29 As such, rivals’ cost is inten-
tionally raised either to foreclose the market or to reduce competition by 
forcing competitors to raise their prices.30 Most recently, Hall et al has 
demonstrated the relationship between patent thicketing and market 
inefficiency regarding to the UK experience.31 Specifically, a lower pro-
pensity to patenting has been indicated in those industries where 
patent thickets are denser.32 This points forward the idea that thickets 
can result in “some kind of barrier to entry in those technology areas in 
which they are present”.33 In particular, sunk costs, i.e. ‘costs that pro-
tect incumbents against competitive entry’ 34  are taken into 
consideration. In point of fact, patents can be sunk costs considering 
that newcomers in the market need to license them to implement the 
invention.35 Thus, patents can result in fixed costs to enter the market. 
Nevertheless, sunk costs are not anticompetitive per se. Equally, pa-
tents are not anti-competitive per se. According to Hall et al, patents 
can result in detrimental effects on competition when it is necessary to 
acquire a large number of them, as it happen when patent thickets are 
built.36 In such case, thus, ‘patent thickets are barriers to entry, if they 
create important negative externalities for firms not in possession of 
																																																								
28 van Zeebroeck, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (26) 560 
29 SC Salop, DT Scheffman, ‘Raising rivals' costs’  (1983) 73 The American Economic 
Review 267; SC Salop, DT Scheffman, ‘Cost-raising strategies’ (1987) The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 19 
30 Salop, Scheffman (1987) (29) 33 
31 Hall, von Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 
32 Ibid. 59  
33 Ibid. 60 
34 Ibid. 12  
35 Ibid. (“ A patent is the right to exclude others from practicing an invention. There-
fore, in principle a patent will function to increase fixed (and most likely sunk) costs of 
entry into a market where the invention protected by the patent is practiced.”) 
36 Ibid. 26 
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large patent portfolios and if no offsetting social benefits can be ascribed 
to the factors causing thickets to arise.37 
 
According to this brief overview on theoretical models as well as on em-
pirical surveys, firms involved in computer implemented invention area, 
such as business method or software one, tend to use patents strategi-
cally. Indications are, also, provided that patent thicketing approach 
can result in inefficiencies in those technological areas. Investment in 
innovation can be discouraged as result of patent thicketing. The inten-
tional uncertainty generated by patent thickets can also be used to 
increase rivals’ cost, thereby to foreclose the market. Thus, patent 
thickets can easily produce detrimental effects for the society, especially 
when computer technology is involved.   
 
3. Ill effects of patent thickets in business method patents  
 
This research has already made plain that filing several patent applica-
tions as well as describing inventions via broad or overlapping claims 
are not illegal practices in and of themselves. Similarly, the exploitation 
of monopolistic rights is integral with the logic of patent protection.38 
Thus, it is perfectly legitimate. Nevertheless, when neutral actions, such 
as those just described, are used for strategic and eventually harmful 
purposes, doubts are cast and concerns are expressed on the need and 
effectiveness of patent protection.39 Notably, this includes the case of 
business methods, which are routinely questioned considering the in-
crease in number of patent applications and the spreading of 
intentional overlapping that is often correlated to patent offices’ positive 
attitude towards business method patents.40  
 
																																																								
37 Ibid. 13 
38 Text to Section 2 Chapter IX 
39 Ex multis, DL Burk, MA Lemley, ‘Policy levers in patent law‘ (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 
1575; JR Allison, MA Lemley, DL Schwartz, ‘Our Divided Patent System’ (2015) The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1073. 
40 Ex multis, J Bessen, MJ Meurer, Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and law-
yers put innovators at risk (Princeton University Press 2008); Meurer (23)   
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Admittedly, as already discussed in chapter V, patent thicketing can re-
sult in using patents and patent application strategically, i.e. beyond 
the purpose for which the law grants them. As such, strategic behav-
iours can ultimately undermine the effect sought by granting patent 
protection. Indeed, in the case of cumulative inventions it seems that 
the most important effect of patents could not be anymore an increase 
in innovation, always given as the overarching reason in according pa-
tent protection.41  Given this, it is important in the context of this 
research to analyse in more details some of the possible effects that can 
result from granting protection to computer implemented inventions, 
which are one of the most significant example of cumulative innova-
tions. In particular, detrimental effects will be focused.  
 
3.1 Less investment in research   
 
Patent monopoly has been traditionally viewed in connection to R&D in-
vestments. According to literature reviewed in Chapter III, the prospect 
of monopolistic uses of inventions is one of the major drivers for firms 
invest in innovation and to devote significant amount of money toward 
R&D project. In particular, the more a firm eyes earning through the 
development innovative products, the more it is interested in patent 
protections and monopolistic use of inventions, the more it invests in 
R&D. 42 Therefore, from the traditional point of view, patent protection 
directly influences motivation to invest in innovation, with beneficial ef-
fects on society.  
 
Nevertheless, a recent study has reached the opposite conclusion re-
garding computer- implemented technologies. 43 For the purpose of the 
study conducted by Bessen, an economic theoretical model has been 
																																																								
41 Text to Section 4.1 Chapter III 
42  S Scotchmer, ‘Protecting early innovators: should second-generation products be 
patentable?’ (1996) 27 The Rand Journal of Economics 322 
43 J Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies (SSRN, March 
2003) 
< https://ssrn.com/abstract=327760 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.327760> ac-
cessed on the 7th July 2017  
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developed regarding cumulative inventions, such as business method 
and other computer-implemented inventions. In particular, the model 
emphasises the firm’s perception that patent protection can be reward-
ing when the “winner of the innovation race is also the sole winner of a 
monopoly patent right”. 44Most obviously, it is the common scenario 
when final products are based on a singular invention, i.e. on a singular 
patent. Conversely, in cumulative inventions, patents protect only a 
portion of the technology. Hence, in the latter situation profits emanat-
ing from innovation are shared among all patent holders, so that a 
firm’s investment in innovation is often not efficiently remunerated. 45 
According to this model, hence, firm propensity to invest in research 
seems to be negatively affected when innovation profits, i.e. profits em-
anating from marketing new products or licensing patents, should be 
shared with others. Indeed, in such a scenario it is firms’ belief that pa-
tent rights are not able to generate positive outcomes.46 Ultimately, the 
study correlates the finding on low-remuneration in cumulative innova-
tion area with the high probability of patent thicketing in these same 
areas. Therefore, suggestions are made that firms are less interested in 
patent protection and tend to put fewer resources into R&D, when pa-
tent thicketing behaviours take place.47  
 
Decrease in R&D investment has been also linked to another aspect of 
patent thicketing. In particular, correlation between patent thickets and 
increasing of legal costs has been often highlighted regarding cumula-
tive inventions. As already covered in the chapter V, the practice of 
filing several patent applications related to the same invention can re-
sult in a lack of clarity in technology ownership that, together with low 
patenting standards, can give rise to firm possibility to assert or to be 
asserted.48 With this in mind, speculation has been made that decreas-
ing in investment in R&D can occur also as a result of aggressive 
																																																								
44  Ibid. 13  
45 Ibid. 5  
46 Ibid. 19  
47 Ibid. 20  
48 Text to n. 69 in Chapter V  
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behaviours in litigation. Notably, in areas such as software and busi-
ness methods, firms can easily understand the technology behind new 
products. Thus, the creation of competing products, which implement 
similar technologies, is simple and usually not expensive. Given it, firms 
are not prone to implement a “mutual non-aggression” strategy. In-
stead, they tend to file several lawsuits seeking to secure their head-
start position in the market. Nevertheless, a significant part of their 
budget can be ultimately devoted to cover legal costs.  
 
Recently, the correlation between investment in R&D and patent thick-
ets has been analysed in an empirical research.49 During the 1990s, 
software industries were scrutinized, with focus given to the rapid in-
crease in the numbers of patent applications at the beginning of the 
Digital revolution. According to the study’s conclusions, this growth 
could not be connected to an increase in investment in innovation; ra-
ther, legal changes in processes to obtain patents were indicated as the 
main reason for that growth. Moreover, the relationship between the 
number of patent applications and aggressive strategic behaviour was 
put down to the new attitude toward patenting shown by firms, specifi-
cally by the “usual suspect” industries, i.e. industries seem using 
patents for strategic reasons.50  
 
3.2 Low quality patents  
 
This research has already established that patent thicketing usually re-
sults in increasing the number of patent applications.51 Consistently, a 
recent survey has proved that the practice of forming ‘thickets’ of pre-
existing patents and pending patents has led to an exponential growth 
in the number of applications in computer-implemented invention are-
																																																								
49 J Bessen, R Hunt, ‘An Empirical Look at Software Patents’ (2007) 16 Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 157  
50 Ibid. 184  
51Text n. 1 Chapter V  
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as.52 However, as many have pointed out, patent offices worldwide were 
not ready for this rise in the number of applications.53 As such, signifi-
cant delays causing patent backlogs are often highlighted as one of the 
main difficulties encountered by patent offices over the world, specifical-
ly in software-related technologies where the practice of filing more than 
one application referring to the same invention, is most widely adopt-
ed.54 
 
The point has also been that patent offices flooded by this incredible 
number of applications have been often unable to devote the sufficient 
time to proper examine each application.55 Hence, statutory patentabil-
ity requirements, in particular novelty and the inventive step, have not 
been properly scrutinised.56 Equally, it has been voiced that patent of-
fices were not equipped to deal with digital technologies. Indeed, the 
lack of sufficiently large databases has been often criticized, especially 
at the outset of the software industries. 57 As such, it has been put for-
ward that both the increasing in number of patent applications and the 
difficulties in finding all the existing previous art, have ultimately affect-
ed the quality of patent examinations. Thus, the quality of patents has 
ultimately been reduced, particularly in technological area, such as 
business method, where inventions are computer-implemented.58  
 
																																																								
52I Hargreaves, Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth: an inde-
pendent report (2011) < 
http://bipp.com/Portals/0/public/docs/Hargreaves%20Report.pdf> accessed on the 
20th June 2017, 54  
53 MA Lemley,C Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ (2005) 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 83  
54B Mitra-Kahn et al Patent backlogs, inventories, and pendency: An international 
framework  (UK Intellectual Property Office, 2013) <http:// www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-
ipresearch.htm> accessed 7 July 2017, 1 (“the term “backlog” as such is not well de-
fined. To some it refers to all unexamined applications, to some all pending 
applications, and to some “excess” applications beyond office capacity.”); Hall, von 
Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 27 
55 Bessen, Meurer (40) 18-19 
56 AB Jaffe, J Lerner, Innovations and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is 
Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It (Princeton University 
Press, 2004) 
57 Hall, von Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1)10; Bessen, Meurer (40) 160-164; M 
Likhovski, ‘Fighting the Patent Wars’ (2001) E. I. P. R. 267, 270-272  
58 Hall, von Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 26-27; RP Merges, ‘As many as six im-
possible patents before breakfast: Property rights for business concepts and patent 
system reform (1999) Berkeley Tech. LJ577 
	
	 237	
The definition of patent quality is usually related to the capacity of a pa-
tent to meet the requirement of novelty, non-obviousness, and 
sufficiently description of the invention. 59 Additionally, the validity and 
the broadness of the claims have been indicated as features to be taken 
into account in the assessment of patent quality. 60 Most recently, the 
patent quality has been related to the tendency of patents to be ques-
tioned.61 Thus, the number of either patent opposition proceedings or 
cases involving patent infringement has been exanimated.62 Referring 
specifically to software, Allison et al indicate that computer implement 
inventions are litigated more often than other inventions, thereby as-
suming the low quality of these types of patents. 63  Conversely, 
analysing the EPO context, a recent empirical research has proved that 
low quality patents could not be necessarily involved in litigations.64 In 
particular, Harhoff et al. indicates that firms are less likely to oppose ri-
vals’ patents when patent thicketing takes place.65 Indeed, a counter-
opposition is highly concerned according to the uncertainty generate by 
patent thicketing. Specifically, firms developing patent thicket approach 
seem to face fewer oppositions compared to others.66 Hence, “post-grant 
opposition cannot be relied upon to reduce the effects of patent thickets 
on patent quality”.67 Therefore, all this appears to confirm that patent 
thicketing approach can negatively affect patent quality of computer 
implemented inventions, although an increase in litigation could not be 
																																																								
59 R Polk Wagner, ‘Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms’ (2009)157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2135, 2138  (The study provides the definition of quality patent as the “capacity 
of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of patentability – most 
importantly, to be novel, non-obvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.”); SW 
Graf, ‘Improving patent quality through identification of relevant prior art: approaches 
to increase information flow to the patent office’ (2007) 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.495, 
499 
60 BH Hall, D Harhoff, ‘Post-grant reviews in the US patent system—design choices 
and expected impact’ (2004) Berkeley Tech. LJ989, 992  
61 BH Hall, D Harhoff, ‘Recent Research on the Economics of Patents’ (2012) National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working paper n. 17773 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w17773 > accessed on the 20th June 2017, 35-36 
62 Hall, von Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 26 
63 JR Allison, MA Lemley, J Walker, ‘Patent quality and settlement among repeat pa-
tent litigants’ (2010) 99 Geo.LJ 677, 702  
64 D Harhoff, G Von Graevenitz, S Wagner, ‘Conflict Resolution, Public Goods, and Pa-
tent Thickets’ (2015) 62 Management Science 704 
65 Ibid. 707 
66 Ibid. 715  
67 Hall, von Graevenitz, Rosazza-Bondibene (1) 26  
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always implied.   
 
3.3 Asymmetry in bargaining positions and information  
 
Reasoning on the cumulative nature of inventions and on constraints to 
use complex technologies,68 the propensity for extensive patenting has 
been highlighted as one of the main features of software industry be-
haviour. 69 As already discussed in Chapter V, patent overlapping as 
well as the habit of filing low-quality patent applications has been ob-
served as a consequence of the tendency of software and ‘new economy’ 
industries to collect and file numerous patent applications, often much 
more than they need to manufacture final products.70 However, not eve-
ry firm in those new markets can afford the costs of extensive patenting. 
Therefore, practices of building big patent portfolios can result in creat-
ing asymmetric positions in the market. Most obviously, firms with large 
patent portfolio have more ease in fixing licensing terms in their favour: 
getting “more chits to trade” is a useful mean to gain barging power.71 
Significantly, software firms seem to be well aware of the bargaining 
power deriving from quantity instead of quality.72 As been indicated, 
these firms strategically use patent ownership to secure and increase 
their bargaining position not only in the patent but also in the down-
stream market, thus in final product market. 73  Hence, asymmetric 
bargaining power has been pointed out to be a common result of patent 
thicketing, especially in computer- implemented invention areas.74 As 
will discuss in the following subsections, inefficiencies, such as hold-up 
																																																								
68 W Cohen, J Walsh, R Nelson ‘Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
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69 M Noel, M Schankerman, ‘Strategic patenting and software innovation’ (2013) 61 
The Journal of Industrial Economics 481, 483  
70 Text to n.129 Chapter V 
71 Noel, Schankerman (69) 483 
72 CV Chien, ‘ The Market for Software Innovation through the Lens of Patent Licenses 
and Sales’ (2017) 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. ‘(forthcoming)’ 22 
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patents, and imitation’ (2009) 40 The RAND Journal of Economics 611  
	
	 239	
and tacit collusion, can be generate in the market as a result of asym-
metric bargain positions.  
 
Furthermore, asymmetry in information has been viewed as a possible 
cause of inefficiency.75 This is particularly evident in the issue of equal 
access to information related to cumulative innovation. Notably, the 
threat of being imitated is strongly perceived when new inventions can 
be built on the preceding one, as it often happens in software and digi-
tal contexts when new products are based on processes already 
patented.76 As a result, firms are reluctant to share information relating 
to either technical or R&D costs.77 Therefore, the possibility exists that 
firms strategically use unclear language when describing patent claims 
to impede their rivals to follow-up innovation processes.78 Further, fail-
ures in licensing are often thought to be due to asymmetrical 
information in those contexts where innovation is cumulative. Ultimate-
ly, the lack of information, which rivals have on innovative process, can 
result in the setting of royalties that are not mutual profitable.79  
 
3.4 Hold-up  
From an economic prospective, hold-up problems arise when parties in-
tentionally refrain from cooperating, thus inefficiency results in the 
markets because parties ultimately agree on terms that are not the best 
that could be reached. 80 Regarding cumulative inventions, hold-up has 
																																																								
75 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ (2005) 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 83  
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been linked to the practice of applying disproportionate royalty terms in 
licensing agreements. Computer – implemented inventions indeed, seem 
to lead obviously to market inefficiency, whereby fragmentation of pa-
tent ownership can facilitate the requirement of royalties that far exceed 
the economic value of the protected invention.81 Due to the firms neces-
sity of licensing several patents to implement the technology, patent 
holders are more likely to engage in opportunist behaviours and to ex-
tract high payments, especially using the threats of legal action, i.e. the 
leveraging of injunctions.82  
 
As Shapiro highlighted, the risk carried by issuing a huge number of 
patents related to the same technology is that a single product or ser-
vice could infringe on many patents, thereby the possibility of 
injunction increases as well as the propensity to pay greater royalties to 
avoid legal actions. 83 According to the US Supreme Court hold-up ef-
fects are particularly likely in patent thicketing because in such 
contexts “an injunction . . . can be employed as a bargaining tool to 
charge exorbitant fees.”84 Notably, in cumulative inventions, any feature 
- even small or trivial- is important to fully implement the innovative 
technology. As such, injunctions pose a great threat once commerciali-
zation of the innovation is started because any changes could be very 
expensive, especially when a great deal of time and money has been 
spent to implement the invention.85 Therefore, removing of any one sin-
gle patented piece of a particular technology could block, if an 
injunction is issued, firms from producing or even marketing their 
																																																																																																																																																																		
lower value if redeployed outside of the collaboration. The potential for one party to 
hold-up another party that has sunk investments specific to the relationship may dis-
courage that other party from investing efficiently in the collaboration in the first 
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products.86 Several examples of tactic use of injunctions can be found 
in the newspapers over the last years, especially among firms that are 
competitors in the same market.87 All this considered, the risk of being 
sued for infringement and the threat of being blocked ultimately in us-
ing lawful components could hugely incentivise rival firms to sign 
agreements, often cross- licensing ones, even when licensing can result 
in paying high royalties or multiple royalties, i.e. royalty stacking.88 The 
upshot is undoubtedly detrimental for consumers and competition.89  
 
However, the risk of hold-up is significantly different depending if li-
censing, in particular cross licensing, is agreed before or after that 
patent applications are filed.90 Specifically, ex post cross licensing can 
lead to markedly different outcomes when compared to ex ante one. Ex 
ante cross licensing, in particular, is often resorted to a possible solu-
tion of hold-up problems.91 The sharing of information and knowledge 
resulting from cross licensing during the development of new technolo-
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Guardian (London, 4 July 2012), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/10/samsung-galaxy-tablets-
seized> accessed on the 2nd August 2017; C Arthur, ‘HTC victory over Apple in latest 
round of patent battle’ The Guardian (London, 4 July 2012), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jul/04/htc-apple-patent-ruling> 
accessed on the 2nd August 2017; C Arthur, ‘HTC sales may be banned in UK after 
Nokia wins patent dispute’ The Guardian (London, 3 December 2013), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/03/nokia-patent-dispute-htc-
sales banned-uk> accessed on the 2nd August 2017 
88Lemley, Shapiro (82) 1993 (“Royalty stacking refers to situations in which a single 
product potentially infringes on many patents, and thus may bear multiple royalty 
burdens. The term "royalty stacking" reflects the fact that, from the perspective of the 
firm making the product in question, all of the different claims for royalties must be 
added or "stacked" together to determine the total royalty burden borne by the product 
if the firm is to sell that product free of patent litigation. As a matter of simple arith-
metic, royalty stacking magnifies the problems associated with injunction threats and 
holdup, and greatly so if many patents read on the same product.”) 
89 CV Chien, MA Lemley, ‘Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest’ (2012) 98 
Cornell L. Rev 1,6; EPO Scientific Advisory Board, Patent Aggregation and Its Impact on 
Competition and Innovation Policy (EPO,2014) ( The report expresses concerns about 
patent hold-out (also called “reverse hold-up” (“patent hold-out occurs when compa-
nies routinely ignore existing patents and resist taking the necessary licenses from 
patent owners, because they perceive the probability of being compelled to pay as 
small. Such practices impede many licensors’ efforts to license and leave many small 
inventors, but also large companies, without appropriate compensation.”) 
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gies can reduce opportunistic behaviour.92 As will be explained in Chap-
ter VIII, fair royalties and the equal sharing of patent values among 
firms using the same technology often derive from cross licensing - es-
pecially of essential patents – when agreements are reached before 
products are manufactured.  
 
Conversely, ex post cross licensing is often connected to aggressive 
practices mainly consisting in infringement actions brought against 
firms after they have invested of creating, developing or commercializing 
a specific technology.93 As discussed in chapter V, patents and patent 
applications can be used to increase rivals’ costs, ultimately forcing 
competitors out of the market.94 On this purpose, an injunction can be 
sought more to extract exorbitant value from patents than to stop oth-
ers from using the invention itself. According to the “building-up” 
nature of these types of inventions, firms sued for infringement tend to 
agree on paying high royalties, thereby leading to unbalanced cross li-
censing, which is eventually set in order to continue selling products or 
using key features that contain possible infringing components. 95 
Hence, possible distortion in competition has been highlighted as a re-
sult of holdup behaviours in ex post cross licencing, especially when 
non-practice entities are involved in. 96 
 
Concerns have been particularly raised in connection to licensing 
agreements resulting from settlements that involves patent assertion 
entities (PAEs), i.e. firms mainly engaged in the business of patent ac-
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quisition and assertion rather than the using of patents in practice.97 
Such concern centres on the fact that parties are not in equal bargain-
ing positions, when PAEs assert patents against alleged infringers 
implementing the patented technology.98 Indeed, PAEs do not manufac-
ture or market any products so they are not worried of possible counter 
claims.99 What is more, PAEs’ litigation costs are lower since PAEs tend 
to use repetitive revenue models.100 All this allows PAEs to enter in to li-
censing negotiations with a strong bargaining position due to high 
switching costs that their opponents might have to pay. 101 Therefore, 
this asymmetry of litigation risks can often result in greater hold-up ef-
fects; ultimately, inefficiency in the market and detrimental 
consequences for the consumers are high probably when PAEs are in-
volved. 102   
 
3.5  “Raising rivals’ costs” schemes  
 
Generally, royalty rates are expected to be adjusted to maximize both 
profits and selling. It naturally happens when patent-holder (upstream) 
firms and good-manufactured (downstream) firms are integrated. In this 
scenario, indeed, royalties are set at a level that ensures the highest 
possible profits for both upstream and downstream firms, without de-
creasing final product quantity in the downstream market. 103 When 
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firms are not integrated, however, upstream firms could decide to set 
royalties higher than the ones securing the best balance between reve-
nues and quantity. As such, rivals’ costs result to be raised.104 Thus, 
market inefficiencies can ultimately result, such as reduction in quanti-
ty sold or increasing of final prices. 105 This is the case when “double 
mark-up” or “complementary effects” phenomena take place, which 
have been, indeed, blamed for resulting in charging inefficient royalties. 
106 
 
Regarding “double mark-up”, this phenomenon occurs when patent 
holders, i.e. upstream firms, tend to maximize their profits, so to charge 
royalties regardless of the effects on downstream firms’ final costs. 
Forced by the high royalties, downstream firms are driven either to re-
duce their marginal profits or to increase prices of the products. Mostly 
obviously, selling of the final product tend to fall. Thus, downstream 
firms can easily lose interest in staying in the market. Hence, “double 
mark-up” phenomenon can ultimately affect competition.107 Particular-
ly, concerns have been raised when patent holders, which are also in 
the downstream market, strategically decide in favour of raising royal-
ties in order to achieve advantageous positions - namely monopoly – in 
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downstream product    Formally, these two problems are very similar; both involve 
multiple markups in the value chain, set in an uncoordinated fashion. While double 
marginalization refers to situations in which there are two such markups, with royalty 
stacking the number of markups can be much larger.”) 
107 H Hovenkamp ‘Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination.’ (2015) 76 Ohio 
St. LJ 467, 503. 
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the final product market.108 Undoubtedly, fragmentation of patent own-
ership, which usually occurs in patent thickets, increases the number 
of upstream firms involved in the process. Thus, the chance increases 
that downstream firm can be charged with high royalties as well as the 
possibility is enhanced that upstream firm, which are also involved in 
downstream market, can decide for high royalties to increase costs of 
rivals, ultimately to squeeze them out of the market.109 
 
According the “complementary effect” phenomenon, fixing excessive 
royalties can certainly have an impact on competition, regarding also to 
the upstream market. This is the case, in particular, when several firms 
hold patents that should be used together in the same products.110 As 
such, the fixing of high royalties by one of the upstream firms can affect 
the marginal profit of the other upstream firms.111 Most obviously, any 
reduction in the sale of final goods brought about by higher prices can 
also drive down licensing revenues for firms that operate in the same 
upstream market and own patents implemented in the same product.112 
Thus conceived, an high - royalty strategy can be caught by competition 
law when high royalties are intentionally used to increase rivals costs 
by firms, which are involved in the upstream market of complementary 
patents.113  
 
3.6 Tacit collusion 
 
Collusions among firms are generally described as intentional coordina-
tion. As such, collusive behaviours usually involve repeatedly 
interactions, either explicit or tacit, among firms. When collisions take 
																																																								
108 Layne-Farrar, Schmidt (102) 1131 (“a vertically integrated firm has a natural incli-
nation to use its royalty rate to raise the costs of its rivals in order to increase its 
profits in the downstream market.”) 
109 Ibid. 1132; Lemley, Shapiro (82) 2013-14; MA Lemley, AD Melamed, ‘Missing The 
Forest For The Trolls’ (2013) 113 Colum. Law Rev. 2117 
110 Layne-Farrar, Schmidt (102) 1129 
111 DL Rubinfeld, R Maness ‘The strategic use of patents: Implications for antitrust’ in 
F Leveque and H Shelanski (eds), Antitrust, Patents And Copyright: EU And US Perspec-
tives (Edward Elgar 2005), 92  
112 Layne-Farrar, Schmidt (102) 1128  
113 Ibid. 1133  
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place between firms that are competitors in the same market, concerns 
arise according to the possible effect on the market. From the economic 
perspective, indeed, collusion ‘is a market conduct that enables firms to 
obtain supra normal profits, where “normal” profits corresponds to the 
equilibrium situation’. 114 Therefore, collusion can result in inefficien-
cies in the market, specifically when competitors agree on maintaining 
high prices in the market or low quantity of products. For that reason 
collusive agreements are not allowed, similarly tacit collusion, i.e. collu-
sive conducts, is usually contrasted.    
 
Collusion is seen as a possible result of patent thicketing, especially 
when the ownership of patents related to a cumulative technology is 
spread among several firms.115 This is down to the fact that the owner-
ship of patents related to the same technology help to foster 
relationship among firms. As such, firms are more likely to cross- li-
censing with collusive intents. 116Firms involved in same technology, 
indeed, can easily predict the likely conduct of their rivals in the mar-
ket, especially regarding future products and final prices. 117  As 
confirmed by the European Commission, the possibility of sharing in-
formation as well as the reciprocal knowledge of market strategies can 
facilitate “friendly” behaviours in fixing product final prices as well as in 
coordinating sale turnover. 118 All this seems to confirm that firms are 
more likely to engage in tacit collusion in patent thicket context. 119 
Thus, in patent thicketing it is likely that prices and output might be 
																																																								
114 J Tirole et al, ‘The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control’ in 
V Ghosal and J Stennek (eds) The Political Economy of Antitrust (Elsevier Science 
2007),219 (“Tacit collusion can arise when firms interact repeatedly. They may then be 
able to maintain higher prices by tacitly agreeing that any deviation from the collusive 
path would trigger some retaliation..”)  
115 F Jell, J Henkel, M W Wallin. ‘Offensive patent portfolio races’ (2016) Long Range 
Planning 1 
116 M Eswaran, ‘Cross-licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device’ (1994) 
Canadian Journal of Economics 689, 690; C Fershtman, MI Kamien ‘Cross licensing of 
complementary technologies’ (1992) 10 International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion 329 
117 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to technology transfer agreements 2014/C 89/03 (TT Guidelines) 
[2014] OJ C 89/3, para 45  
118 Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker Unie v Commission 
[1975] ECR 1663, paras 173-4   
119 J Tirole et al. (114) 
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different from that which firms would probably generate in the attempt 
to adapt “intelligently” to the existing and anticipated conduct of their 
competitors.  
 
Nevertheless, collusion not only can generate inefficiencies in the mar-
ket, but “concerted practices”, 120 i.e. fixing high prices as well as limits 
on output, can function as barrier to market entry by potential rivals. 
121 This can be the case of computer-implemented invention area, i.e. 
the technological areas where invention can be easily copied. In such 
contexts, to be the first mover is perceived to be crucial to gain higher 
patent revenues and force rivals to increase patent procuring and en-
forcing costs.122 However, the prospect of a patent race can drive rivals 
to strengthen cartel practises, especially when a limited number of firms 
are in the market and each firm has a good knowledge of other firms’ 
market strategies. Thus, firms can intentionally interact to increase 
sunk costs, i.e. costs to enter the market, and ultimately to foreclose 
the market. 123 
 
4. Some conclusions  
 
As illustrated in this chapter, although originally designed as instru-
ments to increase innovation and competition, patents can be used to 
achieve the opposite effect, i.e. they can prevent innovation and compe-
tition, and can deter the entry of other firms into the market. This can 
be the case when patents and patent applications are used strategically, 
and patent thickets are built. As such, the ill effects of patent thicket 
behaviours on society and economy have been discussed, as well as 
their specific detrimental effects on the market and competition. In par-
																																																								
120 Suiker Unie v Commission, para 178 (“ an important element in the legal concept of 
a "a concerted practice" is the  is that causal connexion which must exist between the 
alleged concerted action and the practices which were adopted' and which is absent 'if 
these practices are the natural consequence of market conditions which would have 
been the same even if there had been no contacts between producers'.”)  
121 D Harhoff, ‘The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and 
competition policies’ (European Commission, 2007) 112   
122 Jell, Henkel, Wallin (115), 13   
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ticular, focusing on the possible negative effects of patent thickets the 
analysis has revealed that one of the main concerns related to patent 
thicket behaviours is the possible use of such practices to foreclose the 
market. Ultimately, tacit collusion, as well as hold-up or complementary 
effects, can be used to increase rivals’ costs, thereby creating barriers 
that impede others to enter the market.  
 
Admittedly, patent thickets and reduction of competition are arguments 
usually used to support hostility to business method patents. According 
to the real nature of business methods, patent thicket behaviours are 
indicated as highly probable in this technological area. Empirical analy-
sis in Chapter VI has provided evidence that patent thicket behaviours 
have been partially developed also at the EPO. Therefore, strategic uses 
resulting in reducing competition are often highlighted as possible out-
comes in the decision of patenting business methods in Europe. 
However, there are means that can neutralize or at lest reduce the risk 
that business method patents are used to create inefficiencies in the 
market ultimately impeding rivals to enter the market. In the next chap-
ter, namely Chapter VIII, mutual-licensing agreements will be analysed, 
in order to investigate whether the coordination in the exploitation of 
patents and patent applications can secure the efficient use of inven-








Can mutual licensing agreements prevent patent-thicket 






This research in the previous chapter has already made plain that pa-
tent thickets are a quite common phenomenon in technological areas 
related to IT innovations. By and large, firms involved in exploiting 
computer-implemented inventions have developed the habit of filing 
numerous patent applications related to the same invention. In point of 
fact, the number of patent applications has gone up dramatically over 
the last twenty years. The upshot has been the growth of uncertainty 
both on the ownership of technologies and on the true extent of patent 
protection of innovations. Admittedly, evidence of intentionality in this 
growing of uncertainty appears from the tendency to use patent protec-
tion beyond its proper purposes.1 As emerged in Chapter V, patents 
have started to be used by firms not only to secure their inventions, but 
also strategically. In the last decades, particularly, patent thicket phe-
nomena have been associated to patent strategic uses resulting in 
detrimental effects on economy and society. The decrease of invest-
ments in innovation, as well as the increase in licensing costs, has been 
pointed out.2 However, major concerns have been expressed on the pos-
sibility that patent thickets are intentionally built to foreclose the 
market, i.e. to impede rivals to enter the market.  
 
Mark–up as well as hold-up phenomena have been often shown as in-
herent problems linked to the development of patent thickets. The 
occurrence of overcrowd patent markets can affect economic efficiency. 
																																																								
1 U Hanns, ‘Patent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into the Community or 
the Community into Europe?.’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 433 
2 Ex multis, W Cohen, J Walsh, R Nelson ‘Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appro-
priability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)’ (2000) NBER 
working paper w7552 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552> accessed on the 20th 
June 2015  
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In particular, bringing new products to the market can require to reach 
various licensing agreements and to pay a plethora of royalty fees, when 
several patents cover the same technology. Additionally, the creation of 
final products in the context of complex technologies may become im-
possible, if only one of the patent holders refuses to license. Moreover, 
royalties can be fixed deliberately high especially with regard to patents 
that are essential to implement cumulative inventions. Thus, essential 
patent holders’ leverage increases as well as their opportunities to take 
the most of the final profit.3 Therefore, patent thicket can undermine 
market efficiency. Nevertheless, licensing agreements, specifically mu-
tual licensing, can be useful in solving inefficiencies created by patent 
thickets. 
 
If innovation is cumulative, firms are more likely to share their 
knowledge. Several patents should be exploited to implement a technol-
ogy that is cumulative, thus firms have a reciprocal interested in using 
each other patents. As such licensing agreements involving patent shar-
ing among competitors, i.e. mutual licensing, are usually welcomed as 
they can result in setting reasonable royalties, reducing transaction 
costs and avoid infringement litigations. Accordingly, mutual licensing 
is od capital importance, whereby inefficiencies, which are due to the 
uncertainty intentionally created by filing several patent applications, 
occur. Facilitating patent sharing, cross licensing and patent pool are 
favourably considered and are now encouraged as good ways to reduce 
royalty costs and the infringement problem.  
   
This part of the thesis is aimed at analysing licensing agreements, spe-
cifically mutual licensing agreements, in order to investigate their 
positive impact to solve market inefficiencies due to patent thickets. 
Thus, beneficial effects of licensing agreements on avoiding infringe-
																																																								
3 ex multis, Department of Justice of United States, Federal Trade Commission of 
United States, Antitrust Enforcement & Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation 
& Competition (DIANE Publishing, 2007) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitio




ments and reducing transactional costs will be mainly discussed in this 
chapter. Therefore, the chapter will focus on relationship among firms 
holding patents related to the same cumulative inventions and how it 
can be addressed to eliminate inefficiencies due to new patenting habits 
related to cumulative innovation. This chapter is organised into three 
sections. In the first one, definitions of licensing and mutual licensing 
agreements will be provided. The next two sections, instead, will deal 
with cross-licensing and patent-pool agreements and their contribution 
in solving market inefficiencies due to patent thickets. In particular, a 
brief outline will be traced of the US Supreme Court decisions that 
eventually recognized the importance of mutual licensing (i.e. cross li-
censing and patent pools) in producing beneficial effects, such as 
reducing litigation costs, helping in integrating complementary technol-
ogies and avoiding patent blocking positions. By focusing on some 
aspects of mutual licensing agreements, then, the main features of li-
censing agreements will be discussed, specifically referring to which 
patents could legitimately be included and the effects of including some 




2. Licensing agreements, technology transfer agreements and mu-
tual licensing  
 
 2.1 Licensing agreements 
 
According to WIPO “a licensing agreement is a partnership between an 
intellectual property rights owner (licensor) and another who is author-
ized to use such rights (licensee) in exchange for an agreed payment (fee 
or royalty)”.4 Usually, IP holders are interested in reaching licensing 
agreements to expand in new geographic and product markets that 
cannot be otherwise profitably entered. Nevertheless, licensing agree-
ments are also means to get value from the invention rapidly. Referring 
																																																								
4WIPO, Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights 




to patents, a patent holder can decide either to exploit the patent alone 
or to grant to someone else the right to use it. In particular, the right of 
patent holders to conclude licensing agreement is recognized in the 
TRIPS, namely in the Article 28.5 However, the TRIPS does not detail on 
licensing agreement contents; thus, terms of the use of the patent in li-
censing agreement mainly depend on the will of the parties. 6  For 
example, the licensor can give to the licensee the right to use the patent 
to a full extent, or the patent rights can be granted limited to some 
fields of use or to specific applications of the licensed technology. More-
over, parties can agree about the exclusive or not exclusive use of the 
licensed patent; thus, even the licensor is excluded to exploit the inven-
tion when the parties agree on an exclusive licensing. As well, licensees 
and licensors can agree on territorial restriction, whereby licenses can 
be global in nature or limited to some countries or regions. License 
agreements usually detail, also, about the payment of the royalty that 
licensee is due to pay to the licensor for the use of patent rights. In par-
ticular, clauses can provide that royalties are calculated depending on 
how much the licensed technology is exploited by the licensee or ac-
cording to licensee's final output. 
 
 2.2 Technology transfer agreements 
 
Beneficial effects, such as the economic growth or the spurring of inno-
vation, are usually related to licensing agreements. In particular, 
licensing is likely to lead to positive effects for society when the parties 
not only intends to secure the use of a patent, but they agree more gen-
erally on the possibility to mutually exploit and implement their 
patents. When it happens, indeed, licensing can result not only in al-
lowing the use of patent rights, but also in sharing of knowledge and 
																																																								
5URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT: TRIPS Article 28  
6 An overview on contents of patent licensing agreement in CJ Furman, ‘Drafting Intel-
lectual Property License Agreements: Issues Overview’ (MacPherson Leslie & Tyerman 
LLP, 2010) < http://documents.jdsupra.com/a34ab85c-6f3d-4e5e-ab93-
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expertise related to the patented technology.7 In this case, thus, the 
agreement between a licensor and a licensee will result in a sort of a co-
operative arrangement aimed at efficiently using patents, especially 
patents related to the same innovation. Ultimately, agreements result-
ing in a coordinate use of patents will support and improve the patented 
technology. As will be better discussed later, both spread of knowledge 
and incentive to invest in innovation seems to be positively affected by 
this type of contracts. Because of these, licensing, especially when 
meets the features of the above described technology transfer agree-
ments, tends to be seen in a “favorable light”.8  
 
Nevertheless, the definition of what should be a technology transfer 
agreement has been the subject of a wide debate.9 In general terms, the 
transfer of a technology is ‘the process by which science and technology 
are diffused throughout human activity’.10 According to the Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP) of the World Intellectual Proper-
ty Organization, transfer technology can result from technology 
licensing due to the fact that “the actual use of the patented technology 
by the licensee may facilitate better understanding of the relevant tech-
nology and increase the capacity of the licensee to absorb new 
technology.”11  
 
In the EU law framework, technology transfer agreements are usually 
associated with licensing. According to the TT Guidelines “ the concept 
of ‘transfer’ implies that technology must flow from one undertaking to 
																																																								
7 WIPO, Successful Technology Licensing (IP Assets Management Series, 2015) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/wipo_pub_903.pdf> ac-
cessed 7th August 2017, 6 
8 P Regibeau, K Rockett, Assessment of potential anticompetitive conduct in the field of 
intellectual property rights and assessment of the interplay between competition policy 
and IPR protection’ (European Commission, Competition Report COMP/2010/16, 
2011),11 
9 D M Haug ‘The International Transfer of Technology: Lessons that East Europe Can 
Learn from the Failed Third World Experience’ (1992) 5 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology 209. 
10 H Brooks ‘National science policy and technological innovation’ in R Landau and N 
Rosenberg (eds) The Positive Sum Strategy (National Academy Press Washington DC, 
1986) 119. 
11  WIPO, Standing Committee On The Law Of Patents Transfer Of Technology 
(SCP/14/4, 2009) para 24 
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another”.12 Further, the TT Guidelines highlights that “Such transfers 
normally take the form of licensing”.13 From the EU perspective, hence, 
technology transfer agreements are chiefly licensing agreements that 
secure “to operate inside the scope of the exclusive right of the patent”14 
with the purpose “to seek appropriate remuneration for successful pro-
jects” or “required to recoup the investment”. 15  Therefore, the 
fundamental quality of a technology transfer agreement is indicated in 
facilitating a more efficient implementation of innovations, i.e. the ex-
ploitation of all the patents related to a technology.  
 
The implementation of innovation is really achieved when licensing 
agreements are aimed at exploiting the technology “for the purpose of 
producing goods and services”.16 Additionally, in the category of the 
technology transfer agreement can also be listed those agreements 
“where the licence creates design freedom for the licensee by allowing it 
to exploit its own technology without facing the risk of infringement 
claims by the licensor”.17 Consistently with this definition, according to 
the EU perspective, technology transfer agreements generally result in 
licensing between two firms, which can agree on either mutually shar-
ing their patents or enabling only one of them in exploiting a specific 
technology. 18 On the other hand, the TT Guidelines does not exclude 
that technology transfer agreements can result in multiparty agree-
ments or in bilateral agreements that allow to license to a third party, 
although these type of agreements will not be specifically cover by block 
exemptions ex TTBER.19  
 
 2.3 Mutual licensing agreements  
																																																								
12 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agree-
ments (TT Guidelines) [2014] OJ C 89/03, para 51   
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. para 8 
16 Ibid. para 58 
17 Ibid. para 59 
18 Ibid. para 98 




The idea of mutual licensing agreements usually epitomizes both patent 
polls and cross-licensing agreements. As explained in further details in 
the following sections, mutual licensing agreements result in allowing a 
coordinate use of a technology by more than one entity at the same 
time. Ultimately, these agreements are typified by providing a patents’ 
reciprocal exploitation. As such, mutual licensing agreements, i.e. cross 
licensing and patent pools, fall in the definition of technology transfer 
agreements provided in the EU legal framework.20  In particular, cross-
licensing agreements are commonly identify in contracts between patent 
holders mainly agreeing to reciprocally exploit their patents. Providing 
the right to use each other’s patents, thus, cross licensing are aimed at 
securing beneficial effects to both the parties.21 Indeed, cross licensing 
can be crucial in areas where several patents cover a technology, as it 
happens in cumulative invention contexts. In such cases, the efficient 
exploitation of technologies can occur only when parties agree on licens-
ing each other the use of their respective patents. As such, cross-
licensing agreements secure firms in continuing to exploit their inven-
tion without the threat of litigation or infringement.  
 
More often than not, granted patents are the objects of cross-licensing 
agreements. Nevertheless, pending patent applications or promises to 
share future patents can also be included within this type of contracts. 
Regarding possible clauses of cross-licensing agreements, patent hold-
ers can reciprocally provide detailed indication about the extent of 
patent exploitation, i.e. limitations, for example, on field or territorial 
use. Conversely, parties do not create a separate entity to jointly man-
age patents in cross licensing. Thus, agreements do not usually contain 
clauses about joint sale of patents or joint setting of royalties. Similarly, 
cross licensing frequently do not provide specific clauses on how to ar-
																																																								
20 Text to n. 19  
21 TR Beard, DL Kaserman ‘Patent thickets, cross-licensing, and antitrust’ (2002) 47 
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range future licensing to third parties, as parties tend to license its own 
patent independently to third parties in the majority of the cases.  
 
Regarding patent pools, they are signed by two or more parties to share 
their complementary technologies and to collaborate in arranging to li-
cense the patents related to those complementary technologies as a 
package to third parties.22  Mainly, patent pools serve the purpose to al-
low a “one stop shopping”.23 Thus, once the pool is formed, both parties 
of the pool and third parties get the possibility to grant permission to 
use all the patented technologies in the pool, signing only one license 
agreement instead of several with each patent holders. As such, patent 
pool agreements are designed to create a common portfolio containing 
all the patents related to the standard of a specific technology.24 Given 
it, once the patent pool is created, one of the patent holders or a com-
mon organization is designed to coordinate the conclusion of future 
licensing agreements and to collect, and afterward distribute, the royal-
ties related to all the patents in the package. Thus, patent pools can 
reduce transactional costs, which subsequently results from reaching 
only one agreement to license several patents. Similarly, the amount of 
royalties to be paid can significantly decrease in patent-pool contexts; 
indeed, royalties are more reasonable setting for a group of patents than 
for a single one. Additionally, patent-pool agreements can reduce the 
risk of patent infringement and ultimately avoid expensive litigation.25  
  
3. Market efficiency and mutual licensing  
 
As discussed in the previous subsection, mutual licensing agreements 
are mainly aimed at allowing parties in using the same technology, serv-
ing the reciprocal interest of licensors and licensee to use each other 
																																																								
22 R Raysman et al. Intellectual property licensing: forms and analysis (Law Journal 
Press, 2011) 6  
23 RJ Gilbert ‘Ties that bind: Policies to promote (good) patent pools’ (2010) 77 Anti-
trust Law Journal 1, 19  
24 A Layne-Farrar et al., ‘Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organiza-
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25 C Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stand-
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patents. Cross licensing and patent pools, therefore, tend to be reached 
when none of the parties could exploit and implement a specific tech-
nology alone; thus, an agreement that allows all the parties to jointly 
use several patents is seen as the best way to secure future profits, 
avoiding the risk of infringement. Nevertheless, both cross licensing and 
patent pool agreements not only can produce beneficial effects for the 
parties, but also economic growth can be stimulate by this type of con-
tacts.26 In particular, firms are encouraged in giving information about 
their products and technologies even to competitors as cross- licensing 
or patent-pool agreements are reached. Thus, the mutual exchange of 
data is facilitated in a technology transfer context, so that the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge is ultimately achieved. Moreover, both 
patent pools and cross licensing agreements often involve joint efforts in 
implementing invention; thereby, patents are thought to be exploited 
more effectively when patent holders enter in a cross licenses or in a pa-
tent pool, especially when these type of contracts are signed by firms 
involving in the same technological market.27 Further, beneficial effects 
on consumer, such as reduction of costs and development of new prod-
ucts, have been highlighted as result of agreements resulting in sharing 
of technologies among firms.  
 
WIPO has recently made a strong statement on this point. 28 In particu-
lar, the opportunity of virtuous circles generated by mutual licensing 
agreements have been emphasized. Regarding the joint use of patents, 
it has been shown the importance of mutual licensing because not only 
such agreements allow the shared use of patented technologies, but al-
so secure improvements in the technological implementation and 
investments in further innovation and collaborative research efforts.29 
In particular, WIPO has indicated the beneficial effect produced by mu-
tual licensing agreements, giving prompt consideration to some of them. 
First, it has been highlighted that cross-licensing and patent pools tend 
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to promote firm collaborations and cooperation between competitors, 
thereby the technical expertise and know-how increases and competi-
tiveness is ultimately improved. 30Additionally, society as a whole is 
affected according to the fact that the mutual licensing increases com-
petitiveness of industry and boosts the creation of local industries as 
well as encouraging the circulation of knowledge and further implemen-
tation of technologies. 31  Last but not least, the opportunity to get 
advanced products at low costs generated by mutual licensing agree-
ments can have valuable effects on consumer welfare. 32 
 
Also the EPO has recently stressed the role of patent aggregation33 in 
encouraging dissemination of technical knowledge and in improving in-
vestment in innovation.34 As such, the EPO offers a different perspective 
toward the well-know practice of building up patent pools. Some posi-
tive effects of patent aggregations are highlighted. Third parties, for 
example, are facilitated in accessing patented technologies when pa-
tents related to the same technology or to similar innovative processes 
are jointly managed; indeed, transaction costs as well as hold-up behav-
iours can be taken under control.35 At the same time, in the case of 
combinatorial innovations,36 patent aggregation can offer the opportunity 
for early revenue and more efficiently licensing because of the better co-
ordination that can be achieved between the parties interested in patent 
exploitation.37 Ultimately, patent pools and cross licensing are indicated 
																																																								
30 Ibid. para 26 
31 Ibid. para 17  
32 P Giuri et al, Report of the Expert Group on Patent Aggregation (European Union, 
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as useful in improving the commercialisation of new product.38  Moreo-
ver, mutual licensing can avoid the risk of duplication of innovation 
linked to patent overlapping, whereby aggregation works to encourage 
firms to share information and knowledge.39  
  
4. The US debate on beneficial effects of mutual licensing agree-
ments 
 
The recognition of beneficial effects of mutual licensing agreements is, 
however, a recent outcome. In particular, as will be explained in the 
next chapter, namely Chapter IX, EU legislation has developed this pos-
itive attitude towards the mutual licensing agreement only in the last 
decades, thereby establishing a specific set of rules. The Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) has been introduced, in-
deed, to encourage entities operating in the European context to share 
their technologies by means of licensing patents and other IP rights. 
This approach, nevertheless, owns much to the US experience on this 
area as mutual licensing has been long discussed on the other side of 
the ocean. Specifically, the effect of these types of agreements have been 
lauded or condemned as beneficial or detrimental from time to time.  
 
The debate on the issue has been mostly provoked by concerns about 
the possible use of IP rights, especially the monopolist prerogative se-
cured to IP holders, to decrease competition in the market. Thus 
conceived, the positive or negative approach toward the practice of 
reaching agreements on sharing of patent prerogatives has been regard-
ed in according to mutual licensing potentially in interfering with 
antitrust regulations. A specific overview on interferences and correla-
tions between patent and antitrust legislations will be provided in the 
next chapter. Chapter IX, indeed, will be mainly devoted on discussing 
European legislation about licensing agreements, especially from the 
prospective of competition law. With this in mind, the issue of the inter-
face between IP rights and competition law will be intentionally ignored 
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in the following subsection. Thus, the analysis in the following sections 
will be narrowed on the reasons put forward to recognize legal protec-
tion to mutual licensing agreements. On this purpose the American ex-
experience will be taken into consideration according to the fact that the 
results of the US debate has been fully embraced by the EU institu-
tions, especially by the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
 
 4.1 The hostile approach  
 
In the US the way toward the full recognition of the beneficial effect of 
cross-licensing and paten-pool agreements can be broadly divided into 
three stages. The first of these stages can be placed at beginning of last 
century when the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court consistently 
recognized patent holders’ rights to license their patents even mutually. 
An excellent example of this trend was the Bement v. National Harrow 
decision. 40 The case related to an agreement among several patent 
holders reached to assign to a new entity, National Harrow, all the pa-
tents (85 in total) referring the same technology, i.e. float spring tooth 
harrows. In particular, the parties agreed that the new entity would 
have licenced the patents at uniform terms and fixed royalties. The 
purpose was to avoid future infringements as well as to improve the 
manufacture and sell of the shared technology, a particular harrow. 
However, it happened that one of the parties, Bement, refused to pay 
the required royalties arguing that the agreement ultimately restrained 
the use of patents. Arguments were putted forward that licensees were 
deterred to exploit patents, even their own patents, as they were forced 
to pay price that was already fixed, thereby not depending on the mar-
ket trends.41 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, 
recognising implicitly the beneficial effects of the agreements resulting 
from the lessening in litigation.42 Additionally, the Court took the oppor-
																																																								
40 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902)  (“the general rule is absolute 
freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws The fact that the conditions 
in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.” 
41 Ibid. 74  
42 Ibid. 93  
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tunity to emphasise the nature of patent rights and their property pre-
rogative. 43 Thus, fixing royalties either was considered lawful because 
of patent holders’ rights to decide how to exploit their patents. 44  
 
However, it did not take long that the Court changed its opinion. A dec-
ade later, in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing case, 45  the Supreme 
Court ruled against a mutual licensing agreement and invalidated the 
patent pool formed by manufacturers of enamelled sanitary ironware. In 
particular, the Court pointed out that the agreement was ultimately put 
in place by firms to control the output and price of final products.46 
Thus, the Court started to point out about the possible detrimental ef-
fects of mutual licensing, additionally developing the idea that patent 
rights could be exercised beyond their proper use.47 Conclusively, the 
Court ruled that licensing agreements, especially mutual licensing, 
could go beyond what was necessary ‘to protect the use of the patent or 
the monopoly which the law conferred upon it’.48 Similarly, the Court 
held in Standard Oil Co. decision.49 In this case, the attention was draw 
to some cross licensing agreements reached by the holders of patents 
covering methods of cracking crude oil to yield larger quantities of gaso-
																																																								
43 Ibid. 91  
44 Ibid. 93  
45 U.S. v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. 220 US 20 (1912). 
46 Ibid. 47-48 
47 Ibid. 48; more about of patent misuses doctrine in the US in JM Mueller, ‘Patent 
misuse through the capture of industry standards’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech. LJ 623, 
671 (“ The misuse doctrine has its genesis in judicial decisions that predate any signif-
icant development of U.S. antitrust law. Different policies ground patent misuse and 
antitrust doctrine. Misuse focuses primarily on the patentee's behavior in expanding 
the scope of its rights beyond the statutory patent grant, while antitrust measures the 
impact of that behavior on the marketplace.”). Referring to the abuse of right doctrine, 
MA O'Rourke, ‘Toward a doctrine of fair use in patent law’ (2000) 100 Colum. Law 
Rev. 1177, 1248-49 (“While antitrust law shapes an intellectual property rightholder's 
expectations with regard to how it may exercise that right, patent fair use is still nec-
essary. Patent fair use would address situations in which the antitrust laws may not 
be implicated and therefore have no impact on the patentee's decision to license… An-
titrust law, then, is not a substitute for patent fair use, but rather a supplement to it. 
It is a part of the public law that should be sensitive to the pro-competitive benefits 
that private licensing institutions, including patent pools, may offer, and the role of 
fair use in encouraging these solutions and safeguarding against their abuse.”)  
48 U.S. v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co (45) 48. 
49 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 283 US 163 (1931); R Peritz JR  ‘Competition policy and its 
implications for intellectual property rights in the United States’ in SD Anderman 
(ed) The interface between intellectual property rights and competition policy  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 178  
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line. In particular, the case referred to some oil companies that had 
agreed to use their patents reciprocally in order to reduce the risk of in-
fringement. 50  Among the terms of the mutual licensing, the firms had 
also agreed on the amount of royalties to be paid for using patents. In 
contrast to its previous decisions, the Court expressed concerns about 
this type of clauses. 51 In particular, it was underlined the role that roy-
alty clauses could have played in allowing patent holders to arrange not 
only the amount of royalties to be paid, but also to fix the price of final 
products, in that case the gasoline. Therefore, the Court decided against 
the agreement, conceiving of the possible detrimental effect of mutual 
licensing agreements on competition.52  
 
Nevertheless, the Standard Oil Co. decision was a double-edge one. The 
detrimental effect of cross licensing was stressed; especially, the re-
straint of trade resulting from mutual licensing agreements was 
focused. However, the decision clarified that mutual licensing agree-
ments not only were not per se illegal, but they could also be crucial 
when patents were complementary, i.e. several patents covering the 
same technology.53 As such, the Court empathized the increase of in-
fringement lawsuits under these circumstances because of the 
simultaneous and independent development of the same manufacturing 
process. 54 Thus, the Court suggested that cross licensing could be of 
the utmost importance “to avoid litigation and losses incident to con-
flicting patents” when innovation was cumulative. 55  The Court, 
therefore, concluded that cross license agreements were “frequently 
necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened 
litigation”.56 Consequently and in summary, Standard Oil Co. decision 
clarified that mutual patent agreements could offer beneficial effects 
both creating certainty about rights on patent implementation and per-
																																																								
50 Ibid. 167 - 168 
51 Ibid. 171 
52 Ibid. 179  
53 Ibid. 171 
54 Ibid.   
55 Ibid. 168 
56 Ibid. 171 
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mitting each firm to continue technological development and produc-
tion. 57  However, the decision definitely also asseverate that cross-
licensing agreements could result in restraining trade “unduly”, namely 
in increasing prices, in reducing output, and reducing quality.58 
 
The conclusions drawn in the Standard Oil Co. case were consistently 
confirmed over the years. In particular, the decision held in Line Materi-
als case59 emphasised that cross licensing could be allowed ‘only when 
both patents could be lawfully used by a single maker could the public 
or the patentees obtain the full benefit of the efficiency and economy of 
the inventions’.60 Therefore, the Court held that the  
 
Arrangements between two patentees for cross-licensing of 
their interdependent product patents...[which] were intended 
to and did control the prices at which products embodying 
both patents were sold...transcends the limits of the patent 
monopoly granted to each of them, no matter how advanta-
geous it may be to stimulate the broader use of the patents.61 
 
The US Supreme Court also expressed its doubts about mutual licens-
ing agreements, ruling in the Hartford-Empire case.62 The case was 
about a paten-pool agreement reached by firms representing the ninety-
four per cent of the US market for glass production. According to the 
patent-pool dominant position, concerns were cast on the possible use 
of mutual licensing agreements to impede competitors to enter in glass 
market. Thus, the ill effects of patent pool on trade were pointed out. 63 
However, some beneficial effects of the patent-pool were recognized in 
decreasing the rate of infringement.64 Additionally, the Court took a new 
approach as it was concluded for the unlawfulness of the agreement, 
																																																								
57 Text to n.53  
58 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (49) 169  
59 U.S. v. Line Materials Co., 333 US 287 (1948). 
60 Ibid. 291 
61 Ibid. Syllabus. 
62 U.S. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. 386 (1945)  
63 Ibid. 453   
64 Ibid. 419  
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unless firms accepted that patents could be licensed at standard royal-
ties.65 Nevertheless, the Hartford-Empire decision was not able to affect 
the negative attitude towards mutual patent licensing, which remained 
essential unchanged.66  Over the following forty years, therefore, the US 
Supreme Court persisted in declaring the unlawfulness of mutual li-
censing agreements as they resulted in restraining trade unduly.67  
 
In the 1970’s, moreover, some clauses commonly added in mutual li-
censing agreements were listed by the US Department of Justice in the 
so-called “Nine No-No’s” list. 68  The clauses in the list (among them, for 
example, tying and  grant-back clauses)69 were considered to be unlaw-
ful per se. Indeed, the agreement was deemed to produce ill effects 
because of the clauses’ potentiality in negatively affecting the competi-
tiveness in the market. Hence, if one of the clauses of the “Nine No-No’s” 
list was included in a licensing agreement, the US Department of Jus-
tice did not need to prove the impact of the agreement on trade. 70 As 
such, parties of a licensing agreement included the banned clauses 
were ultimately asked to change the terms of their arrangement or pro-
duce evidences on the positive impact of the licensing on the economic 
																																																								
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid, 406  
67 DP Homiller, ‘Patent misuse in patent pool licensing: from national harrow to" the 
nine NO-NOs" to not likely’ (2006) 7 Duke L. & Tech. Rev.20, 28 
68 The list was presented by Bruce Wilson, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Antitrust Div., Department of Justice at the Fourth New England Antitrust Con-
ference Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and 
Quantity Restrictions ( 6th November 1970).  See also, R Gilbert et al. ‘Antitrust issues 
in the licensing of intellectual property: The nine no-no's meet the nineties’ 
(1997) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 283; H Ullman, ‘A 
modern look at the nine ‘no-nos’ of patent licensing under U.S. antitrust law: the first 
four ‘no-nos’ (Antitrustwatch, 2013) < 
http://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2013/02/04/a-modern-look-at-the-nine-no-nos-of-
patent-licensing-under-u-s-antitrust-law-the-first-four-no-nos/> accessed the 7th Au-
gust 2017 
69 Tying clauses provides for selling a patented technology on the condition that an-
other technology will also be purchased. Grant-back clauses consist in an agreement 
that allows the licensor to use the improvements made by the licensee to the licensed 
technology 
70  KM Frankel, MS Zhai, ‘A Return to the DOJ's "Nine No-Nos"?’ (The AIPLA Antitrust 
News, 2013) <http:// 
www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9324c489-94fe-4bb0-
a499-8a8817794e44 > accessed the 7th August 2017  
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growth.71 However, this strict approach was heavy criticised.72 Finally, 
substantial changes occurred when in 1995 the US Department of Jus-
tice together with the US Federal Trade Commission edited the new  
“Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property”.73 Ulti-
mately, beneficial effects of cross licensing and paten pools, such as 
reducing cost litigation, helping in integrating complementary technolo-
gies and avoiding blocking position, were recognised.74 
 
 4.2 The turning point  
 
The “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” is-
sued in 1995 by the DOJ and the FTC offered a completely new point of 
view. Significantly, not only the possibility of building patent pools and 
reaching cross licensing was expressly stated, but also it was empha-
sised that mutual agreements could positively affect the market. The 
Guidelines underlined that those licensing transactions could better re-
sult in providing new products and low price service to final consumers 
when combining several patents, specifically blocking ones.75 Thus, im-
provements in product quality and increase in efficiency of technological 
processes were showed as significant main effects of joining comple-
mentary inventions. 76 Hence, the hostile approach was definitively 
abandoned. In particular, the assumption was challenged and eventual-
ly discarded that mutual licensing agreements per se could confer 
market power and negatively affect competitiveness of the market.77  On 
the contrary, the US Department of Justice together with the Federal 
																																																								
71  JD Wright, DH Ginsburg, ‘Patent Assertion Entities And Antitrust: A Competition 
Cure For A Litigation Disease?’ (2014) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 501, 520 
72  RA Posner, ‘The Chicago School of antitrust analysis’ (1979) 127 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 925 
73 United States, Department of Justice (DOJ),Federal Trade Commission (FTC), ‘Anti-
trust Guidelines for Intellectual Property Licensing’ (1995) < 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/archived-1995-antitrust-guidelines-licensing-
intellectual-property> accessed the 7th August 2017 
74 Ibid. para5.5  
75 Ibid.  
76 JI Klein, ‘Cross-licensing and Antitrust Law’ (American Intellectual Property Law As-
sociation, San Antonio, Texas, May 1997) 
<http://www.usDOJ.gov/atr/public/speeches/speeches.htm>, accessed 7th August 
2017  
77 DOJ (3) 22  
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Trade Commission endorsed that ‘intellectual property licensing allows 
firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally 
precompetitive’.78 Henceforth, the 1995 US Guidelines outlined that pa-
tent holders could agree on clauses that could affect trade, for example 
laying down temporary limits in commercializing or producing goods, 
when such limitations placed in cross licensing or patent pools hap-
pened to be essential for the development of new products and, 
ultimately, to benefit costumers.79As will be discussed in the next Chap-
ter, similar conclusions have been reached in Europe as the distinction 
between existence and exercise of an IP rights has been focused. Ac-
cording to this, both licensing and polling have been indicated as means 
to enable the technology to be used. As such, licensing is an existence 
issue, whereas terms, which have effects on pricing, production limits, 
or which deal with licensing to third parties, are deemed to be related to 
exercise issues.  
 
Consistently with the Guidelines, both the DOJ and the FTC imple-
mented the new favourable approach in the following years. 80  In 
particular, from 1997 to 1999, the DOJ issued three Business Review 
Letters.  The letters mainly refer to competition issues according to the 
inherent nature of “one-stop shop” of the patent polls involved. Never-
theless, the letters also emphasise the significance of mutual licensing 
in solving market inefficiencies related to the cumulative nature of some 
recent inventions. The first one was related to a patent pool on technol-
ogies about compression and transmission of digital video/audio signals 
(MPEG LA).81 In particular, asked to initiate an enforcement action 
against the pool, the Department pointed up the positive effects of com-
bining and integrating MPEG patent in a patent pool as the agreement 
could result in providing an easier access to the patented technology, 
																																																								
78 Antitrust Guidelines for Intellectual Property Licensing (73) para 2.0. 
79 Ibid 5.5; see also J Lerner, J Tirole, ‘Efficient patent pools’ (2004) 94 The American 
Economic Review 691  
80 DOJ (3) 64-66  
81 United States, Department Of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division, Business Review 
Letter (26 June 1997) < https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-trustees-columbia-




especially allowing non-discriminatory term licensing.82 Equally, it was 
suggested that beneficial effects for consumers could come from the pa-
tent pool agreement given to the decrease in final product prices, which 
resulted from the reduction in the amount of royalties paid for using the 
shared technology.83 Additionally, the letter stressed the absence of 
grant-back obligations in the agreements. As such, licensors were not 
allowed to use improvements made by the licensee to the licensed tech-
nology; thereby the development of rival products and technologies was 
eventually encouraged.84 Therefore, the DOJ concluded that the pool 
did not inhibit innovation; on the contrary, the DOJ outlined that the li-
censing agreement provided significant cost savings and pro competitive 
effects.85  
 
Based upon the conclusion reached in this first Business Review Letter, 
the DOJ approved other two pools created to combine patents about 
DVD technologies.86 In both decisions, in particular, the US Department 
underlined that the two DVD pools, like the MPEG pool, were aimed at 
mutual licensing patents related to DVD standard technologies, thereby 
only patents that were essential for the implementation of the DVD 
technologies were exclusively assigned to pools.87 Thus, any antitrust 
concerns related to the two DVD pools was ultimately discharged ac-
cording to the fact that both the patent-pool agreements preserved the 
patent holders’ right to continue licensing its own patents also outside 
the pool.88 Accordingly, the DOJ decisions on DVD pools strongly under-
lined the positive outcome achieved by these agreements in reducing 
the transitional costs of firms that were interested in implementing DVD 
																																																								
82 Ibid. Part II, para B 1.1 
83 Ibid. Part II, para B 1.3 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid. Part III   
86 United States, Department Of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division, Business Review 
Letter (16 December 1998) < https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-koninklijke-
philips-electronics-nvs-sony-corporation-japans-and-pioneer-electronic > accessed the 
7th August 2017; US Department Of Justice, Antitrust Division, Business Review Letter 
(10 June 1999) in < https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-hitachi-ltds-matsushita-
electric-industrial-co-ltds-mitsubishi-electric-corporations> accessed the 7th August 
2017. 
87 DOJ (10 June 1999) (86) Part II, para A  
88 Ibid. Part III, para A.    
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technologies. In particular, it was highlighted the pool’s commitment to 
license the patents essential to implement DVD technologies, if an in-
terested party so request; similarly, the “one shop stop” policy 
supported in the agreements was held in high esteem.89  
 
Notwithstanding, doubts were cast on some terms of the patent pool 
agreements. Concerns, in particular, were expressed referring to those 
clauses that laid down the indivisibility of the package of patents related 
to DVD technology. As such, firms, which were interested in the pro-
duction of DVD players and discs or in implemented their products 
through DVD discs, were forced to license all the patents related to that 
technology, even if they did not need all of them to develop their prod-
ucts.90 Despite these concerns, the DOJ conclusively recognised that 
cross licensing and pool agreements were effective means for the dis-
semination of technologies, and their action could result in price 
reduction and growth in performance and functionality of the final 
products.91 
 
The FTC reinforced this positive stance in the decisions regarding the 
allegations against the Summit Technology and VISX’s patent pool.92 
These two firms were leaders in laser technologies and had agreed in 
pooling in a partnership the existing and future patents for photo re-
fractive keratectomy (PRK) vision correcting eye surgery. The 
Commission complaints rose about the effects of that partnership on 
competition. Indeed, in creating the pool, the two firms had agreed in 
giving each other the right to prevent the pool from licensing any of the 
																																																								
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. Part III, para A    
91 Ibid. Conclusion. See also, DG Raymond, ‘Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for 
Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2002) 16 Antitrust 41; J Lerner, M Strojwas, J Tirole. 
‘The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules’ (2007) 38 The RAND 
Journal of Economics 610  
92  Summit Tech., Inc. & VISX, Inc., Complaint n. 9286 (24 March 1998) < 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/03/summit.cmp_.ht
m> accessed the 7th August 2017. All documents related to Summit Technology, Inc. 
and VISX, Inc.,<https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/summit-
technology-inc-visx-inc-matter> accessed the 7th August 2017. 
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pooled patents to third parties. 93  Thus, the Commission outlined that 
this licensing agreement, unlike other contracts, resulted in restricting 
other firms’ access to PRK technology.94 Additionally, the pool agree-
ment set a fee to be paid to the partnership each time a laser vision 
perfection procedure was performed.95Given it, the Commission under-
lined the ill effect of the pool resulting in fixing the final price that 
consumers were to pay for PKR eye surgery.96 Thus, the Commissions 
decided against the partnership between Summit Technology and VISX’s, 
ultimately highlighting the differences between this patent pool agree-
ment and the ones capable of producing efficiencies in he market, 
indeed, allowed by the DOJ.97 
 
5. Key issues in recognising beneficial effects of mutual licensing 
agreements  
 
According to the brief overview of the US case law, the current positive 
approach to mutual licensing agreements is the result of the progressive 
identification of the beneficial effects that sharing of knowledge and ex-
pertise can have in implementing innovation, increasing competition, 
and ultimately benefiting consumers. However, some terms and con-
tents more than others are deemed to be crucial in influencing this 
positive attitude towards mutual licensing agreements.  Firstly, a great-
er legal protection seems to be offered to those agreements that allow 
both licensors and licensees to use complementary patents and to de-
velop rival goods.98 Therefore, identifying patents as complementary or 
substitute is thought to be a key factor to determine the extent of legal 
protection for mutual licensing agreements.99  
 
																																																								
93 Ibid. para 12-13  
94 Ibid. para 27-30  
95 Ibid. para 25(a), 27(b). 
96 Ibid. para 13 
97 Summit and VISX Settle FTC Charges of Violating Antitrust Laws Press Release ( 21 
August  1998) < https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/08/summit-
and-visx-settle-ftc-charges-violating-antitrust-laws> accessed the 7th August 2017  
98 DOJ (3) 66  
99 Ibid. 77  
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In the past, mutual licensing agreements were mainly used with dis-
semination purpose, thus sharing of knowledge as well as of patented 
inventions were often behind the firms’ decision to reach cross–licensing 
and patent pool agreements. Thus, as indicated by the case review per-
formed in the previous sections, mutual-licensing agreements involved 
mainly patents related to the same technology. In recent years, howev-
er, this type of agreements tend to be used strategically by firms, mostly 
by large firms, in order not only to share patents and technologies, but 
also to gain market power and, ultimately to exclude independent com-
petitors. 100  In this new context, hence, the risk increases that 
competition can be harmed by mutual licensing agreements, whereby 
agreements resulting in bringing the most significant patents related to 
a technology under the control of a small number of firms.101 All this 
considered, defining substitute and complementary patents, and among 
these, blocking and essential patents is a key point to identifying when 
mutual licensing agreements can result in beneficial effects, thereby 
solving inefficiencies due to patent thicketing.    
  
 5.1 Substitute and complementary patents  
 
The difference between substitute and complementary patents is usual-
ly based on infringement, i.e. the probability to be sued for 
infringements. In particular, each patent can be alternatively used to 
implement the same of technology, when patent are substitute.102 Thus, 
in a substitute patent context, patent holders do not fear to be sued 
from infringement by the owners of the patents, which cover the same 
technology. Conversely, the risk of infringement is worriedly high, when 
patents are complementary. Patents are described as complementary 
																																																								
100 Ibid. 61-62  
101 MH Morse, M. Howard ‘Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools: Legal Framework and 
Practical Issues (2002) 3 Antitrust and Intellectual Property 42  
102 Text to n 99; also the difference between complementary and substitute patents is 
described by Shapiro referring to Cournot theory, Shapiro (25) 145 (“Cournot assumed 
that the two inputs, copper and zinc, were required in certain fixed proportions for the 
production of brass. If one input can be substituted for the other, they have properties 
of substitutes as well as complements, in which case competition between the two in-
put owners can go far to solving the problem posed here.”) 
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when the development of a technological process or product requires 
the use of more than one patent. As already explained in Chapter VII, 
patents have to be used together to offer a new good or service in the 
market when innovation is cumulative. 103 
 
In the light of the above, substitute patents seem to be naturally suited 
to increase innovation and ultimately competition in the market, where-
as complementary patents can be easily used to block the normal flow 
of the economic growth. Hence, licensing, namely cross licensing and 
patent pools, is deemed to be a key factor in avoiding any detrimental 
use of complementary patents.104 Indeed, sharing complementary pa-
tents has been seen to be essential non only in reducing infringement, 
but also in leading to more efficient exploitation of technologies both al-
lowing the development of new product and the reduction of costs. All 
this considered, patent pool and cross-licensing agreements are en-
couraged in the case of complementary patents.105  
 
On the contrary, mutual licensing agreements are viewed with suspi-
cious when patents are substitute. Firms are deemed to be naturally 
inclined to exploit and implement their own patents when they can 
bring substitute goods in the market. As such, firms tend to invest in 
innovation and to develop new products in substitute innovation con-
text. Being the first-mover, i.e being the first to apply for patent 
protection, is considered pivotal to maintain the position in the market. 
106 Given it, patent beneficial effects on economic growth are considered 
to be inherently in the exploitation of the singular substitute patent; 
thus, further patent sharing, namely mutual licensing agreements, are 
commonly deemed to be not needed by firms to maximize profit or to 
avoid infringements. Hence, some tactics and strategies, specifically 
																																																								
103 Text to n. 46 Chapter VII 
104 G Graevenitz, S Wagner, D Harhoff, “Incidence and growth of patent thickets: The 
impact of technological opportunities and complexity’ (2013) 61 The Journal of Indus-
trial Economics 521, 526 
105 DOJ (3) 64; TT Guidelines (12) para 17 
106 H Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination’ (2015) 76 Ohio 
St. LJ 467, 503  
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foreclosing the market to competitors, could be the real reasons behind 
the reaching of mutual licensing agreements when firms hold substitute 
patents.107 
  
 5.2 Essential and blocking patents  
 
Among complementary patents, another distinction has been drawn be-
tween blocking and essential patent to underline the possible effects of 
mutual licensing on innovation and competition. Generally, patents are 
thought to be blocking when they are not only complementary but also 
absolute indispensable to implement a technology, so that patent hold-
ers can exploit their invention only using patents that are held by other 
firms. 108 Hence, as observed by the US Supreme Court “A patent may 
be rendered quite useless, or “blocked,” by another unexpired patent 
which covers a vitally related feature of the manufacturing process”.109 
In blocking patent context, therefore, “a commercially acceptable prod-
uct” cannot be produced utilizing one patent but not infringing the 
others.110 Thus conceived, the chance to be sued for infringement as 
well as the possibility to sue someone for infringement is extremely high 
in those technological areas where patents tend to be blocking.111 
Therefore, mutual licensing should be welcomed as it could solve the is-
sue of infringement. Nevertheless, cross-licensing in blocking patent 
context is often perceived negatively regarding the possible use of these 
type of agreements to strengthen the position of firms, specifically the 
large ones, in the market. Hence, blocking patents are commonly asso-
																																																								
107 DOJ (3) 74 
108 Shapiro (25) 134; H Hovenkamp, M Janis, MA Lemley, ‘Anticompetitive settlement 
of intellectual property disputes.’ (2002) 87 Minn. L. Rev. 87 1719, 1726 (“Consider 
the case of so- called "blocking patents," in which each party would have the right to 
exclude the other from the market if the competing patents are held valid”)  
109 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co.(49) para 171 
110 International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1964)  
111Charles River Associates Ltd., Report on Multiparty Licensing, (London, 22 April 
2003) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/multiparty_licensing.pdf > 
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ciated with decrease in competition and innovation when large firm are 
involved.112  
 
Essential patents are identified in those complementary patents that 
are necessary to implement a technology according to a fixed technical 
standard.113 Firms involved in development of the same technology can, 
indeed, decide to fix some criteria, methods or processes in order to en-
sure a certain degree of uniformity regarding the performance or quality 
of final products. As such, patents related to these standards become 
essential and cannot be substitute by others, if a firm decides to imple-
ment that specific technology.114 Ultimately, firms, which own essential 
patents, can achieve competitive advantages. However, in order to avoid 
distortion on competition, firms establishing a technical standard are 
encouraged to agree in packing all the related patents in a joint licens-
ing program.115 As already discussed in the previous sections, patent – 
pool agreements are supported by policy makers.116 Especially, some 
beneficial effects are appreciated such as the possibility to reach a sin-
gle licensing agreements referring to all the essential patents or the 
fixing of fair and reasonable royalties.117  
 
Important clarifications on this issue, i.e. the identification of essential 
patents and beneficial effects, have been given in Philips v. ITC by the 
																																																								
112 Shapiro (25) 123 
113 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking’ (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1991, 1991; RP Merges, ‘As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Proper-
ty Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. 
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114 Hovenkamp (106) 504  
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116 Ibid.; WIPO, Secretariat  Patent Pools And Antitrust – A Comparative Analysis  
(WIPO, March 2014)<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
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2013)< 
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US Federal Circuit.118 The affair started in 2002, when Philips filled a 
complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that 
several companies had infringed its patents related to recordable (CD-R) 
and rewritable (CD-RW) CD technologies, which were identified as es-
sential in the so-called Orange Book and aggregated in a patent 
pool.119However, the infringing companies argued that the patent pool 
was strategically deployed by Philips in order to pack together both es-
sential and not essential patents.120Additionally, Philips’s competitors 
highlighted that they were asked to pay “flat rate” royalties to the pools, 
i.e. a fixed amount of royalties. As such, royalties were paid regardless 
of the quantity of patent exploited and even if not essential patents were 
used to manufacture the final product. 121  According to competitors, 
therefore, Philips used the patent pool to restrain competition in the CD 
market.122 All this considered, the ITC decided against Philips based on 
the circumstance that potential licensees were not put in the position to 
license singular patents; instead, Philips used the pool to force them to 
license the entire package of patents, even if they wanted to use only a 
patent that was not essential considering Orange Book on CD standard 
technologies.123  
 
In the decision, the ITC underlined that at the beginning the pool had 
offered a single package of patents; changes occurred later, so that the 
pool’s offer was gradually diversified into a number of packages combin-
ing essential and non-essential patents. 124  Nevertheless, the 
Commission highlighted that those changes did not resolve the antirust 
issue as concerns were raised about the definition of “essential patents” 
used by the pool. In particular, the formula used (“essential as a practi-
cal matter”) was seen as too wide. 125As such, the pool could have 
labelled as essential also substitute patents, whereby used by the ma-
																																																								
118 U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
119 Ibid. 1182 - 83  
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid.1189  
122 Ibid. 1185 
123 Ibid. 1184 
124 Ibid. 1192  
125 Ibid. 1188 
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jority of the firms.126 Hence, essential patent advantages were ultimately 
conferred to patents that were not strictly required to implement the 
CD-R or CD-RW standards.  
 
Nevertheless, the US Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Com-
mission. The Court underlined that mutual licensing agreements were 
perfectly lawful, no matter if the arrangement covered more patents 
than ones indispensable to the licensee. Indeed, a patent license  
 
does not obligate the licensee to do anything; it simply pro-
vides the licensee with a guarantee that it will not be sued for 
engaging in conduct that would infringe the patent in ques-
tion. 127  
 
The US Court, therefore, emphasised the significant of paten pools in 
avoiding the threat of infringement and linked that positive effect to 
others pro-competitive benefits that could result from mutual licensing. 
In particular, the Court highlighted that cross licensing and patent 
pools could “integrating complementary technologies, reducing transac-
tion costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly 
infringement”.128 Thus, the Court concluded that mutual licensing al-
ways provided that kind of certainty in using and exploiting patent 
rights that could beneficially affect investments.129 Notwithstanding, the 
Court overshadowed the Commission’s conclusions on the broad defini-
tion of “essential patent” used in the agreement and cleared Philips of 
any wrongdoing based on the circumstance that Philips ultimately had 
																																																								
126 Ibid. 1195 
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protecting against the unpleasant surprise for a licensee who learns, after making a 




not charged its licensees anything additional for the non-essential pa-
tents.130   
 
Hence, there remain concerns on how essential patents should be iden-
tified. Two points has been seen as crucial. On one hand, technical 
standards are usually fixed at the onset of a technology development. 
However, essential patents can change over time as standards can 
change, according to modifications in technical and manufacturing pro-
cesses.131 As such, the identification of a patent as essential should 
been reviewed over the years. On the hand, several features have to be 
taken into consideration in identifying a patent as essential referring to 
a technology. Thus, a patent can be deemed essential in relation to spe-
cific technology, whereas the same patent is substitute referring to a 
different technical process. 132 
 
6. Some conclusions  
 
In recent years the perception of mutual licensing agreements has com-
pletely changed. Formerly opposed, cross licensing and patent polls are 
now encouraged. In accordance with the US Department of Justice ap-
proach, mutual licensing is now sponsored as an effective means to 
improve efficiencies and competition in the market. Indeed, firms can 
spend less time in negotiations and reduce royalty costs when several 
patents are licensed all in one package. Furthermore, the risk of in-
fringement is significantly reduced, whereby the extent of patent rights 
is clearly defined by the good practice of reaching mutual licensing 
agreements between competitors. Thus, the uncertainty, which is creat-
																																																								
130 Ibid. 1192. See also S Bhattacharyya, ‘US Philips Corp. v. International Trade 
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132  European Commission, ‘Standard-essential patents’ (Competition Policy, June 
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ed by the strategic use of patents, is dispelled once patent polls and 
cross licensing are put in place. Similarly, the threat of infringement is 
significantly reduced, as well as costs of legal actions are sharply mini-
mised.  
 
In the light of this, mutual licensing can be effective also in reducing in-
efficacies produced by patent thickets in business method patents 
arena. Similarly to other kind of cumulative inventions, business meth-
od patents can result in overlapping and uncertainty that mutual 
licensing can help to eliminate. In particular, blocking positions can be 
cleared by mutual licensing agreements, especially by cross-licensing 
agreements, so far as holders of business method patents decide to 
share their knowledge, thereby reducing risks of infringements and 
transaction costs. Nevertheless, hostility has been expressed in the past 
to mutual agreements according to their potential to control prices and 
product quantity, ultimately impeding rivals to enter in the technology 
area.  
 
These concerns are still addressed. As such, mutual licensing effects on 
competition are still a major issue. Mutual licensing can solve problem 
between firms holding patents related to particular technology, but can 
it deal with the issues faced by those who would like to enter that tech-
nology arena?   All this considered, the EU legal framework regarding 
mutual licensing agreements will be thoroughly discussed in the next 
chapter. In particular, the EU competition law, namely the TTBER and 
the TT Guidelines, will be analysed to understand whether the EU cur-
rent legislation can contrast efficiently the detrimental effects of patent 








The EU competition law, mutual licensing agreements 
and business method patents 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The analysis provided in the previous chapter, namely Chapter VIII, 
has indicated the development of a new positive attitude towards mu-
tual licensing agreements, i.e. cross-licensing and patent pools. These 
agreements are now considered to be useful in encouraging innova-
tion and competition. In particular, the beneficial effect of mutual 
licensing agreements seems to be amplified in technological areas 
where patents are cumulative and patent thicket approaches are 
adopted. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about the possibil-
ity that mutual agreements can be used strategically. On the pretence 
of securing the efficient use of the shared technology, for example, 
parties could agree on limitations on the amount of output or on re-
strictions in the field of use. In such a case, firms could use cross 
licensing or patent pooling not only to eliminate or reduce patent-
thicket inefficiencies, but also to interfere with the market develop-
ment. Thus, mutual licensing could ultimately impede other firms to 
enter the market. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that firms, espe-
cially those involved in patent thicketing, could conceal behind the 
coordination in the exploitation of inventions, which is deemed inher-
ently positive, other purposes.  
 
These concerns arise even more when business method patents are 
involved.1 As discussed at length in this research, business method 
patents are a clear examples of cumulative patents. The result is that 
																																																								
1 RC Dreyfuss, ‘Are business method patents bad for business’ (2000) 16 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. LJ 263. 
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either implementing or developing a business method often requires 
the exploitation of several patents, each of them covering just a little 
piece of the full process. In the business method patent area, there-
fore, some firms can gain strong bargaining positions, ultimately 
blocking the others to fully exploit their inventions. Indeed, it is likely 
that some of the algorithms already patented are critical to perform a 
new business method, when business methods are computer imple-
mented. Another usual concern about business method patents is 
related to the extent of the protection ultimately granted. In point of 
fact, traditional patents gain a monopoly over particular ways of im-
plementing a process; instead, business method patents tend to give 
a monopoly over the process itself. Therefore, traditional patent leaves 
competitors free to devise new ways of implementing that process, 
whereas business method patens usually result in granting a wide 
patent protection that impede rivals to developing not only the same 
process, but also any other process similar to the patented one. Thus, 
patent thicketing has been often linked to business method patents. 
Real threats to competition are also been warned when business 
method patents are involved, especially when grating patent protec-
tion to a well-known business technique can result in securing 
blocking positions in the market, i.e. positions that impede rivals to 
fully exploit their patents, ultimately foreclosing the market.  
 
The quantitative analysis performed in Chapter IV and in Chapter VI 
has revealed possible strategic uses of business method patents and 
patent applications in Europe. In particular some of the features 
identifying the patent thicket phenomenon, such as large numbers of 
patent applications and a close web of relations among patent cita-
tions, occur in the category G06Q. Thus, concerns arise because of 
the risk that business method patents and patent applications could 
be used, for example, to hold-up rivals or to strategically raise their 
costs, thereby affecting competition. However, as suggested in Chap-
ter VIII, mutual licensing agreements might help in clearing some of 
these detrimental effects. Ultimately, the coordination among firms in 
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exploiting and developing business method patents can forestall the 
development of strategic behaviours. Nevertheless, as already men-
tioned above, coordination can lead to tactics and collusion, thus 
mutual-licensing agreements can result in reducing competition.  
 
This chapter, therefore, is mainly devoted to understand whether the 
EU competition law can effectively constrain the strategic use of 
business method patents and patent applications, especially neutral-
izing the detrimental effect on competition generated by mutual 
licensing agreements tactically reached. On this purpose, the chapter 
will be divided into three sections. Referring specifically to the EU le-
gal framework, in the first section, a brief overview will be provided on 
the interface between patent legislation and competition law with 
specific regard to the interaction between Article 101 TFEU and li-
censing agreements. The analysis will highlight that both the 
European Commission and the CJEU have admitted the pro-
competitive effect of mutual licensing, ultimately matching the US 
conclusion already discussed in Chapter VIII. Accordingly, a specific 
Regulation has been established, namely the Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER), to control mutual licensing 
agreements.  
 
In the second section, this piece of law, together with the Technology 
Transfer Guidelines (TT Guidelines), will be examined. Indeed, as-
sessments ex Article 101 (1) and ex Article 101(3) are faces of the 
same coin; thus, indications about exempt agreements can give evi-
dence also on how the European Commission will act in assessing the 
non-exempt agreements. As such, this section will highlight the im-
portance of the TT Guidelines on what extent mutual licensing 
agreements between large firms may be caught by Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. In the following sections, instead, singular provisions of the 
TTBER and the TT Guidelines will be analysed. Attention will be paid 
especially to those detrimental effects already discussed in Chapter 
VII, namely hold-up, tacit collusion and raising rivals’ costs schemes, 
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which are common outcomes of patent thicket practices. All this to 
understand whether the current EU legal framework on mutual li-
censing agreements offers effective means to constrain the strategic 
use of business method patents and patent applications resulting in 
reduction of competition.  
 
2. The interaction between IP rights and competition law 
 
The relationship between IP rights and competition law has been one 
of the most debated issues over the recent years.2 The potential con-
flict, particularly, has been highlighted between IP monopolistic 
prerogatives and market efficiency. As is widely known, monopoly 
rights are one of the main features of patent protection. Thus, patent 
holders have the right to exploit their own invention and to exclude 
others to use it, unless a licensing agreement is reached. The analysis 
in Chapter III has already revealed that granting the exclusive use of 
a patent to the patent holder can be worthy for the society, especially 
conceiving the push towards increasing in investment on innovation 
and on the development of new technologies, which usually results.3 
Nevertheless, it must not be ignored that the exercise of IP preroga-
tives can affect competition. For example, either refusing to license or 
including quite severe restriction terms on price, sales or territories 
could affect the efficiency in the market and the consumer welfare. 
Hence, the right to exploit inventions could be used not only to ex-
clude others to implement the same invention, but also to avoid them 
to develop similar technologies.  
  
Discussions on this issue have been centred on an “apparent an-
tinomy” between patent-holder exclusive rights and fair competition 
in the market. 4  According to some scholars, an insoluble conflict 
																																																								
2 SD Anderman (ed) The interface between intellectual property rights and competition 
policy ( Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
3 Text to para 2 Chapter III  
4 G Ghidini, E Arezzo, ‘On the intersection of IPRs and competition law with regard to 
information technology markets’ in CD Elherman, I Atanasiu (eds) European Competi-
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arises between antitrust and IP legislations as the first strongly op-
pose any type of monopoly, while patent protection results in granting 
monopolistic position to patent holders. 5  On the contrary, other 
scholars recognise that both antitrust and IP legislations are equally 
aimed at encouraging firms to compete fairly in the market.6 Never-
theless, the possible clash between IP rights and competition law 
takes on particular interest in the EU context, according to the pecu-
liarities of the EU legislation. In particular, the completion of the 
Single market is of critical importance both in the EU protection of IP 
prerogatives and in the EU competition law.  Mainly aimed at secur-
ing the free movement rights, the TFEU recognizes IP rights. As such, 
the Article 36 TFEU allows restrictions in trade due to the IP preroga-
tives, although IP right restrictions that result in ‘a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States’ are ultimately prohibited. Similarly, the EU antitrust legisla-
tion are devoted to protect fair competition not as value in its one, but 
as a means to achieve economic integration and avoid discrimina-
tion.7 
 
 2.1 Article 101 TFEU 
 
Article 101 TFEU fully reveals the above-mentioned tension of the EU 
competition law toward the completion of the Single Market. As 
known, Article 101 and 102 TFEU constitute the core of the EU com-
petition law. If the role of Article 102 is to avoid that firms can abuse 
of their dominant position in the market, Article 101 focuses on 
agreements that could result in preventing, restricting or distorting 
																																																																																																																																																																		
tion Law Annual 2005: The Relationship Between Competition Law And Intellectual Prop-
erty Law (Hart Publishing 2006)  
5 V Korah, ‘The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European 
Experience’ (2001) 69 Antitrust L. J. 801, 805 
6 P Régibeau, K Rockett, Assessment of potential anticompetitive conduct in the field of 
intellectual property rights and assessment of the interplay between competition policy 
and IPR protection (COMP/2010/16)(Office of the European Union 2011) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2012_technology_transfer/study_ipr_
en.pdf> accessed the 20th June 2017, 10 -12  
7 A Jones, B Sufrin,  EU competition law: text, cases, and materials (OUP, 2014)   
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competition in the market. As such, the Article is basically divided in-
to two parts. Article 101 (1) TFEU castigates agreements affecting the 
fair competition in the market. Instead, Article 101(3) TFEU provides 
criteria to be applied in order to save those agreements, which reduce 
competition but ultimately result in encouraging an integrated eco-
nomic growth of the Member States. According to Article 101 TFEU, 
therefore, the European Commission (EC), and eventually the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) should decided on the pos-
sible balance between pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects in 
agreements between firms, thereby allowing restrictions on competi-
tion whether necessary to achieve increasing in innovation and in 
economic growth within the EU.  
 
On the purpose of expanding the scope of Article 101 TFUE, an eco-
nomic approach has been developed in the last decades, finally 
stigmatized in the so-called modernisation process.8  As such, the re-
lationship between the parties as well as the identification of the 
relevant market have been emphasized; thus, the market position, 
both real and potential, has been indicated as a crucial feature in the 
assessment of infringements of competition. In particular, the anti-
trust assessment has to take into consideration both the object and 
the effect of agreements.9 Additionally, the European Commission has 
stressed the importance of assessing the market share, especially 
when restriction on competition is not the object of the agreements, 
but the effect of the agreement itself. Moreover, relationship among 
the parties is put forward as crucial, according to the indications of 
the Commission.10  
 
According to the economic approach, therefore, some features regard-
ing the relationship of the parties are analysed to understand if an 
																																																								
8 M Monti, ‘European Competition for the 21st Century’ (2000) 24 Fordham Int'l 
LJ 1602. 
9 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agree-
ments (TT Guidelines) [2014] OJ C 89/03, para 11-12 
10 Ibid. 79 
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agreement fall or not under the EU antitrust umbrella. Apart from the 
generic division based on the fact that parties are direct competitors 
or not, specific attention is paid to the inter-brand competition, i.e. 
parties are suppliers of competing brands, and intra-brand competi-
tion, i.e. parties are distributors of the same brand.11 Even potential 
competition between parties has to be taken into account when 
agreements are reached between intra-brand or inter-brand competi-
tors. However, the assessment ex Article 101 (1) TFEU could be 
slightly different. In the inter-brand competition, “examination of 
competition in the absence of the agreement” is considered “particu-
larly necessary” to assess what would have been the parties’ position 
in the market without the agreement.12 In an intra- brand competi-
tion context, instead, parties can secure their agreements giving 
evidence that it does not even potentially interfere with their position 
in the market as well as it does not strengthen their role in the mar-
ket.13  
 
Nowadays, therefore, a deeper insight in the positions of the parties 
in market is generally required in applying article 101 (1) TFEU.14 
Similar, the definition of the relevant market, i.e. the identification of 
substitutive goods, is specially focused according to the new econom-
ic approach in the application of Article 101(1).15 All this is consistent 
with the aim of encouraging the development of a dynamic competi-
tion that can best serve the “completion of the Single Market” 
purpose. 16 Ultimately, the competition issue is deal with differently 
according to the new point of view. Hence, whilst anti-competitive 
agreements tend to be avoided, pro–competitive effects are utmost en-
couraged.  
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12 Case T 328 /03 O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG v Commission of the European 
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13 Jones, Sufrin (7) 233 
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  2.2 Article 101(3) TFEU  
 
This “modernized”17 approach focusing more on the economic effects 
of agreements has ultimately complicated the relationship between 
article 101 (1) TFEU and article 101(3) TFEU.18 As mentioned above, 
Article 101 (3) TFEU indicates the criteria to be applied to assess the 
balance between pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of 
agreements between firms affecting trade between Member States. On 
this purpose, four effects of the agreement should be taken into con-
sideration and namely 1. the agreement must lead to an improvement 
in  the production or distribution of goods or the promotion of tech-
nical or economic progress, 2. the agreement must allow consumers 
to fairly share the resulting benefit, 3. the agreement should impose 
only restrictions that are indispensable to the attainment of these ob-
jectives 4. the agreement does not afford the parties the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts in question. 19 With its four requirements, thus, Article 101 (3) 
TFEU is scoped to objectively detect the beneficial effect of agree-
ments in enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources.20 As such, the agreement assessment on the 
balance between pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects should 
be to be placed only under Article 101(3) TFEU. However, scholars 
have suggested that some recently decisions of the CJEU have intro-
duced some aspects of the pro–competitive effect assessment also 
under Article 101(1) TFEU, especially with regard to the assessment 
on the potential competition in intra and inter-brand agreements.21 
Nevertheless, this arguments has been dismissed based on the obser-
vation that article 101 (1) TFUE does not contains any criteria to be 
applied in order to perform an assessment of the pro-competitive ef-
																																																								
17 Text to n. 8  
18 Jones, Sufrin (7) 267  
19 Article 101 (3) TFUE  
20 TT Guidelines (9) 33  
21 Jones, Sufrin (7) 266 
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fect resulting from trade agreements. As such, it is now an estab-
lished opinion that article 101(1) TFEU only refers to examination on 
the agreement’s anti- competitive effect, i.e. object or effect the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition, whereas the 
agreement’s assessment under Article 101(3) TFUE is the one desig-
nated to identify agreement’s efficiencies, i.e. pro-competitive 
effects.22 However, as it will better discussed below, the antitrust as-
sessment ex Article 101 (1) TFEU should be taken into account the 
indication provided with regard to the assessment ex Article 101 (3) 
TFUE. As dynamic competition approach suggested, they are two side 
of the same coin.23 
 
 2.3 Article 101 TFEU and pro-competitive effects in mutual 
licensing agreements  
 
The role played by Article 101 (3) TFUE to combine fair competition, 
consumer welfare and deployment of free movement is emphasised in 
the scenario of licensing agreements. Indeed, as already discussed in 
Chapter VIII, licensing agreements can result in improving innovation 
and fostering the economic growth. According to their inherent fea-
tures, therefore, licensing agreements are likely to produce market 
efficiencies. However, licensing agreements could be used to reach 
different, or even opposite, results. In such cases, licensing agree-
ments are caught by the EU legislation, namely the EU competition 
law. This is the conclusion drawn in the so-called Christmas Mes-
sage, where it was clarified that licensing agreement could be caught 
by article 101 (1) TFUE when their previsions go beyond the ‘scope of 
the patent’. 24 At the outset, indeed, the European Commission devel-
oped a quite strict attitude toward licensing agreements.25 The CJEU 
																																																								
22  Ibid. 267  
23 Sidak, Teece (16) 
24 European Commission, Notice On Patent Licensing Agreements (The So-
Called Christmas Message) 24 December 1962 [1962–1963] Jo 2922/62, withdrawn 
by O.J. C 220/14 (1984)  
25 D Grosh, Patent ‘Licensing Agreements and Anti-Trust in the EEC: Recent Decisions 
of the EEC Commission’ (1973) 49 Notre Dame Law 392, 392  
	
	 287	
approach was also utmost severe at the beginning, as demonstrated 
by the Costen and Grundig decision.26 In particular, the Court made 
clear that ‘”]he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in member 
states governing the system of property ownership”.27 Nevertheless, 
licensing agreements fell under Article 101 when going beyond their 
scope and resulting in reducing competition’.28 However, a more posi-
tive perspective was development in the 1980s, which ultimately 
matched with the US favourable approach already discussed in Chap-
ter VIII. In the pivotal Nungesser KG decision,29 the Court stressed 
the importance of licensing agreements in avoiding that investments 
in innovation could fall apart with detrimental effects on the dissemi-
nation of knowledge and technique in the Community.30 As such, the 
beneficial effect of licensing was clearly recognized, especially in im-
proving the development of new products and ultimately in increasing 
the competition in the market.31  
  
Accordingly to this positive attitude toward licensing agreements, the 
European Commission has also adopted a favourable approach to-
ward mutual licensing agreements. Significantly, in some decisions 
regarding patents pools, the European Commission based its decision 
on the beneficial effects of licensing underlining that “this patent pool 
helps to promote technical and economic progress by allowing quick 
and efficient introduction of the MPEG-2 technology...the pool has 
beneficial effects for the consumer” 32 . Similarly, relating to DVD 
technologies, the European Commission approved the patent pool 
agreement underlining that “this patent pool would help promote 
																																																								
26 Cases C-56/84 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299. The 
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technical and economic progress by allowing quick and efficient in-
troduction of the DVD technology”. 33 Furthermore, deciding on the 
Philips and Sony agreement on CD technologies, the Commission 
stressed the importance of mutual patent agreement; thus, it was 
outlined that “The adoption of the system [CD system] by music com-
panies and consumer electronics manufacturers was strongly 
facilitated by the availability of the combined patents of Philips and 
Sony under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms”.34 
  
The positive approach developed by the EU Institutions toward licens-
ing agreements, particularly toward mutual licensing agreements, is 
coherent with the idea that both the IP and competition law serve the 
same purpose. As such, the EU Commission has often pointed out 
that competition law and intellectual property protection pursue the 
same goals, even with different approaches. 35 In particular, both IP 
and competition laws have been introduced to increase efficiency of 
resource allocation and to encourage innovation, development and 
economic growth. Thus, the Commission argues, the two bodies of 
law are not antithetic at all, since either legal patent protection and 
antitrust law are aimed at ensuring a genuine competition in the 
market, by promoting an efficient use of inventions. 36 These ideas 
have been strongly promoted over the years. The Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) established by the European 
Commission provides a clear example of this, when it states that  
 
Such agreements will usually improve economic efficiency and 
be pro-competitive as they can reduce duplication of research 
																																																								
33  European Commission, ‘Commission approves a patent licensing programme to im-
plement the DVD standard’ (Press Release IP/00/1135 9 October 2000) < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-1135_en.htm > accessed 7th August 2017 
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(Press Release IP/03/1152 7 August 2003) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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and development, strengthen the incentive for the initial re-
search and development, spur incremental innovation, 
facilitate diffusion and generate product market competition.37 
 
3. The Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
 
In recent years, the European Commission has increasingly adopted 
specific regulations with the purpose of providing clear rules about 
the implementation of Article 101 (3) TFEU. For example, regulations 
on the implementation of article 101(3) TFEU to vertical agreements 
(i.e. agreements between parties active at different levels in the eco-
nomic supply chain),38 as well as regulations on the application of 
Article 101(3) to research and development agreements39 have been 
established. Often indicated as block-exemption regulations, these 
pieces of legislations are intended to identify those agreements that 
are pro-competitive, thereby exempted from antitrust assessments ex 
Article 101 (1) TFEU. 
 
According to their more recent development, block-exemption regula-
tions identify and list clauses that express per se an anti-competitive 
attitude, i.e. restrictions. Additionally, thresholds are fixed to recog-
nize firms’ positions that can affect the market efficiency. Therefore, 
once a block exemption regulation is adopted, all the agreements that 
do not contain restrictions and do not exceed the fixed threshold are 
held pro-competitive; thus, these agreements are told to be in the 
safe harbour of the regulation and the assessment under article 
101(1) TFEU is not required. Conversely, firms, who decided to agree 
on clauses that are not exempt, take the risk that the agreement 
																																																								
37Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
technology transfer agreements (TTBER)  [2014] OJ L 93/17, 17   
38 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Ar-
ticle 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices  [2010] OJ L 102/1   
39 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the applica-
tion of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain 




could be voided, when resulting in reducing competition. Similarly, 
an assessment on the effect of the agreement is necessary when the 
parties’ market share exceed the fixed threshold. All this confirms the 
importance of the block – exemption regulations that not only estab-
lish a specific regulation on the assessment ex Article 101 (3) TFEU, 
but provide indirect indications also on the assessment ex Article 
101(1) TFEU. 
 
Consistently with the block-exemption framework, the European 
Commission has established also a regulation regarding the imple-
mentation of Article 101(3) in the specific context of licensing 
agreements, namely the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regu-
lation (TTBER). 40  Thus, licensing agreements meeting the 
requirements of the TTBER are in the safe harbour of the pro-
competitive effects ex Article 101(3), whereas the others need to be 
assessed by the Commission.  On this purpose Article 2 (1) of TTBER 
clearly states, “ Pursuant to Article 101(3) of the Treaty and subject to 
the provisions of this Regulation, Article 101(1) of the Treaty shall not 
apply to technology transfer agreements”. Nevertheless, both Article 2 
and the current TTBER, namely Regulation n. 316/2014 of 21 March 
2014, are the culmination of a long process.  
  
 3.1 At the beginning of the TTBER  
 
A first attempt at drawing lines in the implementation of Article 101 
(3) in the IP licensing agreement context was made in 1984. On this 
purpose, the Regulation n. 2349/84 was established with specific re-
gard to “patent licensing agreements, and agreements combining the 
licensing of patents and the communication of know-how, to which 
only two undertakings are party”. 41  The Regulation listed some 
clauses that could be part of this type of agreements. In particular, a 
																																																								
40 TTBER (37) 
41 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of Ar-




so-called “white list” was presented in Article 1, which included 
clauses that were considered to be per se pro-competitive. On the 
other hand, Article 3 presented a so called “black list”, including 
clauses that were to be considered to fall always within antitrust re-
strictions, such as clauses that provide on the obligation not to 
challenge the validity of licensed patents or that fix prices of products 
based on the licensed technology. Other clauses were listed in Article 
2, the so-called “grey list”. According to this provision, a licensing 
agreement could produce pro-competitive effects overweighting ill ef-
fects on competition that could result from clauses providing on 
minimum royalties, restrictions for fields of use or patent further ex-
ploitations.42 
 
This sharp distinction between “black” and “white” clauses was main-
tained in the subsequent version of the TTBER adopted with the 
Regulation n. 240/96.43 However, some changes were made. The new 
Regulation was applied also to pure know-how licensing agreements, 
44 although patent pools and joint ventures remained excluded.45 
Some clauses were added to the “white list”,46 whereas the “black” 
one was shortened.47 Nevertheless, the “list” approach developed in 
both the 1984 and 1996 Regulations was regarded as too theoretical 
and incapable of considering all possible effects of licensing agree-
ments on competition. 48 According to this approach, the assessment 
ex Article 101 (3) should be carried out ex ante, especially looking at 
the matching between the term of the agreement and clause lists pro-
																																																								
42 WL Fugate, ‘Antitrust Aspects of International Patent and Technology Licensing’ 
(1984) 5 JL & Com 433, 447   
43 Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of 
Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements 
[1996] OJ L31/2 
44 Ibid. 2 
45 Ibid. Article 5  
46 Ibid. Article 1  
47 Ibid. Article 2  
48 EC Commission, ‘Evaluation Report on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption 
Regulation 240/96’ (Evaluation Report)  [2001] COM/2001/0786, para 76 (“The TTBE 
is perceived as being too formalistic and rigid”); H Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (Aspen Law & Busi-
ness 2001) 45–28 
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vided in the Regulations. 49 Hence, neither the relationship between 
parties or their potential position in the market was taken into specif-
ic account. As such, it was suggested that the Regulation could have 
‘the effect of forcing companies into a legal straitjacket which may 
discourage dissemination of technologies or deter more efficient 
transactions’. 50 Thus, a new version of the TTBER - this time accom-
panied by a set of interpretative guidelines - was drafted by the 
European Commission in an attempt to simplify the structure of the 
regulation, take into consideration parties’ market position and widen 
the application of block exemptions to most of technology transfer 
agreements.  
  
 3.2 A new approach to the TTBER  
In April 2004, the Regulation n. 772/2004 was finally adopted ‘to 
move away from the approach of listing exempt clauses and to place 
greater emphasis on defining the categories of agreements which are 
exempted up to a certain level of market power and on specifying the 
restrictions or clauses which are not to be contained in such agree-
ments’.51 Significantly, the new TTBER showed important changes in 
the criteria for the application of block-exemption regulations and the 
assessment ex Article 101 (3) TFEU. Especially, the relationship be-
tween parties was focused. Thus, different market-share thresholds 
were set depending on whether licensing agreements were reached 
between competitors or non-competitors. Therefore, only licensing 
agreements between competitors whose market share total holding 
does not exceed 20% could be exempted.52 As such, licensing agree-
																																																								
49 M Hansen, O Shah ‘The New EU Technology Transfer Regime-Out of the Straight-
jacket into the Safe Harbour?’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 465, 466  
50 Evaluation Report (48) para 76; SD Anderman, J Kallaugher. Technology transfer 
and the new EU competition rules: intellectual property licensing after modernisation 
(OUP, 2006). 
51 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Ar-
ticle 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ L 
123/01, 1  
52 Ibid. Article 2  
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ments between competitors were believed to pose more risks for the 
competition than those between non-competitive firms.53  
 
With regard to the contents of the licensing agreement, most of the 
clauses listed in the previous versions of the Regulation were ar-
ranged in the new TTBER, though lexicon was changed. In particular, 
the Regulation n.772/2004 separated “hard-core” restrictions from 
the “excluded” ones. According to Article 4 of the 2004 TTBER, ex-
emptions ex Article 101 (3) TFEU never apply to licensing agreements 
between competitors that included “hard-core” restrictions, such as 
clauses that restricted the ability to determine selling prices or  lim-
ited the amount of products to be produced and sold. On the other 
hand, Article 5 of the 2004 TTBER named the “excluded” restrictions, 
i.e. clauses needed be individual assessed when included in transfer 
technological agreements, such as clauses providing obligations on li-
censee to grant an exclusive license to the licensor in respect of 
licensed technology improvements (so-called grant-back clauses), or 
not to challenge the validity of the IP rights held by the licensor (so-
called non-challenge clauses) or to terminate the contract in the event 
that the validity of licensed IP rights  was  challenged (so-called ter-
mination clauses). 
 
Significantly, in 2004 the Commission decided to accompany the 
TTBER with a set of guidelines. Hence, the Technology Transfer 
Guidelines (TT Guidelines) were published with the purpose to pro-
vide some guidance in interpreting and applying the TTBER to 
licensing agreements between two parties, but not only.54 The TT 
Guidelines also provided a set of principles to be applied to licensing 
agreements falling outside the TTBER – i.e. agreements containing 
hard-core restrictions or exceeding the market share’s threshold- and 
																																																								
53 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer 
agreements [2004] OJ C 101/02, para 26  
54 Guidelines (53)  
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to licensing agreements reached between more than two parties.55 Ul-
timately, the Guidelines suggested a more effective approach to the 
Article 101 (3) TFEU assessment, thereby considering, for examples, 
the market position of parties or the existence of previous barriers to 
entry in the market.56 The new approach was ‘unambiguously wel-
comed’.57 Especially, it was praised the focus brought on the dynamic 
aspects of competition as well as the opportunity of individual as-
sessments. 58  However, the Regulation n. 772/2004 received 
criticisms. In particular, practical difficulties in calculating the mar-
ket share’s threshold emerged as well as ambiguities in the definition 
of the relevant market.59 Moreover, doubts were casted on the ap-
proach of the Regulation and the Guideline towards incentives to 
innovation.60  
 
 3.3 The EU Regulation n.316/2014 of 21 March 2014 
 
In March 2014, a new version of TTBER has been established, though 
the new TTBER, namely Regulation n.316/2014.61 The 2014 TTBER 
mostly repeats the framework of the previous version. Consistently, 
the new TTBER offers two different lists of “hard-core” and “excluded” 
restrictions.62 The new Regulation also establishes two different mar-
ket share’s thresholds, whether the agreement is reached between 
competitors or non-competitors.63 The effect is ultimately to provide a 
“safe harbour” from antitrust scrutiny to those licensing agreements 
																																																								
55 Ibid. para130  
56 Ibid. para 54 
57 S Bishop, D Gore, ‘ From Black and White to Enlightenment? An Economic View of 
the Reform of EC Competition Rules on Technology Transfer’ in CD Ehlermann and I 
Atanasiu (eds) Competition Law Annual 2005 (Hart Publishing Oxford 2007) 142. 
58 Ibid, 159 – 60; MR Patterson, ‘Revision of the New Technology Transfer Block Ex-
emption Regulation: convergence or capitulation?’ in H Ullrich (ed) The Evolution of 
European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition? (Edward Elgar Chel-
tenham, 2006) 70 
59 H Ullrich, ‘The interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law: 
an Overview’ in CD Ehlermann and M Marquis (Eds.) 10th European Competition Law 
Annual 2007 - A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC  (Oxford 2007); FL Fine The EC 
Competition Law on Technology Licensing (Sweet & Maxwell London 2006) 53. 
60 Jones, Sufrin (7) 728 
61 TTBER (37) 
62 Ibid. Article 2 and Article 4  
63 Ibid. Article 3 
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that do not contain “hard-core” restrictions and are agreed between 
two firms that do not have relevant market power. Few adjustments 
have been made in the 2014 TTBER compared to previous versions. 
In particular, passive sales limitations are now considered always 
among the “hard-core” restrictions. Similarly, a more rigid approach 
is adopted regarding grant-back 64  and non-challenge 65  clauses, 
which are now more widely assessed. Regarding market-share’s 
thresholds, Article 3 of the Regulation n. 316/2014 confirms by and 
large what already established in the 2004 Regulation. However, the 
new Regulation clarifies that competitor market share’s threshold 
should be meet also when parties are not current, but potential com-
petitors, whereby the entry in the same market is “not just a mere 
theoretical possibility”.66  
 
 3.4 The TT Guidelines of 28 March 2014  
 
A new version of the TT Guidelines has been also introduced in 
March 2014.67 As with the former TT Guidelines, the new ones offer 
indications on how the TTBER will be interpreted and applied by the 
European Commission. Additionally, the TT Guidelines give im-
portant indications about balancing between pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive effects regarding those IP licensing agreements fall-
ing outside the TTBER. 68  Thus, the TT Guidelines are utmost 
important for understanding on what extent mutual licensing agree-
ments, specifically those between big competitors in the market, are 
allowed according to the EU competition law. However, it has to make 
																																																								
64 TT Guidelines (9) para 129 (“exclusive grant backs (that is to say an exclusive li-
cence back to the licensor of the licensee's improvement) or assignments to the 
licensor of improvements of the licensed technology”  
65 TT Guidelines (9) para 133 (“non-challenge clauses, that is to say, direct or indirect 
obligations not to challenge the validity of the licensor's intellectual property, without 
prejudice to the possibility, in the case of an exclusive licence, for the licensor to ter-
minate the technology transfer agreement in the event that the licensee challenges the 
validity of any of the licensed technology rights.”)  
66 W van Weert, D Henry, ‘Assessing Technology Transfer Agreements under the EU 
Anti-Trust Rules: Revised TTBER—Assessment and Outlook’  (2014) 4 Computer and 
Telecommunication Law Review 108,108; TT Guidelines (9) para 162   
67 TT Guidelines (9)  
68 Ibid. para 156  
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clear that the CJEU is not bond to apply the TT Guidelines.69 In point 
of fact, the TT Guidelines bind only the Commission, as their role is 
to clarify the criteria that will be used by the Commission when the 
assessment ex Article 101 (3) is performed in licensing agreements. 
Thus, decisions on dispute involving the Commission and undertak-
ings on application of Article 101 TFEU to IP licensing agreement will 
be based only on the current TTBER.70 
 
4. The EU competition law, ill effects of patent thickets and 
business method patents  
 
The analysis in the previous section has made clear the major aim of 
the TTBER and the TT Guidelines, which is to balance the IP preroga-
tives with the protection of competition. 71  Therefore, A positive 
approach toward mutual licensing agreements has been developed 
according to the dynamic competition perspective. 72 Matching the US 
attitude about cross licensing and patent pool agreements, therefore, 
the EU competition law has finally emphasis the pro-competitive ef-
fects of the licensing agreement, particularly of the mutual licensing 
agreement 73  
 
as it leads to dissemination of technology and promotes inno-
vation by the licensor and licensee(s). In addition, even licence 
agreements that do restrict competition may often give rise to 
pro-competitive efficiencies, which must be considered under 
Article 101(3) and balanced against the negative effects on 
competition (10). The great majority of licence agreements are 
therefore compatible with Article 101.74 
 
																																																								
69 Ibid. para 4  
70 Ibid. para 2  
71 Ibid. para 15-17 
72 Ibid. para 8-9; SB Opi, ‘The approaches of the European Commission and the US 
antitrust agencies towards exclusivity clauses in licensing agreements’ (2000) 24 BC 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 85. 
73 For example, TT Guidelines (9) para100 or para 104  
74 Ibid. para 9 
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It is with this in mind that this part of the thesis aims to examine 
whether the European competition legal framework, namely the 
TTBER and the TT Guidelines, can effectively counteract those pa-
tent-thicket ill effects that result in reducing competition. This is a 
pivotal point. The displayed hostility - mainly in Europe - toward 
business method patents is linked to the fear that granting patent 
protection to such inventions may result in increasing the patent 
thicket phenomenon. As already discussed in Chapter VII, the spread 
of patent thickets is often linked to inefficiencies in the market. In 
point of fact, patent thickets can be strategically put in place to create 
uncertainty about what is covered by patent protection and what is 
not. This lack of clarity, in particular, can result in increasing final 
costs. As such, firms can be encouraged to reach licensing agree-
ments, specifically mutual licensing agreements to reduce patent- 
thicket inefficiencies. However, patent thickets can result in social in-
efficiencies whereby mutual licensing agreements serve the purpose 
of discouraging new firms to enter the market. Hence, patent thickets 
can affect the level of competition in the market and, indeed, the de-
crease of competition is considered one of the most probable 
outcomes if a favourable attitude towards business method patents 
would be adopted in Europe.75    
 
In the business method area, in particular, the ill effect on competi-
tion created by patent thicket behaviours seems to be ever more 
amplified. In point of fact, business method patents tend to cover 
large areas of knowledge. Usually claims in business method patents 
describe the entire process rather than the specific way in which the 
method is implemented. Referring to computer-implemented business 
methods, for example, it is usually stressed the fact that patents tend 
to cover not just the specific implementation of the algorithm, but the 
																																																								
75 ex multis, C Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard–Setting’ (2001) 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119; BH Hall, G 
von Graevenitz, C Rosazza- Bondibene, ‘A Study of Patent Thickets’ (The Intellectual 
Property Office, 2013) <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf > accessed 
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algorithm itself.  As such, business method patents are often accused 
to grant a too broad patent protection, thereby increasing the risk of 
overlapping among patents. Hence, uncertainties are likely to happen 
in the technological area of business methods. Especially, concerns 
arise about the practice of well-know firms to filing a large amount of 
business method patent applications, given the risk of creating un-
certainty to be used to strengthen the market position of large 
companies to the detriment of start-ups.  
 
In Chapter VIII, however, it has been made clear that it is commonly 
believed that coordination among patent holders can reduce or even 
solve the patent thickets issue. Cross-licensing or patent pools, in 
particular, are indicated as useful means in improving coordination. 
As such, mutual licensing agreement can encourage the sharing of 
knowledge and information among firms, with the positive effect of 
clearing uncertainties. Made the case of a firms that owns a patents 
about processing data to manage margin brokerage and another firm 
that has obtain patent protection for a system that covers some as-
pects of the customer dealing instruction related to the same margin 
brokerage management. In point of fact, each firm could block the 
other threating infringement action. As such, hold-up and cost in-
creasing could easily result. However, reaching a cross- licensing 
agreement could allow both firms to exploit and implement the mar-
gin-brokerage management system. 76  Thus, mutual-licensing 
agreements can be helpful and, perhaps indispensable, for ensuring 
efficiencies in the market and encouraging the spur of innovation, 
thereby promoting competition and consumer welfare. Given it, mu-
tual licensing agreements are boosted in Europe  (and in the US, too), 
as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Nevertheless, the risk exists that mutual agreements are put in place 
for with strategic reasons, ultimately amplified the same ill effects of 
																																																								
76  LB Allen, ‘The Patentability of Computer Programs: Merrill Lynch's Patent for a Fi-
nancial Services System’ (1983) 59 Ind. LJ 633  
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patent thickets and ultimately affecting competition. As WIPO 
stressed, referring to cross licensing:  
 
‘limitations in licensing agreements, such as territorial limita-
tions or limitations as to the field of use, may be pro-
competitive under certain circumstances’, though ‘a competi-
tion law concern may arise if a licensing agreement contains 
restraints that adversely affect competition among entities 
that would have been competitors in the relevant market in 
the absence of the license’.77  
 
In such a case, the beneficial effect of a coordinate patent exploitation 
could be not only reduced, but also eliminated. In particular, the hy-
pothesis can be done of a player in the market of business method 
patents that negotiates a cross-licensing agreement to share the use 
of some technologies. Using the umbrella of the EU competition law, 
which encourage this type of contracts, some restriction on competi-
tion could be allowed in the agreement, but what happens when 
restrictions are used to strengthen the position in the market? In our 
hypothesis, one party could use the uncertainty created by patent 
thickets, and the threat of legal actions to force the other firm to pay 
high royalties or to produce only a limited amount of output. Ulti-
mately, market inefficiencies would result, as already discussed in 
Chapter VII. Additionally, detrimental effect on competition can be 
created, thereby discouraging new players to enter the market of 
business methods. All this considered, it is essential to investigate 
whether mutual licensing agreements are caught by Article 101 (1) 
TFEU even thought they are reached to solve ill effects of patent 
thickets. For this purpose, the following sections are mainly aimed to 
analyse patent thicket behaviours, i.e. hold-up, tacit collusion and 
raising rivals’ price scheme, from the point of view of the TTBER and 
																																																								
77  WIPO, Standing Committee on the Law of Patent, Transfer Of Technology 
(SCP/14/4, 2009) < 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_14/scp_14_4.pdf> accessed 7th Au-
gust 2017, 128. 
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the TT Guidelines. All this to investigate on what extent mutual li-
censing agreements can solve market inefficiencies created by patent 
thickets without undermine or weaken competition in the market.      
 
With regard to the analysis of the TTBER and the TT Guidelines, which 
will be performed in the next sections, some comments are needed. It 
has made clear in the first section of this Chapter that the European 
Commission’s proceedings ex Article 101 TFEU could be brought either 
to investigate the anti competitive effects of an agreements ex article 
101 (1) or its pro –competitive effects ex Article 101 (3). In particular, 
the TTBER and the TT Guidelines serve the purpose of clarify what 
agreements can be caught by Article 101 (3), thereby identifying licens-
ing agreements to be exempted from the Commission assessment ex 
Article 101(1). However, the two assessments, i.e. the one ex Article 
101(1) and the other Article 101(3), are the two side of the same coin. 
Thus, the analysis of the TTBER and, in particular, the examination of 
the TT Guidelines can offer useful information also about how the Eu-
ropean Commission will act in the antitrust assessment regarding 
mutual licensing agreements that fall out of the TTBER umbrella.  
 
On the other hand, the importance of the analysis is not diminished be-
cause of the different enforceability of the TTBER and the TT 
Guidelines. In particular, the TTBER establishes a set of rules immedi-
ately applicable in all Member State, i.e. enforceable by rivals too, 
defining what technology transfer agreements are exempt from the anti-
trust assessment; instead, the role of the TT Guidelines is to provide 
criterion that the Commissions has to take into consideration in per-
forming the assessment ex Article 101 (3) TFEU, regarding not only the 
exempted agreements but all licensing agreements. Indeed, the TT 
Guidelines bind only the European Commission; other EU or national 
institutions, and even the CJEU can interpret the TTBER without prej-
udice of the TT Guidelines. Nevertheless, the TT Guidelines could have a 
great deal of influence in practice. In point of fact, it is the Commission 
that generally brings proceedings ex Article 101 TFEU and the Commis-
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sion has to conduct the assessment according the Guidelines. Thus, the 
TT Guidelines ultimately operate like a law, at least until a court de-
cides otherwise. Therefore, the indications provided by the TT 
Guidelines on mutual licensing agreements are utmost important to 
understand whether the patent thicket ill effects are caught by article 
101 (1) TFEU.  
 
4.1 Clauses resulting in “raising rivals’ cost scheme” or 
“hold-up”  
 
One of the main concern related to patent thickets, as discussed in 
Chapter VII, is the possibility that patent holders can use the uncer-
tainty intentionally created around the boundaries of their patents to 
force rivals or downstream firms to license a bundle of patents, which 
are not all necessary to implement a process or a method. Similarly, 
the uncertainty produced by patent thickets can be used to increase 
apprehensions about possible infringements, ultimately forced firms 
to accepted high royalties. This could be the case when a patent is 
needed to implement a specific technology (blocking patent); thus, 
firms, which want to enter that market or are already involved in the 
market, could accept to pay high royalties to license blocking patents 
and to avoid any risk of infringements. Most obviously, high royalties 
ultimately influence the final cost of service or products in such a 
way that competitors and newcomers are discouraged to enter the 
market or are forced to leave it. In the following subsections, some 
clauses that can be used to create “hold-up” or “raising rivals’ costs 
scheme” will be analyzed together with the solution offered by the EU 
Competition law.   
 
a. Running royalties 
When the amount of the royalties to be paid is linked to the number 
of product sale or - taking the example of the margin-brokerage man-
agement system – to the share transactions, royalties are called 
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“running royalties”.78 The contract term providing running royalties is 
carefully considered, given the risk of resulting in a “raising rivals’ 
costs scheme”.79  Indeed, the rate of the royalty affects directly the 
cost of each unit of output, when parties agree on running royalties; 
thus, the final price of the product is inevitably affected, with conse-
quences on the consumer welfare. Given this, inefficiencies in the 
market can easily occur when running royalties are provided. Fur-
thermore, running royalties can revealed some unbalanced positions 
between the parties. In particular, firms that play a significant role in 
the market, i.e. blocking-patent holders, are facilitated to pressure 
other market players to accept running royalties. In such cases, 
downstream firms that want to remain in the market are forced to in-
crease final product prices or to reduce their final output. 80  
Nevertheless, it is also possible that firms can decide to leave the 
market. Especially, small firms, which cannot bear high costs, could 
find more effective to leave the market than to stay with low profits.  
 
The TT Guidelines frames the issue in para 100, referring the practice 
of running royalties to those that can be caught by Article 4 (1) (a) 
TTBER. In particular, the TT Guidelines highlight the reduction in 
competition, especially resulting when running royalties are applied 
reciprocally to cross licensing between competitors.81 Therefore, tech-
nology transfer agreements between competitors that include running 
royalties are out of the TTBER safe harbor. Nevertheless, parties can 
prove the pro-competitive effect of the agreement, even if a running 
royalty clause is included. In that case, the agreement is considered 
valid.82  Similarly, referring to licensing agreements falling outside 
TTBER, it is pointed out in para 185 that  
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79 Shapiro (75) 130 
80 ML Katz, C Shapiro, ‘On the licensing of innovations’ (1985) The RAND Journal of 
Economics 504 
81 Text to n. 78  
82 Ibid.  
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It is a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(a) if competitors 
provide for reciprocal running royalties in circumstances 
where the licence is a sham, in that its purpose is not to allow 
an integration of complementary technologies or to achieve 
another pro-competitive aim.  
 
Hence, it is stated in para 186 that Article 101 TFEU can be applied 
to cross licensing between competitors that exceed the threshold of 
the safe harbour, when running royalties result in fixing prices that 
significantly affect competition in the market. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that running royalties schemes are generally kept under 
review by the Commission, according to the effects on the final prices 
and ultimately on competition in the market. Thus, it does not give 
rise to concerns the possibility that firms, which have gained blocking 
positions by patent thicket behaviours, could force rivals to cross- li-
censing agreements applying running royalties schemes. Indeed, 
these clauses will be always caught by Article 101 (1) TFEU, when 
their ill effects are not balancing by pro competitive effects, i.e. tech-
nology integration or implementation.  
 
b. “All product sales” royalties 
 
As pointed out by the European Court of Justice,83 costs of final 
product incorporating a licensed technology can increase more than 
expected when licensors are forced into agreements that fixed royal-
ties on the basis of quantity of product sold, irrespective of whether 
the licensed technology is used. Taking the example of the margin-
brokerage management system, this would be happen when royalties 
are fixed considering the number of customers accessing the system 
irrespective if they use the specific service related to the patented 
technology.  This type of licensing are identified as “all product sales 
royalty” agreements because firms agree to pay royalties for all prod-
ucts or services sold, irrespective of the fact that their own competing 
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technology or a third party technology are implemented in the prod-
uct or service sold.  Clearly, when these type of clauses are included 
in a licensing agreement firms’ costs are considerable affected. As a 
consequence, firms can decide to stop manufacturing a product or 
employing a method or, even not to enter a specific market, consider-
ing the significant amount of royalties that it can imply. Reducing in 
competition, therefore, has been highlighted as a possible result when 
licensees are asked to pay royalties not only on products or services 
implementing the licensed technology, but also extended to products 
or services implementing their own competing technology or with a 
third party technology.84   
 
The Court’s concern has been endorsed by the Commission. In the TT 
Guidelines it is taken into account the possibility that parties adopt 
an “all product sale” royalty scheme. According to para 101, these 
schemes can be caught by both Article 4 (1) (a) and 4 (1) (d), when 
apply to cross licensing between competitors because 
 
In general such agreements restrict competition since the 
agreement raises the cost of using the licensee's own compet-
ing technology rights and restricts competition that existed in 
the absence of the agreement  
  
However, according to the following para 102 TT Guidelines, parties 
can prove that this type of royalty plan is indispensable to generate 
pro-competitive effects, though objective evidences need to be provid-
ed.85 This may be the case when it is proved that otherwise it would 
be impossible or unduly difficult to calculate and monitor the royalty 
payable by the licensee, for instance because the licensor's technolo-
gy leaves no visible trace on the final product and practicable 
alternative monitoring methods are unavailable. Equally, it seems 
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Publishing 2014) 348  
85  See also TT Guidelines (9) para 188   
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that the Article 101 (3) requirements can be met also regarding no-
competitor cross licensing falling outside TTBER when ‘there is no 
other practical way of calculating and monitoring royalty payments’.86 
Hence, a favorable balance towards pro – competitive effects is 
deemed possible even when cross licensing among no competitors ex-
ceed the TTBER thresholds, insofar as the coordinate use of patents 
allowed by an “all product sales” royalty scheme does not result in an 
appreciable foreclosure of the market.87 According to the EU competi-
tion law, therefore, an accurate assessment ex Article 101 (3) needs 
to be made when firms agree on “all product sales” royalty schemes. 
Thus conceived, the possible antitrust risks pointed out refereeing to  
“all product sales” royalties, i.e. reducing in competition due cost to 
cost raising, can be controlled even when this practice is engaged by 
cross licensing in patent thickets.   
 
c. Disproportionate royalties  
 
In patent thicket areas, firms tend to settle patent litigation accepting 
to pay royalties that are greater than could be justified by the market 
value of patents.88 This hold-up effect is typical, for example, when a 
firm with a relevant position in the market is under the threat of a 
potential entrant, which claims the ownership or the validity of a key 
patent for a specific technology. In such a case, parties could reach 
an agreement that provide on the payment of royalties higher than 
patent values. In particular, incumbents tend to settle those types of 
cases out of the court by agreeing on settlement terms that are more 
profitable for competitors than to enter the market itself. However, 
these settlement agreements eventually result in inefficiency in the 
market. The monopolistic level of output and the monopolistic price 
																																																								
86 TT Guidelines (9) para 188 
87 TT Guidelines (9) para 188 referring to criteria in para 229 to assess the ease of 
third party  entry “ depends not only on the availability of licensees but also the extent 
to which they have access to distribution”  
88 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ (2005) 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 91-92   
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are, indeed, maintained. 89Ultimately, consumers will suffer for high 
prices and cuts in the product choice.90 Nevertheless, hold-up effects 
can occur also in competitive market. For example, firms can agree 
on excessive royalties persuaded by the threat to be sued for in-
fringement even when more firms are already active in the same 
market. In point of fact, uncertainty on patent validity as well as on 
litigation costs make more profitable to pay substantial royalties, in-
stead of bearing costs for switching toward a different product.91 
Therefore, disproportionate royalties are agreed in this scenario as a 
lesser evil. 
   
Both the scenarios described above are considered in the TT Guide-
lines. In particular, disproportioned royalties are deemed to fall under 
the hardcore restrictions when applied to a cross licensing agreement 
between competitors, unless the parties do not reach the TTBER 
threshold.92 Additionally, settlement agreements can be caught by Ar-
ticle 101 (1) TFEU when royalties are so high that firms are impede to 
fully exploit their inventions93 or product final costs are significantly 
impacted.94 However, para 186 TT Guidelines clarifies that  
 
In assessing whether the royalties are disproportionate it is 
necessary to examine the royalties paid by other licensees on 
the product market for the same or substitute technologies. In 
such cases it is unlikely that the conditions of Article 101(3) 
are satisfied.  
  
Therefore, hold-up practices that result in disproportionate royalties 
are effectively tackled by the EU competition law. As such, hold-up ef-
fects can be controlled even when patent thickets are put in place. 
																																																								
89 Lemley, Shapiro (88) 92 
90 TT Guidelines (9) para 186 
91 J Farrell, C Shapiro, ‘How strong are weak patents?’  (2008) 98 The American Eco-
nomic Review  (2008) 1347, 1361  
92 TT Guidelines (9) para 186 
93 Ibid. para 240 
94 Ibid. para 241 
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Nevertheless, doubts have been casted on the extent of the assess-
ment that can be conducted by the Commission ex Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. Ultimately, disproportionate royalties are among those clauses 
included in the safe harbor, when cross licensing is reached by com-
petitors with a joint market share lees than 20%.95 Nevertheless, 
such scenarios, i.e. agreements between firms that represent less 
than 20% of the market, are not those where patent thickets tend to 
occur.    
 
4.2 Clauses resulting in tacit collusion  
 
Competition should increase in the market, when more than one firm 
hold patents related to an innovative process and the new technology 
can be implemented by several firms at the same time.96 In such cas-
es, prices tend to be low, with beneficial effects for consumers. 
However, patent holders might decide to conclude cross-licensing 
agreements to pursue some market strategies. In particular, scholars 
have suggested that cross-licensing agreements can be used to tacti-
cally organize firms’ activities, i.e. to impede that product prices 
decrease or output quantities increase. Thus, mutual-licensing 
agreements can be ultimately reached to prevent the outbreak of a 
price war which is likely when large quantities of similar products are 
placed simultaneous on the market and rivals can decided to reduce 
prices to gain market share. Such a scenario is possible when patent 
thickets take place especially with regard to digital technologies. In 
digital areas, as usual in other cumulative technologies, more firms 
are often involved in the same technology or in similar technologies, 
given the ease in copying or developing similar inventions. This im-
plies that firms usually work on products and services that are 
																																																								
95 DS Jeon, Y Lefouili, Cross-Licensing and Competition  (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
DP10941, 2015) 23  
96 Federal Trade Commission of United States, Competition Policy in the New High-Tech 
Global Marketplace. Vol. I  (FTC Staff Report 1996) 
 <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/anticipating-21st-century-
competition-policy-new-high-tech-global-marketplace/gc_v1.pdf >accessed 7th August 
2017, 6; Guidelines (9) para 163  
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similar and firms tend to serve the same market or subsidiary mar-
ket, when digital technologies are involved. 97   In this kind of 
scenario, firms can be facilitated in knowing each other strategy. 
Consequently, it is possible that  “similar views on the terms of coor-
dination” can be shared among competitors, when patent thicket 
practises are developed in digital technologies. 98 Indeed, parties can 
tacitly agree to keep prices high or quantities low in order to avoid 
hurting each other. As a result of mutual patent agreements, there-
fore, competition can be tactically reduced when patent thicket 
behaviours are developed in digital technologies. The TBBER and the 
TT Guidelines try to deal with some of the ill effects created by these 
collusive behaviours, especially between competitors.  
 
 a. Price fixing  
 
Price fixing can result when parties agree on the exact price to sell 
the final product that implements the licensed technology.99 Price fix-
ing can also occur when parties decided for a certain royalty rate that 
is arranged consistently with margins or maximum level of discounts; 
thus, prices are indirectly controlled.100 Moreover, collusive behaviors 
can emerge when parties agree on measures to identify price cutting, 
i.e. establishing a price monitoring system or imposing obligations on 
licensees to report price deviations, because of the control ultimately 
achieved on the price trend.101 Nevertheless, fixing price terms are 
caught by art 101 TFEU, irrespective of the fact that the control of fi-
nal prices is gained directly and indirectly. Indeed, Article 4 TTBER 
includes fixing price clauses into the hard-core restrictions to the 
competition. However, a different legal framework is provided accord-
ing to the relationship between the parties. For instance, a 
contractual term, which fixes a minimum amount of royalties to be 
																																																								
97 MA Lemley, C Shapiro, ‘Patent holdup and royalty stacking’ (2006) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1991, 2025  
98 TT Guidelines (9) para 171  
99 TT Guidelines (9) para 99  
100  TT Guidelines (9) para 118 
101 Ibid.  
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paid, does not always “in itself amount to price fixing”, when provided 
in a cross-licensing agreement between competitors. 102 Similarly, a 
more detailed analysis is required to verify if “the agreement is devoid 
of any pro-competitive purpose”,103 when competitors fix a low fringe 
in the royalty amount.  
 
Case by case antitrust assessment is also conducted on non-
competitor cross-licensing agreements, when parties agree, for exam-
ple on a list of recommended prices or on a list of maximum prices.104 
Indeed, the TT Guidelines suggest that these scenarios are completely 
different from those where parties agree on clauses that result in fix-
ing or minimum prices.105 Indeed, a recommended maximum price 
list can be crucial to encourage newcomers to enter the market when 
it is particularly costly or risky to implement a new technology.106 
Thus, restrictions on competition that result from clauses applying 
recommended sale prices are ultimately allowed, whereby balanced 
with pro competitive effects, such as increasing in consumer choices 
or starting up of new markets.  
 
Nevertheless, doubts continue to be raised on maximum price claus-
es. Recently, the Commission’s New Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
have clarified that clauses providing a list of recommended maximum 
prices could ultimately affect competition. In particular, a fixed max-
imum price can become a focal point for the resellers and the 
suppliers that can find difficult to deviate from a price proposed by 
important supplier or seller on the market. Therefore, under such cir-
cumstances the practice of imposing a maximum resale price or 
																																																								
102 TT Guidelines (9) para 99  
103 Ibid. para 100 
104 Ibid. para118 
105 Ibid.  
106 MA Lemley, ‘Ten things to do about patent holdup of standards (and one not to)’ 
(2007) 48 BCL Rev. 149,159 . 
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recommending a resale price may infringe Article 101 TFEU, if it 
leads to a uniform price level.107  
 
All this considered, it can be concluded that fixing price clauses are 
generally considered among those affecting competition when provid-
ed in licensing agreements. Indeed, there is not TTBER safe harbor 
for this type of clauses, unless parties provide evidences of pro-
competitive effects. Additionally, fixing price is also clearly castigated, 
when included in mutual licensing agreements that fall outside the 
TTBER. Especially, it is the case of technology pools “composed solely 
or predominantly of substitute technologies”, whereby clauses result 
in establishing a fixing price cartel among the parties of the patent 
pool.108 In conclusion, there are no doubts that the EU competition 
law provides an adequate legal framework capable of dealing with 
price fixing practices. Thus, unless pro competitive effects are proved, 
fixing price is always castigated and this would be true even when 
these clauses are provided in mutual licensing agreements reached 
between firms involved in patent thickets.  
 
b. Market-sharing agreements  
 
           b.1 Exclusive clauses 
 
Exclusive clauses are usually provided in licensing agreements in or-
der to allow licenses to be the only to exploit the licensed technology 
in a particular territory or for a particular use.109 These clauses are 
perfectly legal; however, problems arise from exclusive clauses in-
cluded in cross-licensing agreements between competitors. 110 Firms, 
for example, can agree on reciprocate exclusive clauses when they 
have relevant positions in market of substitutive goods or services. It 
																																																								
107 Commission Notice on the Guidelines on vertical restraints [2010] OJ C 130, para 
227- 228 
108 TT Guidelines (9) para 246 
109 TT Guidelines (9) para 190 
110 Ibid.  
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can be the case when two or more banks offer similar financial deriv-
atives. In such a case, banks can reach an agreement based on 
exclusive clauses related to types of consumers (for example, firms 
and individuals) or territories, thereby easily resulting in market 
sharing. As such, exclusive clauses can facilitate collusion on outputs 
to be put in the market regarding each of the substitutable products, 
ultimately impede rivals to enter. 111  Further, reciprocal exclusive 
clauses can lead parties to arrange to ‘where they may sell products 
incorporating the licensed technology’, whereby their positions will be 
strengthen and rivals will be ultimately discouraged to enter the mar-
ket. 112  Similarly, tacit collusions on the market allocation can result 
when competitors agree on a reciprocal sole licensing clauses, i.e. 
clauses that provide only limitation on licensing to third parties to 
produce within a given territory. All this considered, licensing agree-
ments between competitors including exclusive or reciprocal sole 
licensing clauses are caught by art 101 TFEU. Nevertheless, the 
Commission recognizes the importance of a case-by-case analysis ac-
cording to the economic approach, finally embraced by the recent 
formulations of the TTBER (the 2004 and the 2014 version).113  
 
According to the TT Guidelines, the assessment ex Article 101(3) 
TFUE of those agreements providing exclusive clauses has to taken 
account of several features such as the nature of the agreement, the 
market position of parties and competitors, the existence of entry 
barriers and the maturity of the market.114 As such, the TT Guide-
lines mainly recall the four cumulative conditions defined in the 
 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on hori-
zontal agreements. According to those Guidelines firms are asked to 
prove that the are fulfilled so that contracts 1) provide pro-
competitive efficiencies (cost efficiencies or qualitative efficiencies) 2) 
grant consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits in the form of a 
																																																								
111 Ibid. para192 
112 Ibid. para 191 
113 Ibid. para192  
114 Ibid. para 159 
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wider variety of products based on the same technology or of cheaper 
products, 3) parties can prove that they continue to be a competitive 
force with regard to their own technology, thus that the contract do 
not allow market allocation 4) the contract is indispensable  since 
without the exclusivity clause the parties may refrain from licensing if 
the other party is able to grant licenses to other market partici-
pants. 115  Only when all these conditions are completely fulfilled, 
exclusive clauses can be legally included in cross- licensing between 
competitors that falls under the TTBER. 
 
A particular attention is paid when non-reciprocal exclusive licensing 
clauses are included in cross licensing agreements between competi-
tors.116 In such cases, the licensor should abstain from producing 
goods and services in the territory in question or worse licensor 
should leaves the market, if the exclusive licensing is worldwide. 
Hence, exclusive clauses can have detrimentally affect licensor posi-
tions in the market.117 According to the TT Guidelines, Article 101 
TFEU can be applied to these agreements, unless exclusive clauses 
regard small territories or no significant portion of the market. In par-
ticular, non-reciprocal exclusive licensing are considered in the in 
safe harbour of the TTBER, when evidences are given that reductions 
on competition do not occur and exclusiveness is essential to incen-
tive the technology implementation.118 For example, exclusive clauses 
are allowed when a large investment is needed to develop the licensed 
technology. In such a case, exclusive clauses can ensure licensees to 
recoup the investment. This is specifically true when exclusive claus-
es are agreed between non-competitors. 119  Therefore, exclusive 
clauses will encouraged licensees not only to efficiently exploit the in-
vention, but also to implement the licensed technology when a large 
																																																								
115 Guidelines on horizontal agreements (35) para 49  
116 TT Guidelines (9) para 98 (“A non-reciprocal agreement is an agreement where only 
one of the parties is licensing its technology rights to the other party or where, in the 
case of cross licensing, the licensed technologies rights are not competing technologies 
and the rights licensed cannot be used for the production of competing products”) 
117 Ibid. 193 
118 Ibid.  
119 Ibid. para 194  
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investment is necessary. As such, beneficial effects on technology 
dissemination, innovation and ultimately on competition can result 
when exclusive clauses are agreed.120  
 
To sum up, exclusive clauses are thought to produce beneficial effects 
in the following cases: a) an exclusive patent licensing agreement may 
produce pro-competitive efficiencies where the licensee combines the 
licensor’s technology with its own knowledge and assets, leading to 
improved products that are advantageous for consumers, b) exclusivi-
ty can be indispensable when a license would not occur in its 
absence because the licensee is unwilling or unable to make signifi-
cant investments in the production process due to fears of 
competition from a very strong licensor or other licensees, thus ex-
clusivity creates pro-competitive efficiencies as it leads to a 
dissemination of valuable technologies; d) the exclusive license may 
also be indispensable in cases where the licensee is not willing to un-
dertake significant investments to adapt his production facilities to 
produce under the license due to fear of competition from the strong 
licensor, who can use the same technology without royalty burdens; 
e) an exclusive license serves as a necessary inducement for the li-
censee to invest in the licensed technology and to bring the products 
to market in a timely manner.121  
 
            b.2 Sale restriction clauses  
 
In cross licensing agreements, parties can include clauses that pro-
vide restriction on the sales of products incorporating the licensed 
technology with regard to a given territory (territorial sales re-
strictions) or to a given customer group (customer restrictions).122 
																																																								
120 Ibid.   
121 S Fina, AM Baumgartner, A Comparative Antitrust Analysis of Exclusivity Clauses in 
Patent Licenses Under Article 101 TFEU and Section 1 Sherman Act, (TTLF Working Pa-
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When business method patents are involved, for example, a re-
striction on sale can result in restriction on service supplying with 
regard a certain territory or customer group. However, restrictions on 
sales can result in market sharing, specifically when applied to a 
non-reciprocal cross licensing agreement between competitors. 123 
These types of clauses are, indeed, listed in the Article 4 TTBER 
among the hardcore restrictions; thus, cross licensing agreements 
that include sale restrictions fall out of the safer harbour provided by 
the TTBER. Nevertheless, the TT Guidelines highlights the possibility 
that sale restrictions can facilitate the increase of consumer welfare; 
especially, it could happen when restrictions on sale according to a 
specific territory or a specific group of costumers can secure the im-
plementation of valuable technologies, which are costly to be started 
up.124 In such cases, pre-competitive effects can overcome the ill ef-
fect of sale restrictions. For example, it can occur when the licensor 
has a relatively weak position in the territory and the risk of facing 
competition would discourage him to disseminate the technology. 
Similarly, restrictions on active sales do not fall under the umbrella of 
hard-core restrictions when the licensee has a relatively weak market 
position in the territory that is allocated to it and huge investments 
are needed in order to efficiently exploit the licensed technology.125  
 
Additionally, sale restrictions are not caught by Article 101 (1) TFEU, 
when they are applied in cross licensing between non-competitors.126 
Nevertheless, restrictions on active and passive sales that applies to 
one or both parties in cross licensing agreements can result in 
asymmetric positions in the market; thus, the dissemination of valu-
able technologies is ultimately deterred, thereby impeding the 
development of new or better products.127 According to the TT Guide-
lines, therefore, the Commission will assess also non-competitor 
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cross licensing agreements including sale restriction, that in theory 
meets all requirements of the TTBER safe-harbour. Equally, particu-
lar attention is paid to sale restrictions when they are included in 
mutual agreements that fall outside of the TTBER. Hence, effects of 
sale restriction clauses are assessed whether applied in cross licens-
ing that fall under the TTBER or outside the block exemption 
regulation. However, an economic – based approach is suggested in 
the TT Guidelines; thus, a certain flexibility is provided to verify the 
extent of the pre -competitive effects produced by a sale restriction 
clause included in a mutual licensing agreement. Both the position in 
the market and possible barriers to entry need to be taken into con-
sideration.  
 
Ultimately, requirements of Article 101 (3) are considered to be met 
when evidences are given that the licensing agreements would not 
have taken place without including sales restriction terms. For exam-
ples, sale restrictions are considered crucial to encourage licensees to 
invest in the production, marketing, and sale of the products incorpo-
rating the licensed technology. Especially, licensee’s incentive to 
invest could be significantly reduced whether licensee has to face di-
rect competition from the licensor. Indeed, licensors have clear 
advantages in the market due to the fact that costs are not burdened 
with royalty payments.128 Additionally, for examples, sale restriction 
clauses can be used to prevent free riding and to motivate the licen-
see to undertake the investment necessary for the efficient 
exploitation of the licensed technology inside its territory and to pro-
mote sales of the licensed product.129 Therefore, according to the EU 
competition law, mutual licensing including sale restriction clauses 
can be exempted from antitrust assessment when these clauses are 
considered of great importance in reaching the agreement and evi-
dences are provided about their beneficial effects in improving 
competition and consumer welfare.  
																																																								
128 Ibid. para 202 




All this considered, hence, there are not doubts that EU competition 
law can efficiently intercept cases in which mutual licensing agree-
ments can produce market sharing effects. Indeed, the risk of tacit 
collusion is deemed greatest when patent thicket behaviours are de-
veloped. The proximity between big players in the market is high 
probable as well as the opportunity to coordinate their actions; thus, 
either exclusive clauses or sale restrictions can been agreed with the 
strategic purpose of avoiding reciprocal market interferences and 
strengthening market positions, thereby raising barrier to impede ri-
vals to enter the market. Nevertheless, the opportunity to conduct an 
assessment ex art 101(1) TFEU is widely provided by the EU competi-
tion law, when these types of clauses are included not only in cross 
licensing agreements, but also in patent pools. Hence, any concerns 
about reductions on competition can been dismissed with regard to 
the possibility that firms could take advantages of proximity generate 
by patent thickets to achieve market sharing, including either exclu-
sive or sale reduction clauses in mutual licensing agreements.  
 
5. Some conclusions 
 
One of the major concerns about granting patent protection to busi-
ness method patents is related, as discussed in Chapter V, to the 
possibility that these patents could be used strategically. Empirical 
studies have demonstrated that firms interested in business methods 
tend to file a significant number of patent applications. As such, pa-
tent thickets are likely to occur, as it usually happens when 
inventions are cumulative. The quantitative analysis performed in 
this thesis has confirmed, to some extent, that firms active in the cat-
egory G06Q at the EPO show a certain strategic attitude toward 
patents. In particular, a significantly high number of patent applica-
tions, as well as strong relationships between firms in the network of 
citations, have been found in the category G06Q. Hence, it cannot be 
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excluded that business method patents could be used to create ineffi-
cacies, ultimately affecting competition in the European market. 
 
Hold-up effects, tacit collusion and increasing in rivals’ costs are of-
ten indicated to be the common results of patent thickets. As such, 
these effects can probably appear when business method patents are 
used strategically to reduce competition. However, the EU Competi-
tion law, namely the TTBER and the TT Guidelines, seems to be 
already familiar with these issues. An informed approach towards the 
possible strategic use of patents has been developed. In particular, 
attention is paid to licensing agreements, specifically the mutual 
ones, which are the usual means to achieve foreclosing of the market 
to rivals. As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, mutual 
licensing agreements can be strategically used. On this purpose some 
contractual terms, such as exclusive clauses and fixing prices or 
running royalties clauses, could be included in order to generate in-
creasing in rivals’ cost or market sharing.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the last section of the Chapter, the EU 
Competition law provides means to address the issue (the reduction 
of competition due to the strategic use of patents), without affecting 
the positive impact of patents and patent licensing on the economic 
growth and on the spur of innovation. In particular, some of licensing 
agreements are exempted from the application of Article 101 TFEU. 
Others must undergo an assessment. However, the EU framework 
presents a flexible and economic approach, along with the possibility 
of a case-by-case verification. Especially, in balancing pro competitive 
effects of mutual licensing agreement with reduction in competition, 
the European legislation seems to achieve what suggested by 
Shapiro130 in his seminal works, namely a positive attitude towards 
cross licensing and patent pools as a way to get efficiently around pa-
tent thickets. 
																																																								





This conclusion can be applied also to business method patents and 
patent applications at the EPO. Referring to possible strategic uses of 
patents and patent applications in the category G06Q, concerns arise 
because of the existence of relationships among large companies in-
volved in this area. Thus, patent thicketing is considered likely to 
happen as well as the possible use of patent thickets to force rivals 
out of the market, i.e. reaching agreements resulting in raising rivals’ 
costs or excluding rivals from exploiting patents in some territory or 
field of use. Nevertheless, the EU competition law provides effective 
means to deal with these types of agreements. As already discussed, 
an assessment ex art 101 (1) TFEU is likely to be conducted when 
agreements produce such kind of detrimental effects. Thus, also mu-
tual licensing agreements exploiting blocking position put in place in 
business method patent at the EPO are likely be caught by Article 
101 TFEU. In particular, the analysis of the TTBER and the TT 
Guidelines has corroborated this finding.  Not only most of the con-
tract clauses potentially producing ill- effects fall out of the TTBER 
umbrella, but also mutual licensing agreements between large firms 
tend to be assessed ex article 101 (1) by the European Commission, 
as revealed by the TT Guidelines. Hence, there is non-significant risk 
of a strategic use of patents resulting in reducing competition in the 
European business method patent area. As such, the objections 
posed in Europe to patenting business methods cannot be justified by 
the need to avoid patent thicket phenomena, because the current leg-






Both the empirical and the theoretical analysis presented in the thesis 
have supported the evidence that business method patents and patent 
applications are a remarkable phenomenon in Europe, with more than 
34,000 patent applications filed over the last 20 years. Furthermore, the 
quantitative analysis conducted in this research, namely in Chapter IV 
and in Chapter VI, has demonstrated that most of the well-known firms 
in the IT and financial industry are involved in the phenomenon of 
business method patents. Besides, the investigation of the network of 
citations among firms has suggested that strategic purposes could ex-
plain to some extent the popularity of business method inventions at 
the EPO.  
When computer implemented, business methods are based on algo-
rithms and pieces of processes that are already well known. Hence, 
innovation in this technological area is usually the result of small pieces 
of inventions, often already patented, that are combined to build a non-
obvious method. As such, business methods are usually presented as a 
classical example of cumulative inventions. However, a patent crowd 
overlapping all around a specific technology is the key point not only of 
cumulative inventions but also of patents thickets. Thus, concerns on 
the possible growth of patent thicketing are commonly associated with 
business method patents.  
Referring to the findings of the empirical research provided in the the-
sis, a tendency to patent overlap has been revealed in category G06Q at 
the EPO. As results of the analysis suggested, therefore, it cannot be 
excluded that patent thickets could be strategically built in the context 
of European business method patents. In such a case, uncertainty on 
the real extent of patent protection could be used to create inefficiencies 
in the market. In particular, hold-up effects, as well as “raising costs” 
effects, could result when business-method patent holders decide to not 
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cooperate in the exploitation and implementation of their cumulative in-
ventions.  
As demonstrated in the well-know example of “zinc and brass’’ proposed 
by Cournot, 131 cooperative behaviours could be the most effective solu-
tion to this kind of inefficiencies. As such, mutual licensing not only 
secures an efficient exploitation of the resources, but also assures high-
er revenues for firms. Hence, hold-ups and other detrimental effects can 
be cleared by mutual licensing agreements, especially by cross-licensing 
agreements, so far as patent holders decide to share their knowledge 
and to fully exploit their own patents, without risks of infringements.  
However, cooperative behaviors can result in collusive practices. Thus, 
mutual-licensing agreements could be used to emphasize inefficiencies, 
instead of neutralizing them. Ultimately, mutual licensing, especially 
cross-licensing, could result in magnifying the detrimental effects of pa-
tent thicketing, including elimination or reduction of competition in the 
market. Suggestions have been provided that reducing or even eliminat-
ing competition could be the firms’ reason to seek patent protection for 
business methods in Europe. Admittedly, concerns on possible strategic 
uses, together with the lack of a specific piece of legislation, have gener-
ated increasing hostility toward business method patents.  
Nevertheless, this thesis demonstrated that both the EPC and the Eu-
ropean competition law have all the means necessary to define the 
boundaries of business method patentability and to efficiently contrast 
possible detrimental effects on competition, if business method patents 
and patent applications were to be used to create patent thickets. All 
this, therefore, seems to confirm that an adequate legal framework al-
ready exists in Europe with regard to business method patents. 
On the one hand, as described in the first three chapters of this thesis, 
the EPO Boards of Appeal’s case law has finally made clear that busi-
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ness methods are not patentable in Europe, unless the method is com-
puter-implemented and the inventive step results in a technical feature. 
In particular, both Article 52 and Article 56 EPC have been applied ac-
cordingly to the principle of the “technical consideration”, which 
permeates the European Patent Conventions. Therefore, consistent in-
dication has been ultimately provided by the EPO Enlarged Board of 
Appeal on the extent of patent protection to be granted to business 
methods in Europe.  
On the other hand, the European competition law provides a specific set 
of rules regarding the interface of Article 101 TFEU and IP rights, there-
by reducing the risk that patents and patent applications were used 
strategically to prevent or lessen competition. As discussed in the last 
three chapters of the thesis, licensing agreements, specifically mutual 
licensing agreements relative to business method patents and patent 
applications, are castigated when the terms on using the patents in-
cluded in the agreement went beyond the mere protection of IP into 
controlling the market and impeding rivals to enter. However, not only 
most of the contract clauses potentially producing ill effects fall out of 
the TTBER umbrella, but also mutual licensing agreements between 
large firms tend to be assessed ex article 101 (1) by the European 
Commission, as revealed by the TT Guidelines. 
Hence, there is a non-significant risk that a strategic use of patents can 
result in reducing competition in the European business method patent 
area. As such, the difficulties posed in Europe to patenting business 
methods cannot be justified by the need to avoid patent thickets, be-
cause the current legislation offers a proper set of rules capable of 
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